



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____)	
)	Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)
IN RE:)	
GUANTANAMO BAY)	Civil Action No.
DETAINEE LITIGATION)	06-cv-1767 (RMU)
)	
)	
_____)	

FACTUAL RETURN





Respondents hereby submit, as explained herein, a factual return pertaining to the petitioner identified as the subject of the attached Narrative. This return sets forth factual bases¹ supporting petitioner's lawful, ongoing detention pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force and the President's power as Commander in Chief.

Dated: November 24, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

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Assistant Attorney General

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¹ Respondents reserve the right to seek leave to further supplement the record with additional factual bases supporting petitioner's detention, as necessary.



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IN RE:
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Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH)

Civil Action No.
06-cv-1767 (RMU)

DECLARATION OF REAR ADMIRAL DAVID THOMAS

Declaration of Rear Admiral David M. Thomas, Jr.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, David M. Thomas, Jr., hereby declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief, the following is true, accurate, and correct:

I am a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy, with 31 years of active duty service. I currently serve as Commander, Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. I have held this position since 27 May 2008. As such, I am directly responsible for the successful execution of the JTF-GTMO mission to conduct detention and interrogation operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism, coordinate and implement detainee screening operations, and support law enforcement and war crimes investigations.

The attached narrative and supporting materials from files of the Department of Defense or other government agencies contain information used by the Department of Defense to establish the status of the individual who is the subject of the narrative as an enemy combatant and to substantiate their detention as an enemy combatant at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Dated:



DAVID M. THOMAS, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____)	
MASHOUR ABDULLAH MUQBEL AL-SABRI,)	
)	
Petitioner,)	
)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)
)	
GEORGE WALKER BUSH <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
Respondents.)	
_____)	

NARRATIVE FOR PETITIONER MASHOUR ABDULLAH MUQBEL AL-SABRI
(ISN 324)

Introduction

1. Mashour Abdullah Abdullah al-Sabri is a member of al-Qaida. He was an al-Qaida guesthouse facilitator and has ties to Usama Bin Laden. Sabri lived with the al-Qaida cell that planned the attack on the USS COLE and went to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban.

2. Consequently, Sabri is lawfully subject to detention pursuant to, *inter alia*, the President's power as Commander in Chief and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. 115 Stat. 224 (2001).

3. In the materials discussed herein relating to the factual basis for Sabri's detention and the assessment that he is a properly detained enemy combatant, there are documents reflecting interviews with him and others conducted by law enforcement and intelligence personnel, as well as information derived from other sources and methods. Information received from these sources is commonly reproduced in reports created by the collecting officer. Such information is also commonly analyzed by intelligence or law enforcement personnel and used to produce other intelligence products. These reports and intelligence products are routinely relied

[REDACTED]

upon by military or intelligence personnel in making decisions to act upon threats to our national security. Declaration of ^{D3} [REDACTED] on Intelligence 101; Declaration of Robert H. Holmes.

4. The following narrative and attached materials set forth the factual bases supporting Sabri's detention. This narrative is not intended to be a complete explication of the information in support of Sabri's detention in those materials.

5. As with all detained enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Sabri has been assigned an Internment Serial Number, or ISN. The ISN is an administrative code assigned to military detainees. Sabri's full ISN is ^{b(2)} [REDACTED]-000324^{b(2)} in which the number "324" is Sabri's unique identifier and the ^{b(2)} [REDACTED] designation indicates that he is a national of ^{b(1)} [REDACTED]. Source documents attached as exhibits to this Declaration may refer to Sabri by name, full ISN, or various short forms, such as "^{b(2)} [REDACTED]-000324" or "ISN 324."

6. It is common for those engaged in terrorist activities to use an alias, commonly known in Arabic as a *kunya*. Declaration of ^{D3} [REDACTED] on Names, Aliases, Kunyas and Variants. Sabri's *kunyas* include Salman al-Makki, Abu Abdullah, and Mashour. ^{A2} [REDACTED] ISN ^{A2} [REDACTED] CITF (June 8, 2004); ISN 324 FD 302 (Feb. 21, 2002).

General Background

7. Al-Qaida ("the Base") was founded by Usama bin Laden and others in or about 1989 for the purpose of opposing certain governments and officials with force and violence. Nat'l Comm'n On Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, The 9/11 Commission Report 56 (2004) (9/11 Commission Report). Usama bin Laden is recognized as the Emir (prince or leader) of al-Qaida. Id. A purpose or goal of al-Qaida, as stated by Usama bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders, is to support violent attacks against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of

[REDACTED]



the United States and other countries. Id. at 59-61.

8. Between 1989 and 2001, al-Qaida established training camps, guesthouses, and business operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries for the purpose of training and supporting violent attacks against property and nationals (both military and civilian) of the United States and other countries. Id. at 64-67.

9. In 1996, Usama bin Laden issued a public “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans.” This declaration called for the murder of U.S. military personnel serving on the Arabian peninsula. Id. at 48.

10. In February 1998, Usama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri (bin Laden’s deputy) issued a *fatwa* (purported religious ruling) requiring all Muslims able to do so to kill Americans - whether civilian or military - anywhere in the world. Id. at 47.

11. Since 1989, members and associates of al-Qaida, known and unknown, have carried out numerous terrorist attacks, including, but not limited to: the attacks against the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, which killed approximately 250 people, id. at 68-70; the attack against the USS COLE in October 2000, which killed 17 United States Navy sailors, id. at 190-93; and the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, which killed approximately 3,000 people. Id. passim.

12. The Taliban (students of Islamic knowledge) is an Islamic fundamentalist group that was formed in Afghanistan in 1994. The Taliban in Afghanistan, available at www.cfc.org/publication/10551. After two years of violent conflict that included the capture of Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan’s national government in 1996. 9/11 Commission Report at 65. Although it was never formally recognized by the United States, id. at 124, the Taliban controlled Afghanistan’s national government from 1996 until the




United States-led military campaign ousted the Taliban from power in 2001. Id. at 337-38. During the period in which the Taliban controlled Afghanistan's national government, it provided safe harbor and support to al-Qaida and Usama bin Laden. Id. at 64-67.

13. On September 18, 2001, following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Congress adopted the Authorization for the Use of Military Force. 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Recognizing that the attacks of September 11, 2001 "render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens at home and abroad," Congress authorized the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons." Within weeks, United States military forces were deployed in Afghanistan. 9/11 Commission Report at 337.

14. The United States led the initial aerial bombing campaign of Afghanistan, with ground forces composed of United States forces and Afghanistan militia opposed to the Taliban, including the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance is an association of Afghan groups opposed to the Taliban. The Northern Alliance has assisted the United States in its military campaign in Afghanistan to defeat al-Qaida and the Taliban. Id. at 330-34; 336-38.

15. In December 2001, the United States-led military campaign removed the Taliban from control of Afghanistan's national government. Id. at 337-38. Taliban and al-Qaida forces, however, have continued to operate in Afghanistan and attack coalition forces. Currently, two major military operations are underway in Afghanistan. First, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is a multinational coalition military operation, led by the United States, initiated in



[REDACTED]

October 2001 to counter terrorism and bring security to Afghanistan in collaboration with Afghan forces. See www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/60083.htm. OEF operations led to the collapse of the Taliban government and helped bring security and stability to Afghanistan. *Id.* OEF involves troops from over 20 nations, including about 19,000 United States forces and about 3,000 non-United States troops. *Id.* Second, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a United Nations-mandated international coalition operating under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See www.nato.int/isaf/index.html. ISAF was established in 2002 with the goal of creating conditions for stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan. ISAF is comprised of approximately 50,000 troops from 40 countries. *Id.*

Sabri was deported from Saudi Arabia for criminal activity

16. Sabri was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in 1978.¹ Both of Sabri's parents were born in Yemen, and Sabri claims Yemini citizenship. Sabri lived in Mabdah, Saudi Arabia, until 1990, when he moved to Mecca. Sabri dropped out of school in the ninth grade. After quitting school, Sabri worked as a taxi driver. ISN 324 FD302 (Feb. 21, 2002).

17. In 1997, Sabri met [REDACTED] at the Holy Mosque in Mecca. [REDACTED] was a criminal who forged passports. [REDACTED] spent one hour in Sabri's house, where he had a meeting with two other men.² Six months after meeting [REDACTED] Sabri was arrested for harboring a fugitive. Sabri claimed he did not know [REDACTED] was a criminal. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002).

18. Sabri was incarcerated for 1 ½ months. The government of Saudi Arabia then deported Sabri to Yemen, his country of citizenship. Sabri relocated to Taiz, Yemen, where he met [REDACTED] at the local mosque. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002). [REDACTED] was a

¹ Sabri gives only his Islamic calendar date of birth: the 15th day of the 4th month of 1370. This translates to March 24, 1978. See www.islamonline.net/calculator.

² In a separate interview, Sabri said [REDACTED] stayed a few days at his house. ISN 324 FD302 (Feb. 21, 2002).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

member of the Taliban and had fought in Afghanistan. ISN 324 FD302 (Feb. 21, 2002). [REDACTED] told Sabri that he should start a honey-trading business. Sabri agreed and sold honey for five or six months. He then went to San'a, Yemen, to try to get a Saudi visa to return home. The Saudi government refused to give Sabri a visa until he produced papers proving he was a Saudi citizen. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002).

19. Unable to return to Saudi Arabia, Sabri went to live with his uncle, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] taught his nephew how to use an AK-47 and a pistol. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002).

20. Sabri rented a house in San'a where he lived with several other men. Among those living in the house were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002); ISN 324 FD302 (July 2, 2003).

In Yemen Sabri trained in the use of weapons, was involved in criminal activity, and

[REDACTED]

21. Sabri [REDACTED] b(1), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED] b(1), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED] b(1), b(6) [REDACTED] b(1), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED] trained in the Khalden camp in Afghanistan. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002). While not an al-Qaida-run camp, the facility had an agreement with bin Laden to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts. Graduates of the Khalden camp were offered membership in al-Qaida. Declaration of [REDACTED] D3 [REDACTED] on training camps.

23. Several of the men living in the house were involved in an automobile theft ring. The Yemeni police raided the house in May 1999 and arrested the men. ISN 324 FD302 (July

[REDACTED]

18, 2002). Sabri provided two different motives for the auto theft ring, which he claimed to be unaware of until after he was arrested. Under one motive, the cars would be sold and the profits used to buy weapons, which would then be used to free an individual named [REDACTED] from prison. [REDACTED] had been convicted of murdering four German tourists. [REDACTED] abducted the tourists to use as a bargaining chip to gain the release of an imprisoned sheik. Sabri also offered a second motive for the auto theft ring, where the stolen cars were to be used to kidnap tourists. These tourists would then be used to gain release of [REDACTED] and the sheik. ISN 324 FD302 (Feb. 21, 2002).

24. Sabri was released in January 2000 after spending nine months in jail. Sabri has denied knowing that his roommates were stealing cars or planning a terrorist attack against the United States. ISN 324 FD302 (Feb. 21, 2002).

Sabri traveled to Afghanistan, staying at two al-Qaida guesthouses

25. In January 2000, [REDACTED] suggested Sabri should go to Afghanistan to find work. Sabri also said he was encouraged to travel to Afghanistan by the *fatwahs* issued by Islamic clerics to go fight for the Taliban. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002). In separate interviews, Sabri stated he went to Afghanistan to find a wife³ and simply to visit. ISN 324 FD302 (Feb. 21, 2002); ISN 324 FD302 (June 2, 2003). [REDACTED] A6 [REDACTED] ISN A2 [REDACTED] said Sabri traveled to Afghanistan to avoid being arrested again by Yemeni authorities.⁴ ISN A2 [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 15, 2005).

26. In August 2000, Sabri and three others left Yemen for Quetta, Pakistan. In

³ Sabri speaks only Arabic. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002). The main languages of Afghanistan are Dari and Pashtu. See www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/5380.htm. Sabri did not explain why he would go to a country where he does not speak the language to look for a wife.

⁴ As discussed *infra*, Sabri is a member of al-Qaida. While [REDACTED] A6 [REDACTED] confirmed Sabri was at the Hajji Habbash guesthouse, he denied Sabri was an al-Qaida member. ISN A2 [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 15, 2005).

[REDACTED]

Quetta, Sabri stayed at the Daftare Taliban, a Taliban office that helps Arabs cross into Afghanistan. C2 [REDACTED]. Sabri traveled from Quetta to Kandahar, where he stayed at the Hajji Habash guesthouse. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Al-Farouq was al-Qaida's primary Afghanistan training facility. Declaration of D3 [REDACTED] on Training Camps. D1 [REDACTED]

D1 [REDACTED]

D1 [REDACTED]

D1 [REDACTED] Declaration of D3 [REDACTED] on Guesthouses.

27. From Kandahar, Sabri continued on to Jalalabad, Afghanistan. He was advised to wait until someone else from Hajji Habash guesthouse went. According to Sabri, [REDACTED] a Moroccan, accompanied him to Jalalabad. ISN 324 FD 302 (May 24, 2002). b(1), b(6) Sabri

b(1), b(6) [REDACTED] Sabri b(1) [REDACTED]

b(1) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED]

28. In Jalalabad, Sabri met [REDACTED] was a friend of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ISN 324 FD302 (July 18, 2002). Sabri and [REDACTED] became close friends, and [REDACTED] arranged for Sabri to marry his sister-in-law.⁵ ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002).

29. Sabri lived with [REDACTED] for one year. The only details Sabri provided about his activities during this year were that he went hunting with [REDACTED] and accompanied him to various mosques giving out money. ISN 324 FD302 (July 17, 2002).

⁵ Sabri claims he was arrested before the marriage could occur.

[REDACTED]

30. Sabri also met an arms dealer named [REDACTED] in Jalalabad. Sabri bought a sawed-off pistol from [REDACTED] for protection approximately three months before September 11, 2001. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002).

31. While in Jalalabad, Sabri learned his former roommate died attacking the USS COLE. Sabri tells two different stories about how he learned this. In one version, [REDACTED] learned of the attack at the market and told Sabri upon returning home. In another version, [REDACTED] came to Jalalabad to buy weapons. [REDACTED] came to see Sabri and informed him that [REDACTED] had been a suicide bomber. ISN 324 FD302 (July 17, 2002).

Sabri goes to fight for the Taliban

32. In May 2001, Sabri went to the Taliban's second line of defense near Bagram. ISN 324 FD302 (July 17, 2002). Sabri [REDACTED] b(1) [REDACTED] b(1) Sabri [REDACTED] b(1) [REDACTED] b(1) [REDACTED] b(2) Sabri said he became bored because there was no fighting and returned to Jalalabad. ISN 324 FD302 (July 17, 2002).

Sabri was arrested with [REDACTED]

33. After Kabul fell to the United States, Sabri tried to escape to Peshwar, Pakistan, with two other Arabs and an Afghani guide. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002). [REDACTED] b(1), b(6) [REDACTED] b(1), b(6) Sabri [REDACTED] b(1), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED] The Afghani guide told the men they would likely be arrested at the border, so Sabri turned himself in. ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002).

[REDACTED]

Sabri is a member of al-Qaida

34. Although Sabri denies being a member of al-Qaida,⁶ this is contradicted by several other individuals. A6 [REDACTED] ISN A2 [REDACTED] identified Sabri as a member of al-Qaida.⁷ A6 [REDACTED] stated that around May 2001, Sabri worked at the Hajji Habbash and Nibras guesthouses. New fighters traveled to the Hajji Habbash guesthouse, while Nibras was reserved for experienced fighters and higher officials. Sabri helped transport people from the guesthouse to the airport. On one occasion, Sabri helped A6 [REDACTED] get to the market. Many of the individuals staying at the guesthouses came from the al-Farouq training camp. ISN A2 [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 10, 2005). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

35. Sabri helped the guesthouse residents find weapons. According to A6 [REDACTED] Sabri had a friend who was an arms dealer. The men needed the weapons because they had to turn in their assigned weapons when not fighting. ISN A2 [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 10, 2005).

36. A6 [REDACTED] said Sabri also worked at the Nibras guesthouse. According to A6 [REDACTED] if Sabri denied knowing about the Nibras guesthouse, it was because Nibras was a VIP

⁶ See, e.g., ISN 324 FD302 (July 2, 2003); ISN 324 FD 302 (July 17, 2002); ISN 324 FD302 (May 24, 2002); b(2) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED]

⁷ The author of a Department of Defense Criminal Investigation Task Force (DOD/CITF) memorandum commented in describing A6 [REDACTED] A2 [REDACTED] statement with respect to another detainee that his credibility was in question with interrogators. DOD/CITF Memorandum (May 14, 2004). b(1), b(2), b(5), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

house and Sabri did not want anyone to know of his association with it. ISN^{A2} [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 10, 2005).

37. Sabri was well respected at the guesthouses. ^{A6} [REDACTED] said this was because Sabri was an administrator, had his own room, was able to travel without obtaining permission, was at the guesthouse for a long time, and was respected by the guards. Sabri frequently carried messages or took people places. ISN^{A2} [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 10, 2005).

38. Sabri and ^{A6} [REDACTED] carried large sums of money to the Kandahar airport for Usama bin Laden. ^{A6} [REDACTED] knew this because he was in the same jail cell as ^{A6} [REDACTED] in Pakistan. Specifically, ^{A6} [REDACTED] stated he and Sabri carried \$10,000 U.S. currency and 20,000 Saudi Riyals from the Hajji Habbash guesthouse to the Kandahar airport, and then to a hospital. ^{A6} [REDACTED] and Sabri were going to give the money to bin Laden in Kuhat, Afghanistan, but were unable to do so because the war had started. ISN^{A2} [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 10, 2005). ^{b(1)} [REDACTED]

^{b(1)} [REDACTED]

^{b(1)} [REDACTED] ^{b(2)} [REDACTED]

39. Sabri worked for bin Laden. Sabri facilitated the transfer of weapons and supplies to the frontlines. ISN^{A2} [REDACTED] FM40 (Nov. 9, 2004). ^{A6} [REDACTED] also saw Sabri with ^{A6} [REDACTED] in Tora Bora in September, 2001. ^{A6} [REDACTED] explained that when bin Laden returned from Tora Bora to the Hajji Habbash guesthouse, Sabri also returned. ^{A6} [REDACTED] also stated that while he was at Tora Bora, he saw Sabri wearing the commonly issued al-Qaida military vest and carrying a Kalashnikov. ISN^{A2} [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 10, 2005).

40. While ^{A6} [REDACTED] did not personally witness it, he believed Sabri swore loyalty to bin Laden because he knew bin Laden's travel dates and routes. ISN^{A2} [REDACTED] CITF (Feb. 10, 2005).

41. Another detainee, ^{A6} [REDACTED] ISN^{A2} [REDACTED], saw Sabri at an al-Qaida

[REDACTED]

guesthouse in Kandahar. He also saw Sabri at a bin Laden compound. ISN [REDACTED] A2 CITF (Dec. 3, 2002).

42. Additionally, [REDACTED] A6, ISN [REDACTED] A2 saw Sabri, whom he knew as Mashour or Salman, at the al-Ansar guesthouse in Kandahar. ISN [REDACTED] A2 CITF (June 8, 2004). Al-Ansar was a name assigned to multiple suspicious guesthouses, but most references to al-Ansar describe guesthouses in Kabul or Kandahar. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] D3 [REDACTED]

43. [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) Sabri [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)
[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) Sabri [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)
Sabri [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) Sabri's [REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)
[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)
[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)
[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6)
[REDACTED] b(1), b(2), b(6) [REDACTED] b(2)

44. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] b(1) Sabri [REDACTED] b(1)
[REDACTED] b(1) [REDACTED] b(2)

Conclusion

46. For the reasons described above and in the attached exhibits, among others, Sabri is lawfully detained by the United States.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)	
)	
Petitioner,)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)
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GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)	
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Respondents.)	

EXHIBIT LIST FOR ISN 324

Declaration of **D3** re: Intelligence 101
 Declaration of **[REDACTED]** on Names, Aliases,
 Kuyas and Variants
 Declaration of Robert H. Holmes
 Declaration of **D3** on Guesthouses
 Declaration of **[REDACTED]** on Training Camps

ISN 324 FD-302 (Feb. 21, 2002)
 ISN 324 FD-302 (May 24, 2002)
 ISN 324 FD-302 (July 17, 2002)
 ISN 324 FD-302 (July 18, 2002)
 ISN **[REDACTED]** FD-302 (Feb. 21, 2003)
 ISN 324 FD-302 (June 2, 2003)
 ISN 324 FD-302 (July 2, 2003)

ISN **A2** CITF (Dec. 3, 2002)
 ISN **A2** CITF (June 8, 2004)
 ISN **A2** CITF (Nov. 9, 2004)
 ISN **A2** CITF (Feb. 10, 2005)
 ISN **A2** CITF (Feb. 15, 2005)

b(2)
[REDACTED]

C2
 IIR 4 201 0851 05
 b(2)
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CITF Memorandum (May 14, 2004)

b(2) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)


Petitioner,)
v.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)

Respondents.)

Declaration of 
On Intelligence 101



[REDACTED]



Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration— Intelligence 101

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-633-08/JTI-3A

19 September 2008

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

(U) I, [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

[REDACTED]

(U) Intelligence

(U) Intelligence is information essential to the security of the United States and U.S. interests, especially information that is not easily, readily, or publicly known. This information is collected in a variety of ways by different members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The type of intelligence gathered is identified by the method in which it was collected. The five main types of intelligence are:

- (U) **HUMINT**- Human Intelligence, information derived from a person(s)
- (U) **SIGINT**- Signals Intelligence, information derived from foreign electromagnetic signals transmitted for the purposes of communication
- (U) **IMINT**- Imagery Intelligence, information derived from photographs and other types of imagery.
- (U) **MASINT**- Measure and Signatures Intelligence, information derived from sensors.

[REDACTED]

- (U) **OSINT**- Open Source Intelligence, information that is derived from public sources such as news media.

(U) Intelligence gathered using these methods is classified to protect the sources and methods used by the IC. The level of classification depends on how sensitive the information is and the impact the release of the information would have to U.S. National Security.


- (U) **Confidential**- Release of Confidential information could reasonably be expected to cause *damage* to U.S. National Security
- (U) **Secret**- Release of Secret information could reasonably be expected to cause *serious damage* to U.S. National Security
- (U) **Top Secret**- Release of Top Secret information could reasonably be expected to cause *exceptionally grave damage* to U.S. National Security.

(U) In addition to these classifications, intelligence may be further restricted with a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) caveat. In order to gain access to SCI material, a person must be "read-on" to the program that sponsors the collection of that material, reading a description of the uniquely sensitive nature of the protected information and signing a commitment to be held accountable for the program's security. SCI information is dependent on specific methods of collection; therefore, release of that information would compromise U.S. intelligence collection sources and methods.

(U) **The Intelligence Community (IC)**

(U) The IC is defined as a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for advising foreign relations and protecting the national security of the United States. Such activities include:

- (U) Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security Council and the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
- (U) Production, analysis and dissemination of finished intelligence assessments;
- (U) Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against intelligence activities directed against the U.S. by foreign powers, organizations, and their agents, as well as by international terrorists, narcotics traffickers or other hostile foreign elements;
- (U) Administrative and other support activities within the United States and abroad for the performance of authorized activities; and
- (U) Other intelligence activities as directed by the President.



(U) The threats to the United States that the IC works to mitigate take several forms. In addition to military threats that challenged the community in the past, other transnational problems exist: terrorism, proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials to

[REDACTED]

potentially hostile elements, information infrastructure attacks, narcotics trafficking and foreign intelligence penetrations of sensitive programs.

(U) IC Members

(U) The IC comprises 17 organizations, led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Each member of the IC has its own expertise, mission, and area of responsibility. However, the IC collaborates in various forums, from informal communications, to joint interagency task forces. As of Executive Order 12333, July 2008, the community includes the following organizations:

- (U) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
- (U) The Central Intelligence Agency;
- (U) The National Security Agency;
- (U) The Defense Intelligence Agency;
- (U) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
- (U) The National Reconnaissance Office;
- (U) The other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
- (U) The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps;
- (U) The intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
- (U) The Office of National Security Intelligence of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
- (U) The Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy;
- (U) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
- (U) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury;
- (U) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of Homeland Security;
- (U) The intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Coast Guard; and
- (U) Such other elements of any department or agency as may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the Director and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the Intelligence Community.


(U) Although several offices of federal agencies are members of the IC, the agency itself may not be a member of the IC. For example, the Department of Justice (DoJ) as an entity is not a member of the IC; however, the intelligence elements of the FBI and the DEA, which fall under the DoJ, are members of the Community.

(U) The Intelligence Cycle

(U) The intelligence cycle drives the day-to-day activities of the IC. It is the process of developing raw information into finished products for use by the President, military, policy

makers, law enforcement or other decision makers for National Security purposes. There are five steps in the Intelligence Cycle:

- Planning
- Collection
- Processing
- Analysis and Production
- Dissemination



(U) Planning

(U) The planning stage is the process of identifying intelligence gaps or topics of intelligence interest, prioritizing intelligence needs, and assigning the appropriate organization to obtain that intelligence. It is the beginning and the end of the cycle—the beginning because it involves drawing up specific collection requirements and the end because finished intelligence, which supports policy decisions, generates new requirements.

(U) The whole process depends on guidance from public officials. Policy makers—the President, his aides, the National Security Council, and other major departments and agencies of government—initiate requests for intelligence. At the national level, the result of the planning process is the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF).

(U) The NIPF

(U) The NIPF is the Director of National Intelligence's guidance to the IC on the national intelligence priorities approved by the President. The NIPF consists of: (1) intelligence topics reviewed by the National Security Council Principals Committee and approved by the President, (2) a process for assigning priorities to countries and non-state actors relevant to the approved intelligence topics, and (3) a matrix showing those priorities. The NIPF matrix reflects customers' priorities for intelligence support and ensures that long-term intelligence issues are addressed.

(U) The Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis (DDN/A), on behalf of the DNI, oversees the process for developing recommendations on national intelligence priorities. DDN/A updates the NIPF semi-annually in coordination with IC elements, the National Intelligence Council, designated Mission Managers, and the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Requirements (DDN/PPR) and Collection (DDN/C). Ad hoc adjustments may be made to reflect changes in world events and policy priorities.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Collection

(U) Once intelligence requirements are assigned to the appropriate organization based on their collection assets and mission, the IC begins, or continues, to gather information to satisfy those requirements. The collection specialties of the IC members are as follows:

- (U) HUMINT- CIA, DIA, Military Services
- (U) SIGINT- NSA, Military Services
- (U) IMINT- NGA, NRO, Military Services
- (U) MASINT- DIA, Military Services
- (U) OSINT- Open Source Center (under ODNI)

(U) Processing

(U) Once intelligence is collected, it is typically processed by analysts at the collecting agency who determine its relevance to existing validated requirements. This involves converting the vast amount of collected information to a form usable by analysts through decryption, language translations, and data reduction. This data or "raw" intelligence reporting is then reported electronically or in printed form to customers and to the all-source analytic organizations throughout the IC.

(U) Analysis and Production

(U) The analysis and production step, which occurs at intelligence production centers throughout the IC, includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing all available data to determine topics of interest to IC customers. Analysts consider the information's reliability, validity, and relevance to standing requirements. They integrate data from multiple sources into a coherent whole and form judgments about its collective meaning. The result is finished intelligence assessments intended to inform policy makers of the implications of the information. All-source analysis may be performed on topics of long-term interest and broad scope, or topics pertaining to ongoing events of immediate interest to policy makers.

(U) Dissemination

(U) Dissemination is the final step in the intelligence cycle. In this step, finished intelligence is communicated to the intelligence consumer, to include those decision makers whose needs initiated the intelligence requirements. The most highly protected finished intelligence is hand-carried daily to the President and key national security advisers. However, most finished intelligence products are stored in computer data banks that allow consumers to retrieve them electronically as needed. The IC constantly strives to disseminate its products in a manner and form that best suits its consumers. Where necessary, it will tailor support to meet the needs of individual users. The recipients of finished intelligence products then make decisions based on

[REDACTED]

the information. These decisions may lead to the levying of more requirements, thus triggering the intelligence cycle.

(U) Intelligence Reports

(U) All-source analysts utilize a variety of "raw" intelligence reports to write finished intelligence (FINNTEL) products. Many of these reports are placed into various databases that analysts regularly access. The accessibility of these reports depends on their classification; in some cases, reports may not be available to all analysts in the community. Reports disseminated into the reports databases are referred to as "message traffic." Some examples of reports by the different agencies are listed below.

(U) DoD Human Intelligence Reports

- (U) **Intelligence Information Report (IIR)**. The IIR is the main DoD reporting vehicle for the HUMINT information used by DIA and military services. It is the only report listed here that is broadly available in message traffic. DIA, as the proponent for these reports, has also issued reported numbers to a number of executive branch departments and offices. These include;

- Department of Commerce
- Department of Energy
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- Department of Justice
- Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
- Department of State, U.S. Aid to International Development
- Department of the Treasury
- Drug Enforcement Administration
- Federal Bureau of Investigation
- Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), DHS
- National Infrastructure Protection Center
- National Reconnaissance Office
- U.S. Coast Guard
- U.S. Secret Service

- **Tactical Interrogation Report (TIR)**, [REDACTED]

- **Field Intelligence Report (FIR)**, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- **Draft Intelligence Information Report (DIIR):** [REDACTED]
- **Summary Interrogation Report (SIR):** [REDACTED]

(U) CIA Intelligence Reports

[REDACTED]

(U) NSA Intelligence Reports

(U) NSA intelligence reports are most commonly issued as EGRAMs, electronically transmitted reports that convey only one issue or event. They are distinguished by an alphanumeric serial number. Additional handling instructions may accompany the serial to provide additional safeguards or to protect sensitive, fragile, and/or perishable sources and methods. Access to SIGINT reporting, in addition, requires approval for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.

(U) Law Enforcement Forms

- (U) Field Document (FD 302)- FBI agents fill out this to summarize an interview. This form contains the notes from the interview on the information that is collected. The forms are often used in court as evidence.
- (U) Form 40 (FM40)- The Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) uses this form to record investigation activity, such as witness interviews, lab results, fingerprint analysis, results of modeling, research results and suspect interviews. This form is used to record information relevant to how a crime was committed as well as the logical and factual basis for any deductions about guilt. CITF conducts investigations of war crimes and to determine if any persons captured in the War of Terrorism are responsible. CITF prepares cases according to the Military Commissions Act for trial by a military tribunal for war crimes and/or acts of terrorism.

(U) Intelligence Analysis

(U) Intelligence analysis is the process of dissecting and compiling ambiguous information to determine a truth. Intelligence analysts undergo rigorous tradecraft training. Analysts use various methods and employ specific analytical tools to assist them in sorting and organizing the


various pieces of information. Analysts are trained to recognize and mitigate biases, not only in the information presented to them, but their own cognitive biases as well. The DNI issued the Directive for Analyst Standards in 2007, to ensure that all intelligence analysts in the IC use the same standards of excellence, integrity and objectivity in their assessments.

(U) Analysis: Building an Analytic Argument

- 1. Establish a baseline assessment:** What do we know is going on, what do we think is going on, and what do not we know that we need to figure out?
- 2. Vet new information for consistency with the baseline.** Is it in the ballpark of the baseline? Does it say the same thing or does it reveal new developments? Does it add new details about something we already know? Does it say something outlandish or contradictory to reports from sources that are more reliable?
- 3. Revise your baseline as necessary to accommodate new information.** If there is contradictory reporting of equally good quality, acknowledge this and explore ways it might be reconciled. If there are no good sources or reports with which to establish a reliable baseline, acknowledge the weakness of the reporting and make your best estimate.
- 4. Follow-up information gaps as they become apparent.** Learn about and task collection resources as appropriate across the IC to generate new information. Work closely with collectors whenever possible.

(U) Evaluating Sources

(U) Intelligence analysts must consider the source of intelligence while reading intelligence reports. Several factors help determine the credibility of a HUMINT source, most importantly placement and access to the information, and the motivation for reporting. Much like informant reports received by law enforcement official, HUMINT sources are carefully screened and subsequently rated on their reliability, both on the source themselves and the information provided. Intelligence reports include a source line that gives a description of the source and their assessed credibility by the reporting officer. Further, the analyst uses this information in their overall assessment of the intelligence provided and how it relates to other available intelligence on the same problem set.

- 
- (U) Source's motivation (inform or influence)
 - (U) (U) Wittingness of the source, and their knowledge that the U.S. government will receive the information provided
2. A context statement which provides details regarding the circumstances in which the source obtained information in the report. .

(U) Intelligence analysts take additional steps to determine source reliability, including:

- (U) Verification of intelligence by other means
 - > Other HUMINT sources
 - > Historical reporting
 - > Other intelligence disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, etc)
 - > Review of captured documents and electronic media
- (U) Collaboration of intelligence from other members of the Community
- (U) In some cases, a HUMINT source may be polygraphed

(U) Interrogators are trained to recognize non-verbal cues from the source that will help them determine the credibility of the information provided. Interrogators are also trained to take cultural dynamics to understand the unique psychological issues dealing with sources based on cultural norms. This provides the collectors and interrogators additional insights into deceptive behaviors.

(U) SIGINT, and more specifically communications intelligence (COMINT), is derived from the exploitation of cryptographic systems or other protected sources through the application of specific methods or techniques. In general, SIGINT reporting is deemed reliable since the information comes directly from the communicant(s). However, the information may be deliberately misleading if the communicants suspect they are being monitored and deliberately give false information, or they may be deceptive with the individuals they are communicating with, or they may have a history of providing inaccurate information.

(U) Before a finished intelligence product is disseminated, it goes through a rigorous coordination process, both in the producing organization and with peers throughout the IC. The coordination process ensures there is a consensus on the assessment, and any credibility issues are addressed.

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.



Enclosures:

1. Appendix A, (U) Special Regulations and Designations for Terrorists
2. Appendix B, ICT NIPF Counterterrorism Priorities, June 2008



3. Appendix C, NIPF CT Priorities Terrorist Support Entities June 2008



[REDACTED]

Appendix A, (U) Special Regulations and Designations for Terrorists

(U) Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)

(U) Executive Order 13224, empowers the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to place both groups and individuals on the Specially Designated Global Terrorist list, which defines terrorism as: an activity that 1. involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure; and 2. appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage taking. This also includes any activity that provides financial, material, or technological support to acts of terrorism or entities designated in or under the Order.

(U) Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)

(U) A Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is a foreign organization designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

(U) The Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out and whether that group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

(U) After a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary's intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. After the expiration of the seven-day waiting period and in the absence of Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. By law, an organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.

(U) Until recently, the INA provided that FTOs must be re-designated every two years or the designation would lapse. Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), however, the re-designation requirement was replaced by certain review and revocation procedures. IRTPA provides that an FTO may file a petition for revocation 2 years after its designation date (or in the case of re-designated FTOs, its most recent re-designation date) or 2 years after the determination date on its most recent petition for revocation. In order to provide a basis for revocation, the petitioning FTO must provide evidence that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation are sufficiently different as to warrant revocation. If no such review has been conducted during a five-year period with respect to a designation, then the

[REDACTED]

Secretary of State is required to review the designation to determine whether revocation would be appropriate. In addition, the Secretary of State may at any time revoke a designation upon a finding that the circumstances forming the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations. A designation may be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.

(U) Legal Criteria for Designation

(U) Under Section 219 of the INA, as amended:

- (U) 1. It must be a foreign organization.
- (U) 2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
- (U) 3. The organization's terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

(U) Legal Ramifications of Designation

- (U) 1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as "any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(2) provides that for these purposes "the term 'training' means instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge." 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(3) further provides that for these purposes the term 'expert advice or assistance' means advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge."
- (U) 2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
- (U) 3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.


(U) Other Effects of Designation

- (U) 1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and encourages other nations to do the same.

- (U) 2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.
- (U) 3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.
- (U) 4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.
- (U) 5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.

(U) Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group
3. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
4. Al-Shabaab
5. Ansar al-Islam
6. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
7. Asbat al-Ansar
8. Aum Shinrikyo
9. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
10. Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA)
11. Continuity Irish Republican Army
12. Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
13. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
14. Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
15. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
16. Hizballah (Party of God)
17. Islamic Jihad Group
18. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
19. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)
20. Jemaah Islamiya organization (JI)
21. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
22. Kahane Chai (Kach)
23. Kongra-Gel (KKG, formerly Kurdistan Workers' Party, PKK, KADEK)
24. Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
25. Lashkar i Jhangvi
26. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
27. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)

- 
28. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
 29. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
 30. National Liberation Army (ELN)
 31. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
 32. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
 33. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
 34. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
 35. al-Qaida (al-Qa'ida)
 36. al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly GSPC)
 37. Real IRA
 38. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
 39. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
 40. Revolutionary Organization 17 November
 41. Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
 42. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
 43. Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR) (al-Qaida in Iraq) (formerly Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al-Jihad, JJI, al-Zarqawi Network)
 44. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

[REDACTED]

Appendix B, Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism NIPF Counterterrorism Priorities,
June 2008

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

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
Appendix C, NIPF CT Priorities Terrorist Support Entities June 2008

(U) Priority 1:



(U) Priority 2:

Definition:



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Priority 3:

Definition:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) Priority 4:

Definition:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(D) Priority 5:

Definition:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Terrorist Training Camps

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

[REDACTED]

19 September 2008

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

(U) I, [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) **Afghan Training Camps: 1989 - 2001**

(U) **Overview:**

[REDACTED]

(U) **Camp Breakdowns**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Al-Qaida Camps

[REDACTED]

(U) Al-Faraq Training Camps

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- (S/NT) [REDACTED]

2
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) According to The 9/11 Commission Report at least seven of the 9/11 hijackers who provided "muscle" for the attacks went through a basic training regime at the al-Faruq camp, and one of the pilots, Hani Hanjour, was identified for inclusion in the plot while training at al-Faruq. The Commission concluded this particular camp appears to have been the preferred location for vetting and training the potential muscle hijackers because of its proximity to Usama Bin Ladin and other al-Qaida senior leaders.

[REDACTED]

(U) Mes Aynak

[REDACTED]

(U) Tarnak Farms aka Abu Obeida Training Camp

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET//ORCON//NOFORN~~

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

(U) Camps Utilized by al-Qaida and Others

[REDACTED]

(U) Derunta Training Camp Complexes

(U) The Derunta training complex, located 15 miles from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was a set of advanced terrorist training camps offering training in various explosives, poisons, and chemical warfare agents. Coalition forces destroyed the camp in October 2001.

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

(U) Derunta: Curriculum

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Derunta: Students of Abu Khabab al-Masri

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Sada Training Camp

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Khaldan Camp

[REDACTED]

(U) While the Khaldan camp was not an al-Qaida facility, Abu Zubaydah had an agreement with bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts whereby promising trainees at the Khaldan camp that they could join al-Qaida if desired.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Abu Yahya Camp for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,


Petitioner,
v.


Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Declaration of  on
Names, Aliases, Konyms and Variants





Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Names, Aliases, Knyas and Variants
Defense Intelligence Agency

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

S-616-08A/JTA-3B

19 September 2008

The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

I, [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.



(U) Worldwide: Using Names, Aliases, Knyas and Variants

Arab migration and the spread of Islam around the world intermixed with local ethno-linguistic traditions and cultural practices produce regional variations in the way Arabic names are constructed, pronounced and spelled. These variations, along with differences in standards for the transliteration of foreign names by U.S. military, intelligence and law enforcement organizations, present challenges for the collection, reporting, and analysis of intelligence. The lack of a direct correlation between Arabic and Latin alphabets, combined with these complexities, is of particular importance to analysts while in today's Counterterrorism environment. While using aliases and other forms of multiple identities is not unique to these groups, this declaration will limit itself to providing a basic primer on Arabic-related issues to address the detainee population at Guantanamo.





(U) Elements of Arabic Names

(U) Traditionally Arabic names are comprised of five elements: ism, kunya, nasab, laqab, and nisba. This naming convention is widely used by Muslim populations and in countries with significant Muslim influence around the world, although varying depending on the country or region.

- (U) **Ism**- The ism is the proper name given at birth. This part of the name is considered the most personal of the elements. In some areas, it is impolite to call an elder by their ism, yet in other areas; it is common to call people by their ism.
- (U) **Kunya**- The kunya is traditionally an honorific, which denotes that the person is either a mother or father, and is constructed using the name of the first-born son or eldest daughter if the person has no sons. The kunya for a man is Abu, meaning father of, plus the name of the first-born; while Umm is used for women, meaning mother of, with the name of the first-born. For example, Abu Ibrahim means father of Ibrahim. Addressing someone by his or her kunya is a sign of respect.
- (U) In addition, there are several nicknames that use an "Abu" construction, that are not true kunyas. Much like the name Jack is used as a nickname for John, many commonly used kunyas are used as nicknames that do not bear direct resemblance to the given name. For example, Abu Sadeq is a nickname for Jafar, and Abu Ali is a nickname for Hassan.
- (U) Insurgents, radicals and terrorists commonly use kunyas as assumed names or pseudonyms. Kunyas used in this manner are often chosen, or given, without regard to the children's names or regard to whether the individual has children. In this case, using the kunya conceals the individual's identity. Further, it is often used as a security, denial and deception measure. The reasons for an insurgent choosing a certain kunya varies widely. It could be the region they are from such as Zargawi (from Zarqa), Suri (the Syrian), or al-Masri (the Egyptian). It can be derived from the early heroes of Islamic conquest, like Abu Ubaydah, one of three who led expeditions against Byzantium. It can be derived from past historical or Militant Islamist leaders like Abu Azzam, named after the spiritual founder of al-Qaida Abdullah Azzam.
- (U) **Nasab**- The nasab is a pedigree, which denotes the family lineage on the father's side, and can go back several generations. In many countries ibn or bin, is used for males (the son of) and bint for females (the daughter of), while in other countries the names are simply listed in sequence. For example, Hasan ibn Faraj, would mean, Hasan, son of Faraj. Another example using multiple generations would be Hasan ibn Faraj ibn Ahmed ibn Mohammad, meaning Hasan, son of Faraj, who is the son of Ahmed, who is the son of Mohammad. In some regions, that same name may appear as Hasan Faraj Ahmed. A true name usually consists of the ism, nasab and the nisba.



- (U) **Laqab**- The laqab is a combination of words that describe some religious or admirable quality of the person and is used as a secondary name. In some cases, it is used in place of the ism. A common laqab includes one of the 99 names of God and "Abd," or servant of, for example, Abd al Rahman, or servant of the Merciful. There is no such name as "Abdul" in Arabic, even though we commonly see this in English. This is a mis-translation of "Abd," which is followed by the article "al." Laqab can also connote a person's profession like Samir al-Haddad, which means Samir whose family members at one time were blacksmiths. Another popular laqab of course is Hajj or Haji, meaning the person has made their pilgrimage to Mecca, like Hajj Amin al-Flussein.
- (U) **Nisba**- The nisba is another secondary name that describes the occupation, descent, tribe or residence of the person. It can be used in combination with any of the above elements, but will always be the last part of the name. For example, Mohammad al Masri, means Mohammad from Egypt, or using several elements, Mohammad al Husayn ibn Harun al Qaharani means Mohammad the beautiful, son of Aaron, from the Qaharani tribe. The nisba can tell you much of the persons ancestry and geographic origins, for instance al-Zawahiri although from Egypt, comes from the Zawahir clan of the Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia. Ayman al-Zawahiri attempts to bolster his Arab lineage by making these connections.
- (U) The following example uses a title and all five elements of the naming convention: Mullah Mohammad Abu Nasar Abd al Rahman, bin Ibrahim bin Hasan al Makki; Mullah (title) Mohammad (ism) Abu Nasar (kunya) Abd al Rahman (laqab) bin Ibrahim bin Hasan (nasab, 2 generations) al Makki (nisba). This name would translate to the teacher Mohammad, father of Nasar, servant of the Merciful, son of Ibrahim, grandson of Hasan, from Mecca.

(U) Spelling Variants

(U) Because Arabic and English have several letters representing sounds that do not correspond directly, several letters or letter combinations are used interchangeably to represent the same sound. This often generates multiple English spellings representing the same word or name in Arabic. Other differences in practice, such as whether to use double or single consonants to express a single sound, further increase variation. It is common to see intelligence reports referencing an individual with several different name spellings. Although, most organizations have established naming standards for common names, this is not consistent throughout the Intelligence Community (IC) and has changed over time.

- (U) Other spelling variables include capitalization, and the use or non-use of dashes, apostrophes and spaces. In some cases, apostrophes replace a letters that do not translate into English, such as the Arabic letter "ayn," which has a distinct sound not used in English. For example, the name Mohammad has over 20 variations and alternate spellings of al-Qaida include al Qaida, al Qa'ida, and al-Qaeda.
- (U) Some commonly interchanged letters include:
 - K, KH, GH, and Q such as: Kandahar, Khadahar, Ghandahar or Qandahar

- O and U, such as: Mohammad or Muhammad
- A and E, such as: Ahmad, Ahmed
- OO and U, such as: Noor, or Nur

- (U) Some commonly interchanged words and spellings include:
 - Al, Ul and Ur, as in: Mohammad al Rahman, Mohammad ul Rahman or Mohammad ur Rahman
 - ul Din, and Uddin, as in: Nasar ul Din, or Nasaruddin
 - Abd Ul and Abdul, as in: Abd ul Rahman or Abdul Rahamn

(U) Various titles may be added to the beginning of the name, similar to titles used in Western traditions. Although these specific titles are more common in the Arab world, similar titles are used in Afghanistan or Pakistan, from where many fighters are recruited.

- Mullah- Religious leader
- Imam- Religious leader (as in clergy)
- Hajji- Someone who went on a pilgrimage to Mecca
- Shaykh- Title of high respect, usually a leader of some kind (tribal, etc)
- Qari- Someone who can recite the Quran with a specific rhythm
- Qazi/Qadi- Lawyer or judge (on Sharia)
- Ustad- teacher or professor
- Talib- student (Afghan)
- Malim, or Malauwi -- religious leader (Afghani)
- Akhund- lawyer (Afghan)

(U) The challenges of spelling and translating the use of Arab and Muslim influenced names is further complicated for individuals originating from countries with conventions based in other cultural traditions, especially when combined with significant differences in pronunciation as well as the use of other local languages and alphabets.


(U) The source of the reporting can also have a significant impact on how names are spelled. Sources may have a regional dialect, which may complicate the transliteration of the name phonetically, or misunderstanding the name completely. Some reporting originates from foreign sources using different letters to represent Arabic sounds. For example, in Spanish, the "h" is often substituted with "j," thus Mohammad would be spelled "Mojammad." In French North Africa, Sheriof is Cherief.

(U) Aliases

(U) Aliases can take multiple forms, from part of a true name, to a something completely unrelated to the true name. Like a nickname, some aliases are descriptive of physical traits, such as Nasar al Tawil (Nasar the Tall). Aliases can also be just a single word, such as Tareq. Terrorists do use multiple aliases, often changing them in different locations. Nicknames also provide a degree of "cover" or operational security. In addition to these aliases, many individuals will use "call signs" for security purposes. A call sign is simply another name that is



only used during indirect communication. These call signs may change depending on with whom one is communicating, or where they are located.



(U) Confidence Measures for Identification

(U) Intelligence analysts consider all of these factors when making assessments about a specific individual or group. The biggest asset to an analyst is an understanding of the complexities of this particular problem set. Through training, experience, and drawing on the expertise of senior analysts, subject matter experts and linguists at their disposal, analysts learn the many variables they need to take into account. Analysts use many tools and processes to make confident assessments, some of these include:

- (U) Database programs generally include features allowing the user to search on variants to account for different transliterations or reporting conventions. These tools may include wildcard or pattern matching searches, fuzzy word searches, and phonetic matching algorithms. In addition, some databases have macros, which employ a list of name variants based on historical search results. Analysts then use additional known details and other reporting to make confident assessments.
- (U) Through research and analysis of multiple reporting sources, analysts are often able to determine the various names used. Corroboration and collaboration within the IC helps analysts confirm identities.
- (U) Documents and media recovered from the detainee at the time of detention, and from other sources can help confirm identifications and/or provide further avenues of assessment. Some detainees have forged documents, such as fake passports, that allow analysts to determine alternative identities of a detainee.

[REDACTED]

- (U) Photographs, taken during the detainee's in-processing and those captured with the detainee, provide an additional resource to determine identity. Analysts show these photos to multiple sources in order to get a consensus on the individual(s) in the photograph. The photo identifications (PID) can verify the identity of the detainee and his associates, as well as validate suspected relationships.

(U) Conclusion

(U) Detainees often use aliases and cover stories to hide their actual activities; however, it is difficult to maintain these cover stories over time. Interrogators note any changes in details in the story, which occur when the topic is reviewed multiple times over a significant time period. Analysts compare these stories against other detainee reporting as well as other sources of intelligence to find inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in the cover story, develop further lines of questioning, as well as to corroborate the reliability and validity of truthful information. The IC mitigates the challenges that foreign language and cultural practices cause in this complex environment. Through advice provided by foreign area specialists, experience, education, and specialized tools, analysts are able to identify—with confidence—persons of interest or concern, including detainees.

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

APPENDIX A


Common Country and Tribal Names

Arabic Geographic Adjectives in Names and Equivalents	
Al-Adani	From Aden, Yemen
Al-Afriqi, al-Afriki	The African
Al-Ajami (actually al-'Ajami)	Literally "the foreigner" but almost always pertains to Persians (Iranian, but it could also apply to any Persian speaker—Iranian, Tajik, or Dari-speaking Afghan).
Al-Ajnabi, al-Agnabi	The Foreigner (i.e., not from "here", or "not one of us." NOTE: If "Agnabi" the "g" may imply an Egyptian context.) Al Ajnabi is unlikely to be part of a terrorist nom de guerre, but may be considered an indication that the person so named is considered a "foreigner" or "an outsider" by those using the term.
Al-Almani	The German
Al-Amriki	The American
Al-Andalusi	From Andalusia (southern Spain)
Al-Anfirsi	The man from Antwerp
Al-Ansari	Literally meaning "the supporter" and originally referring to persons in Medina who aided the Prophet Muhammad, al Ansari as now used among jihadists typically means "local jihadist"—as opposed to al-Muhajir, which means "foreign fighter."
Al-Arjantini	The Argentinean
Al-Armini	The Armenian
Al-Asiri (actually al-'Asiri)	From southwest Saudi Arabia
Al-Ayrlandi, al-Irlandi	The Irishman
Al-Badawi	The Bedouin
Al-Baljiki, al-Biljiki, al-Balgiki	The Belgian
Al-Banghali	The man from Bangladesh
Al-Bangladishi	The man from Bangladesh
Al-Baritani, al-Britani	The Brit

Al-Bedoui	The Bedouin
Al-Brazili	The Brazilian
Al-Britani, al-Baritani,	The Brit
Al-Burtughali	The Portuguese
Al-Danmarki	The Dane
Al-Emirati, al-Imarati	The man from the United Arab Emirates
Al-Englizi, al-Inklizi, al-Ingilizi, al-Injalizi	The Englishman
Al-Faransi, al-Faransawi	The Frenchman
Al-Farsi, al-Farisi	The Persian, the Iranian
Al-Fasi	From Fez, Morocco
Al-Filastini	The Palestinian
Al-Filibini	The Filipino (from the Philippines)
Al-Fiyatnami	The Vietnamese
Al-Ghani	The Ghanaian
Al-Gharbi	The Westerner
Al-Hadrami	From the Hadramat region of Yemen
Al-Halabi	From Aleppo, Syria
Al-Hijazu	From western Saudi Arabia
Al-Hindi	The Indian
Al-Hulandi	The Hollander, from The Netherlands
Al-Ifranji, al-Ifrangi	The European
Al-Ighriqi	The Greek
Al-Ilji (actually al- 'Ilji)	Pejorative Iraqi slang for a Westerner
Al-Imarati, al-Emirati	The man from the United Arab Emirates
Al-Injalizi, al-Ingilizi, al-Englizi, al-Inklizi	The Englishman
Al-Inklizi, al-Injalizi	The Englishman

al-Ingilizi, al-Englizi	
Al-Irani	The Iranian
Al-Iraqi	The Iraqi
Al-Irlandi, al-Ayrlandi	The Irishman
Al-Isbani	The Spaniard
Al-Iskutlandi	The Scot
Al-Islandi	The Icelander
Al-Isra'ili	The Israeli
Al-Janubi	The Southerner
Al-Jawfi	From the Jauf region of Yemen or Saudi Arabia
Al-Jazairi	The Algerian
Al-Kamiruni	From the Cameroons
Al-Kanadi	The Canadian
Al-Karibi	From the Caribbean
Al-Kashmiri	From Kashmir
Al-Khaliji	From the (Persian) Gulf
Al-Khawaga, al-Khawaji, al-Khawagi,	Literally meaning "Sir," or "Mister" (used especially for Christians and Westerners, with or without the name of the person so addressed), khawaga/khawaji has a street slang meaning, especially in Egypt, similar to calling someone a "gringo." "Al-Khawaja" is unlikely to be part of a terrorist <i>nomme-de-guerre</i> , but can be considered a likely indication the reference is to a Christian or Westerner considered to be "foreign" or "an outsider" to those using the term.
Al-Kini	The Kenyan
Al-Kubawi	The Cuban
Al-Kuri	The Korean
Al-Kuwayti	The Kuwaiti
Al-Libi	The Libyan
Al-Libiri	The Liberian
Al-Lubnani	The Lebanese

Al-Madani	From Medina, Saudi Arabia
Al-Maghribi	The Moroccan
Al-Majari, al-Magari	The Hungarian
Al-Makkawi, al-Makki	From Mecca, Saudi Arabia
Al-Masri, al-Misri	The Egyptian
Al-Miksiki	The Mexican
Al-Muhajir	Literally "the emigrant" and originally referring to a person who fled from Mecca to Medina with the Prophet Muhammad, al Muhajir as now used among jihadists typically means "foreign fighter."
Al-Muritani/Mauritani	From Mauritania
Al-Nabulsi	From Nablus, in the West Bank, Palestine
Al-Najdi	From central Saudi Arabia
Al-Nasibi	A pejorative for Sunnis used by Shi'a
Al-Nimsawi	The Austrian
Al-Nubi	The Nubian (from area near border between Egypt and Sudan)
Al-Nurwaji	The Norwegian
Al-Parsi, al-Farsi	The Persian, the Iranian
Al-Qamari	From the Comoros Islands
Al-Qubrusi	The Cypriot; from Cyprus
Al-Qudsi	From Jerusalem
Al-Rafidhi	A pejorative for Shi'a used by Sunnis that literally means "rejectionist"
Al-Romani	The Romanian
Al-Russi	The Russian
Al-Sa'idi	From Upper Egypt (i.e., the upland area of southern Egypt)
Al-Safawi	Pejorative for Persians (typically today meaning Iranian, but it could apply to any Persian-speaker—Iranian, Tajik, or Dari-speaking Afghan).
Al-Samarra'i	From Samarra, Iraq



Al-Saudi	The Saudi
Al-Shami	The Syrian, or from Damascus; the Northerner (esp. when North Yemen)
Al-Sharqi, al-Sharuqi	The Easterner
Al-Shili	The Chilean
Al-Shimali	The Northerner
Al-Shishani	The Chechen
Al-Sini, al-Sinani	The Chinese
Al-Sinighali	The Senegalese
Al-Skutlandi	The Scot
Al-Sudani	The Sudanese
Al-Sumali	The Somali
Al-Suri	The Syrian
Al-Suwidi	The Swede
Al-Suwisri	From Switzerland, the Swiss
Al-Ta'ifi	From Ta'if, Saudi Arabia
Al-Tabuki	From Tabuk, Saudi Arabia
Al-Tanzani	The Tanzanian
Al-Trabulsi, al-Trabelsi, al-Tarabulsi	From Tripoli, either Libya or Lebanon
Al-Trinidadadi	The Trinidadian
Al-Tshiki	The Czech
Al-Tunsi, al-Tunisi	The Tunisian
Al-Turki	The Turk
Al-Umani (actually al-'Umani)	The Omani
Al-Urduni	The Jordanian
Al-Urubi	The European
Al-Uzbiki, al-Uzbeki	The Uzbek
Al-Yabani	The Japanese





Al-Yamani	The Yemeni
Al-Yunani	The Greek



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
MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,
v.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Declaration of 



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Use of Intelligence Products in the Targeting and Operational Cycles
in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) (U// [REDACTED])

I, Robert H. Holmes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare
and say as follows:

1. (U// [REDACTED]) This is in response to the request from the Office of General Counsel for a declaration for Habeas Corpus litigation regarding the current procedures used to employ intelligence to locate and capture persons of interest on the Afghanistan battlefield. As the Deputy Director of Operations for U.S. Central Command, I am responsible for overseeing the operations of both special operations and conventional forces within the U. S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of operations (AOR), to include Afghanistan. From the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), U.S. special operation forces (SOF) have located and disrupted terrorist networks through the use of intelligence. While the particular tactics, techniques and procedures have changed over time, the process under which OEF operators acquire and utilize battlefield intelligence remains relatively constant.

2. (U// [REDACTED]) General. Intelligence is critical for all military forces, to include those capturing unlawful enemy combatants in Afghanistan. Ground commanders in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan employ a FIND, FIX, FINISH, EXPLOIT, and ANALYZE (F3EA) process to target the leadership, supporters and key nodes of terrorist networks. The F3EA process is driven by intelligence products of all types, to include Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), Telegraph Disseminations (TD)s, FBI 302s, FM 40s and Summary Interrogation Reports (SIRs). Commanders use multi-source and corroborated intelligence products to provide the clearest possible picture of the operational environment. This is critical in the fight against a highly compartmentalized, savvy and network-based enemy. In this fight we must be able to rapidly identify members of the network to disrupt and defeat their operations. Critically, we must then exploit the final results of that operation to lead us to the next individual inside the network before the network can react and adjust its form to become invisible again. The following explains how intelligence is used throughout this continuous cycle to drive operations and ensure we are removing the enemy from the battlefield with the highest degree of accuracy possible.

Classified By: MG Scaparoff, USCENTCOM J3
Reason: 1.4 (a)
Declassify On: 22 Aug 2018

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3.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

4. (U//[REDACTED]) Unlawful Enemy Combatant Status Determinations. The intelligence products developed and validated during the F3EA process form the foundation upon which commanders make

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determinations of the actual involvement of a target individual in the enemy network and therefore ultimately lead to targeting decisions. Intelligence products and physical evidence from the objective are useful tools with which to determine a detainee's status as an unlawful enemy combatant, and, when subjected to thorough review and analysis by the commanders making the actual determination, generally form the factual basis for that legal determination.

5. (U//██████) Intelligence and information produced through this F3EA process are also fed into the broader intelligence analytical cycle, which combines this data with existing information and intelligence to further task out for additional intelligence operations. The information or intelligence derived from both the analytical cycle and the operational cycle (F3EA) are disseminated to higher, adjacent and subordinate commanders through existing intelligence systems architecture to assist in developing targets and driving operations.

6. (U//██████) Conclusion. The process described above illustrates the ideal with no resource constraints placed upon the process. The practical realities of the battle field often constrain the time and resources available to execute the F3EA cycle; however, the same principles can be applied even with very limited assets to develop the same effect. Additionally, the sensitivity of the target may also drastically reduce the decision making cycle. The F3EA process will never generate a 100% solution; however, the quality and veracity of the intelligence products remain the cornerstone of the ground commander's decision making process and the key to its success.

Signed this 22nd of August, 2008



ROBERT H. HOLMES
Brig Gen, USAF
Deputy Director of Operations

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
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Declaration of 
On Guesthouses





Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration -- Guesthouses

Joint Intelligence Task Force -- Combating Terrorism

S-643-08/JTI-3A

19 September 2008

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

(U) I, [redacted], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Afghanistan/Pakistan Guesthouses

(U) Al-Ansar Guesthouse

(U) Al-Ansar was a name assigned to multiple suspicious guesthouses in Kabul, Afghanistan; Kandahar, Afghanistan; and Peshawar, Pakistan. However, the majority of references to the al-Ansar guesthouses describe guesthouses in Kabul and Kandahar.

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

(U) Al-Nebras Guesthouse

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

(U) Afghanistan: Processing Procedures at Al-Qaida Guesthouses

[REDACTED]

(U) Conclusion

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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
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Declaration of 
On Training Camps



[REDACTED]



Defense Intelligence Agency

Background Declaration – Terrorist Training Camps

Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism

[REDACTED]

19 September 2008

(U) The Defense Intelligence Agency produced the following document for the Department of Defense Office of the General Counsel to utilize in federal court litigation.

(U) I, [REDACTED] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

(U) [REDACTED]

(U) **Afghan Training Camps: 1989 - 2001**

(U) **Overview:**

[REDACTED]

(U) **Camp Breakdowns**

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Al-Qaida Camps

[REDACTED]

(U) Al-Farooq Training Camps

[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]

- (S//NF) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) According to The 9/11 Commission Report at least seven of the 9/11 hijackers who provided "muscle" for the attacks went through a basic training regime at the al-Faruq camp, and one of the pilots, Hani Hanjour, was identified for inclusion in the plot while training at al-Faruq. The Commission concluded this particular camp appears to have been the preferred location for vetting and training the potential muscle hijackers because of its proximity to Usama Bin Ladin and other al-Qaida senior leaders.

[REDACTED]

(U) Mes Aynak

[REDACTED]

(U) Tarnak Farms aka Abu Obeida Training Camp

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Camps Utilized by al-Qaida and Others

[REDACTED]

(U) Derunta Training Camp Complexes

(U) The Derunta training complex, located 15 miles from Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was a set of advanced terrorist training camps offering training in various explosives, poisons, and chemical warfare agents. Coalition forces destroyed the camp in October 2001.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Derunta: Curriculum

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Derunta: Students of Abu Khabab al-Masri

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Sada Training Camp

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Khaldan Camp

[REDACTED]

(U) While the Khaldan camp was not an al-Qaida facility, Abu Zubayduh had an agreement with bin Ladin to conduct reciprocal recruiting efforts whereby promising trainees at the Khaldan camp that they could join al-Qaida if desired.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) Abu Yahya Camp for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I have read this declaration and concur with the findings and conclusion.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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ISN 324 FD-302 (Feb. 21, 2002)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription

02/21/2002

Mashour Abdullah Muqbil Ahmed Al-Sabri (Al-Sabri) aka Abu Abdullah, Islamic calendar date of birth fourth (4th) month, fifteenth (15th) day of 1370 (approximately 1976), place of birth Mecca, Saudi Arabia was interviewed at the United States Temporary Holding Facility at Qandahar Airport, Qandahar, Afghanistan. Present at the interview were Special Agent's [REDACTED] (New York Office) and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (Los Angeles Office), United States Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Special Agent [REDACTED] and United States Army 202nd Military Intelligence Battalion Specialist [REDACTED], who interpreted the interview which was conducted in Arabic. All names and locations provided by Al-Sabri are phonetic. Upon being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, he provided the following information:

Al-Sabri is the son of [REDACTED] age approximately 45 and mother [REDACTED] age approximately 40. Both parents were born in Taiz, Yemen. Al-Sabri's father has a second wife [REDACTED] age 30. Al-Sabri resided in Mabdah, Saudi Arabia with his family from birth until August, 1990. The residence was located near the Quala Al-Yemani coffee shop. The town was very small and visitors would meet at this coffee shop. The family currently resides at [REDACTED], Saudi Arabia, telephone number [REDACTED]. Both Al-Sabri's mother and step-mother are housewives. Al-Sabri's father owns an Arabic food restaurant, [REDACTED]. There was a silent, Arabic partner (NFI) who officially sponsors the restaurant since Al-Sabri's father was Yemeni.

Al-Sabri has three brothers and two sisters all born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia; [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] attended the Al-Hudabiya High School, Gasala District. [REDACTED] currently attends the Rousaiyfa Middle School in Mecca. Sisters; [REDACTED] age 16 and [REDACTED] age 11 attend public school numbers 21 and 22 in the Al-Azaziya District of Mecca.

Al-Sabri attended the Hara Elementary School in Mabdah, Saudi Arabia located behind the Quala Al-Yemani coffee house. He then attended the Ibn Kathir Secondary School in Gasala District, Mecca for approximately one (1) year before being expelled for smoking on school

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property. His father tried to get Al-Sabri re-registered to no avail. He then attended the Al-Jazeera Middle School on Al-Azaziya Street, Mecca. Al-Sabri attended the Al-Hudabiya High School until dropping out in the ninth (9th) grade. He returned to take night classes for twenty days but again dropped out for lack of interest.

After dropping out of school, Al-Sabri stayed home for approximately eight (8) months working odd jobs including driving a taxi in town. While working he became friends with 24 year old [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]'s brother [REDACTED], owned a white, fifteen (15) passenger Mitsubishi bus. Al-Sabri and Said approached [REDACTED] to form a partnership to operate the bus. For one month, Al-Sabri and [REDACTED] would use the bus to transport people for the Haj pilgrimage. Fifty (50) percent of the profit would go to [REDACTED] and the remainder split between Al-Sabri and [REDACTED].

Al-Sabri began using the family vehicle as a taxi around town. Al-Sabri became more religious and began attending the Majid Al-Ibtisham mosque (translated to mean the smiling mosque). He attended the mosque for six months in 1998 and gradually stopped attending.

Al-Sabri met an individual named [REDACTED] through [REDACTED] five (5) months ago. [REDACTED] was a 28 year old Saudi residing on Street 60 in Mecca. [REDACTED] had come to Al-Sabri's residence to stay for a couple of days. Al-Sabri had not known that [REDACTED] was wanted by the Saudi authorities for passport forgery. A friend of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] NFI, stopped by the residence to drop off [REDACTED]'s passport and money. Al-Sabri believed that [REDACTED] alerted the authorities that [REDACTED] was staying at Al-Sabri's residence. [REDACTED] left the following morning.

In the winter of 1998, the Saudi authorities came to Al-Sabri's residence to arrest [REDACTED] on passport forgery charges. [REDACTED] had worked with an unknown facilitator to produce passports. Al-Sabri was arrested for harboring a fugitive [REDACTED]. Al-Sabri claimed that he did not receive any money or goods for allowing [REDACTED] to stay.

Al-Sabri was held for one and one-half months in the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) Mecca Mubahth Prison. There were no trials or convictions, rather a deportation proceeding with a five (5) year Saudi Arabia ban decision by the MOI. Al-Sabri was transported to the Jeddah Mubahth Prison and then deported by plane to Sanaa, Yemen.

While on the plane, Al-Sabri befriended two twenty (20) year old Yemeni brothers, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. All three stayed in the Hotel Al-Salem in the Bab Al-Yemen District, Sanaa. Al-Sabri used his Yemeni passport which he received from the Yemen Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia as identification. The three stayed

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one night and the two brothers contacted an uncle in the Tehnsion neighborhood in Sanaa. Al-Sabri stayed for two days and left for Taiz, Yemen.

Al-Sabri called his family from Sanaa and was told of an uncle, [REDACTED] who resided near Taiz in a small area called Jabil Sabar (meaning Mountain of Sabar). He paid \$600 Yemeni for a taxi to transport him to Taiz. He stayed two weeks looking for work and decided to move to another relatives house since the current living conditions were crowded. Al-Sabri moved to a nearby residence owned by cousin, [REDACTED].

Al-Sabri met a Yemeni named [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), age 25 in Taiz. [REDACTED] had previously traveled to Afghanistan for military training and to fight for the Taliban. Al-Sabri became interested in this discussion and inquired about receiving military training. Among other topics discussed was the local honey trading business. [REDACTED] would purchase honey from a twenty-two (22) year old Yemeni wholesaler, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] purchased honey from neighboring towns and return to Taiz. [REDACTED] would purchase honey and distribute to area merchants. [REDACTED] convinced Al-Sabri that he could make money selling honey in Taiz.

In the spring of 1999, Al-Sabri moved to Taiz and rented a one floor house in the Sina District of Taiz. Al-Sabri paid his rent by obtaining his \$7,000 riyal life savings from his family through a wire money transfer company called [REDACTED]. This company is a large money transfer business in the Middle East. Al-Sabri had to sign a receipt form for the sent money. Al-Sabri began purchasing honey from [REDACTED] and trying to sell out of his rented house. He tried selling honey for approximately six months but became dissatisfied, and decided to try to return home to Saudi Arabia.

Al-Sabri left Taiz to Sanaa, attempting to obtain a visa to return home. His father in Saudi Arabia tried to assist with Al-Sabri's return home by visiting the Jeddah, Saudi Arabia Consulate. Al-Sabri traveled to the Saudi Arabia Consulate in Sanaa. Al-Sabri was not able to obtain a visa immediately and his father told him to stay with a family friend in Sanaa, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] resided in the Gat Al-Yahoud District (named as the place for Jews). Al-Sabri contacted [REDACTED] who told Al-Sabri to stay with his sister's forty (40) year old husband, [REDACTED]. Al-Sabri stayed for ten (10) days. Daily, Al-Sabri would go to the Saudi Consulate to obtain a visa but was told he needed blood work and to come back at a later time.

The residence is located on [REDACTED] in the Habra District, Sanaa. The following eight (8) individuals, aged approximately 25 years, resided at this address:

[REDACTED]

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Two individuals came to visit the residents at the house on the sixth day. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had been staying at a hotel in Sanaa. Al-Sabri provided the following description of [REDACTED]:

Nationality:	Yemeni
Sex:	Male
Age:	23
Height:	6'0"
Build:	Heavy
Hair:	Short, light brown, moustache
Eyes:	Brown
Complexion:	Medium, European

Al-Sabri provided the following description of [REDACTED]:

Nationality:	Yemeni
Sex:	Male
Age:	23
Height:	5'10"
Build:	Medium
Hair:	Short black, bearded
Eyes:	Brown

Four days after the two visited, Sanaa police raided the house and arrested Al-Sabri and the residents. [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and a third individual named [REDACTED] were arrested at the Sanaa hotel. There were three others arrested in front of [REDACTED] residence in a parked vehicle, [REDACTED], [REDACTED] aka [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

Al-Sabri and the other arrested individuals were transported to the Sanaa Bahahth Prison. Al-Sabri believed that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had been surveilled to the house. For nine (9) months, Al-Sabri and the others were incarcerated without criminal charges. He was released with everyone else except for four individuals.

Al-Sabri learned that [REDACTED] was in charge of an auto theft ring. [REDACTED] would arrange to rent vehicles from an auto rental business in Sanaa. He was caught with two (2) stolen Jeeps upon arrest. [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were

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all drivers who rented vehicles using their passports for deposit. Al-Sabri did not know if the identifications used were fraudulent.

There were several motives provided by Al-Sabri as to why the auto theft ring existed. [REDACTED] and the drivers would steal the vehicles and drive them to a location in Sada, Yemen next to the Saudi Arabian border. The vehicles would be sold in Saudi Arabia and the proceeds used to purchase weapons. The goal was to violently free [REDACTED] from a Sanaa prison. [REDACTED] had been convicted of murdering four (4) German tourists. [REDACTED] had kidnaped the tourists to bargain with the Yemeni Government to release an imprisoned sheik associated with the South Yemen group, [REDACTED] (Army of Aden). The Yemen Government refused to negotiate resulting in [REDACTED] killing the tourists. [REDACTED] was subsequently imprisoned and later executed.

Other plans included kidnaping other tourists using the stolen vehicles. The four individuals would themselves attempt to negotiate the release of [REDACTED]. Al-Sabri denied having knowledge of the auto theft ring or the plans involved to free [REDACTED]. The plans were learned while he was imprisoned for nine (9) months. The Bahahth General holding facility, Sanaa Central Prison and the Political Security Service detention facilities. Al-Sabri was released in December, 1999 without being convicted of any crime. He had obtained a Yemeni federal identification card and returned to stay at [REDACTED]'s Sanaa residence.

Al-Sabri continued to visit the Saudi Arabian Consulate in hopes of receiving a visa to go home. He would attend [REDACTED]'s court appearances while in Sanaa. Al-Sabri had a cellular telephone through TelYemen subscriber number [REDACTED]. In January, 2000, he had convinced a security officer to allow [REDACTED] to use his cellular phone to call [REDACTED]'s residence in Saudi Arabia, from the Sanaa General Prison. Al-Sabri was arrested for suspicion of providing the telephone for [REDACTED] to further terrorist operations. Al-Sabri denied these allegations and stated the Yemen Government later verified that the call was made to [REDACTED]'s Saudi Arabian residence. He remained incarcerated for three (3) days.

Al-Sabri had his Yemeni identification card, cellular phone and several telephone numbers for [REDACTED]. Al-Sabri denied having any other telephone numbers in his possession upon arrest. Al-Sabri left Sanaa for Taiz for five days staying with his uncle, [REDACTED]. Al-Sabri decided to return to Sanaa again trying to obtain a Saudi visa. Al-Sabri returned to Sanaa and stayed at

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Al-Shadadi's residence for one week. Al-Sabri received his Saudi visa and planned to leave for Saudi Arabia.

In January, 2000 Al-Sabri took a public bus to the Saudi Arabia border but was denied due to the five (5) year ban. He took a taxi from the border to a hotel NFI in Hudada, Yemen for one night. Al-Sabri returned to Taiz and stayed with his uncle. Al-Sabri contacted his friend ██████ and ██████ convinced him to travel to Afghanistan for a better life and find a wife. Al-Sabri did not tell anyone that he intended to leave. Al-Sabri had \$1000 US dollars and 5,000 Riyals.

Al-Sabri left Sanaa in the late summer/fall of 2000. He flew Gulf Air with layovers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain. Al-Sabri arrived in Karachi, Pakistan within a day of leaving Sanaa. The entire flight cost was approximately 67,000 Yemeni dollars. From Karachi, Al-Sabri took a Pakistan Air flight to Quetta, Pakistan and stayed at a Taliban guesthouse called the Daftar Al-Taliban. ██████ told him to stay at this guesthouse. The manager of the house was an Afghani NFI. Al-Sabri stayed three (3) days at this guesthouse.

Al-Sabri took a taxi to the border town of Boldak whereupon he crossed the border on foot. Three (3) other individuals; ██████, ██████ LNU and ██████ who stayed at the guesthouse, traveled across the border with Al-Sabri. Al-Sabri provided the following description of ██████:

Nationality:	Yemeni
Sex:	Male
Age:	19
Height:	5'10"
Build:	Medium
Hair:	Black, short length, thin beard
Eyes:	Brown
Complexion:	Medium
Other:	Facial acne


Al-Sabri provided the following description of ██████ LNU:

Nationality:	Yemeni
Sex:	Male
Age:	23
Height:	5'10"
Build:	Small
Hair:	Black, medium length, beard
Eyes:	Brown
Complexion:	Medium

Al-Sabri provided the following description of ██████:

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Nationality: Saudi
Sex: Male
Age: 21
Height: 5'10"
Build: Medium
Hair: Black, goatee
Eyes: Brown
Complexion: Medium

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,
v.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RML)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

ISN 324 FD-302 (May 24, 2002)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription

05/24/2002

MASHOUR ABDULLAH MUOBIL AHMED AL-SABRI, ISN# [REDACTED]-00324 [REDACTED], was interviewed at [REDACTED] U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on 05/01/02, 05/04/02 and 05/10/02 and 05/22/02. Present during the 05/01/02 and 05/04/02 interview were Special Agents (SA) [REDACTED], Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and Detective [REDACTED], New York Police Department (NYPD)/Joint Terrorism Task Force. Present during the 05/10/02 interview was SA [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED], FBI. Present during the 05/22/02 interview was SA [REDACTED] and DET [REDACTED] (NYPD/FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. SPC [REDACTED] translated the 05/01/02, 05/04/02 and 05/10/02 interviews into English from Arabic. TSGT [REDACTED] translated the 05/22/02 interview into English from Arabic.

AL-SABRI was born in Mecca, Saudi Arabia (SA) on the 1398 4th month/15th day. He speaks Arabic only and claims citizenship in Yemen. AL-SABRI attended six years in elementary school and three years at AL JEZRAH Middle School in Mecca, SA. He went to high school at night quitting before completing the first class. He quit because he was the youngest in the class and did not like to attend with older people.

His grades out of middle school were so poor that he was not able to get into standard high school so night classes were his only option. After high school he worked very little operating a taxi service on a part time basis.

AL-SABRI advised he was incarcerated in Saudi Arabia during the latter part of 1998 for harboring a fugitive. As history, in the Summer of 1998, approximately three to four months prior to his arrest, AL-SABRI met [REDACTED] through [REDACTED], a friend he'd met two years previously playing soccer in a local league. AL-SABRI and [REDACTED] had social contact approximately two to three times weekly in the six months to a year prior to his arrest. [REDACTED] lives on ABDULLAH AL KHIYAT STREET in the AL AZAZIA neighborhood, Medina Mecca. When they met, [REDACTED] was in Saudi Arabia to participate in a mini-Hajj. They spoke for ten minutes at [REDACTED]'s house and did not communicate or meet again until AL-SABRI moved to Yemen in late 1998.

[REDACTED]'s brothers are [REDACTED] (age 35), [REDACTED] (age 33), [REDACTED] (age 30), [REDACTED] (age 29), [REDACTED] (age 27), [REDACTED] (age 25), and [REDACTED] (age 25)

05/01-22/02 Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

SA [REDACTED] (NCIS) DET [REDACTED] (NYPD)
SA [REDACTED] (FBI) DET [REDACTED] (NYPD)

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At the end of 1997, approximately one year prior to his arrest, AL-SABRI also met [REDACTED] (AKA: [REDACTED]), another friend of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] is a Saudi male, approximately 25 years old, 6 feet and of medium build. They met at the Holy Mosque in Mecca on four or five occasions and once at [REDACTED]'s house. AL-SABRI did not know how long [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] had known one another. In the Summer of 1998, [REDACTED] came to AL-SABRI's house unannounced and asked to wait there for his brother, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stayed for approximately one hour and had tea with AL-SABRI. They spoke mostly of buying and selling dates, [REDACTED]'s occupation. [REDACTED] arrived with two friends, both SAUDI males in their mid-twenties who appeared to be under the influence of narcotics. AL-SABRI gave them privacy by leaving the room although he was still able to see the two brothers. He observed [REDACTED] give his brother what looked like a Saudi passport and what [REDACTED] later confirmed was 3000 Saudi riyals. [REDACTED] did tell AL-SABRI he needed the passport to leave Saudi Arabia but AL-SABRI maintained he did not know [REDACTED] was in any trouble.

AL-SABRI never saw or heard from [REDACTED] again. [REDACTED] came back six months later, days before AL-SABRI's arrest, and asked if he had seen or heard from [REDACTED] further adding vaguely that [REDACTED] had a problem with the government. AL-SABRI advised he did not know [REDACTED]'s whereabouts but [REDACTED] suspected he did and threatened to tell the Saudi authorities that. Within days, the Saudi authorities arrested AL-SABRI, at his home, for harboring a fugitive ([REDACTED]) and searched his residence subsequently incarcerating him for one and a half months before deporting him to Yemen. AL-SABRI said he learned later that AL-[REDACTED] was involved in falsifying passports. This arrest took place approximately one year after he quit high school.

AL-SABRI was remanded to Yemen, his country of citizenship. He flew to Sa'na and ended up staying in a hotel called THE DOOR OF PEACE (BAB AL SALAM) HOTEL for two days with two men he met at the airport prior to boarding his plane. The men, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were brothers or cousins who were the same age as AL-SABRI. They were also being deported after having been convicted in Yemen for stealing. They had just been released after spending two years in jail. They went to breakfast together near the butcher shop of their uncle whose name AL-SABRI cannot recall, in the neighborhood called TELEVISION. He never saw them again after he left their company that day. AL-SABRI brought 200 riyal with him (approximately \$50.00) and obtained a new Yemeni passport when he first arrived in Sa'na.

The following day he called his brother, [REDACTED], in Mecca and asked him to contact [REDACTED] and request [REDACTED]'s telephone number. AL-SABRI said he did have [REDACTED]'s telephone number but did not want to call him directly and would not give a reason why. [REDACTED] did provide

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AL-SABRI with [REDACTED]'s phone number. He also told AL-SABRI that [REDACTED] does not want AL-SABRI to contact him. AL-SABRI presumed it was because

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[REDACTED]
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AL-SABRI had been arrested and so [REDACTED] did not want his name associated with AL-SABRI. AL-SABRI does not know whether [REDACTED] was ever arrested.

AL-SABRI then contacted [REDACTED] and met with him the same day. They met at the SALA BUILDING in the neighborhood of TELEVISION and went to a restaurant called THE GUEST (AL DIAFA) located nearby for lunch. They spent one and a half hours at lunch talking mostly about why AL-SABRI was deported. Afterwards, [REDACTED] dropped AL-SABRI off at the taxi station. From there he took a taxi by himself to TAIZ.

AL-SABRI stayed in Taiz for a period of two weeks. He lived for two weeks between the homes of his paternal uncle, [REDACTED] AL-SABRI and his maternal uncle, [REDACTED]. Both uncles lived in the Seena neighborhood, Seena Street, Medina Taiz. AL-SABRI worked very little in Saudi Arabia but did start his own business trading honey after moving to Yemen. He was given the idea by a man named [REDACTED], a Saudi, whom he'd met at the ALKHAIR Mosque in Taiz during his first couple weeks in Yemen. [REDACTED] had military training and did fight in Afghanistan. Prior to starting the business AL-SABRI had his brother wire him 7000 riyals. He sold honey for five or six months and then he went back to Sa'na to try and get a Saudi visa to return home.

AL-SABRI never traveled outside of Saudi Arabia prior to his deportation to Yemen.

AL-SABRI applied with the Saudi Embassy for a visa but was told he would have to wait as they needed paper to prove he was of Saudi descent. During this waiting period he lived in a house owned but not occupied by [REDACTED]'s sister and brother in law, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] facilitated the living arrangements. Each man paid 2000 riyals per month. There were five bedrooms shared between them. The following individuals lived there:

[REDACTED] - Yemeni. AL-SABRI came to know him best as they shared a room and spent the majority of their time together.

[REDACTED] - Yemeni. AL-SABRI said [REDACTED] trained in Afghanistan:

[REDACTED] - AL-SABRI said he first met [REDACTED] in 1995 at a soccer game in Mecca. [REDACTED] lived in Medina at the time but was playing soccer on a traveling team. They became friends after playing against one another in one soccer game and kept in contact via monthly telephone contact and one in person visit in Medina. AL-SABRI ran into

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██████████ in the market in Sa'na the day before they were arrested. ██████████ was in Sa'na preparing for his wedding so AL-SABRI invited him to stay with him to save money. ██████████ was arrested the following

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day and, as a result, did not end up getting married. AL-SABRI saw ██████████ twice after they were released from jail.

██████████ - AL-SABRI said ██████████ has two brothers, ██████████ AND ██████████. ██████████ was killed in Afghanistan. ██████████ trained in the KHALDEN Camp near Jalalabad

██████████ - (AKA ██████████ - AL-SABRI said ██████████ trained in Afghanistan. ██████████ came and went a lot during the day when they lived together. ██████████ and ██████████ spent the most time together prior to their arrests and were constantly together in jail. While in jail, ██████████ spent the time when he was not with ██████████ either reading the Qu'ran or writing.

██████████ - Yemeni. This living arrangement was facilitated by ██████████. AL-SABRI socialized with ██████████ the most. ██████████ seemed to know everyone in the house well. He was in Yemen writing his marriage contract. He left but returned two days before the arrest. ██████████ and ██████████ also spent time together.

██████████ - AL-SABRI said ██████████ spoke English which he learned when he lived in England. In England he lived with a Saudi named ██████████. ██████████ trained in Afghanistan. ██████████ seemed to know everyone in the house well and was in Yemen writing his marriage contract. He left the house two days before the arrest. AL-SABRI did not know where he was in that two day period.

In May 1999, AL-SABRI was arrested when the house he was living in was raided by Yemeni law enforcement. AL-SABRI explained that three individuals who were visiting the house, ██████████ and ██████████ and ██████████ were involved in a car theft ring and this is what led to the raid and AL-SABRI's subsequent arrest. After being held for nine months, AL-SABRI was released without ever having made a court appearance. After his release from jail he returned to his paternal uncle, ██████████ AL-SABRI's, residence in Taiz. He stayed there for one week before returning to his friend ██████████'s parents residence in Sa'na. ██████████ was released from jail the day after AL-SABRI's release.

AL-SABRI socialized at ██████████'s house several times a week after his arrest. AL-SABRI confirmed having met ██████████ (██████████), ██████████'s brother in law.

AL-SABRI advised that during this time he decided that there was not much opportunity for him in Yemen. During the Summer of 1998,

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family interceded, paid a fine of 2000 riyals and got him a visa to Saudi Arabia. When he attempted to cross the border, however, he was denied access due to his deportation status. AL-SABRI went back to TAIZ and stayed with his maternal uncle for approximately five months.

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During this time frame he learned about weaponry from his paternal uncle, [REDACTED] AL-SABRI. He was taught to fire and AK-47 and a pistol.

[REDACTED] told AL-SABRI that he should move to Afghanistan as work was easier to find there. In addition, AL-SABRI was influenced by a Fatwa issued by nationally recognized religious scholars, [REDACTED] of Quaseem, Saudi Arabia, and Sheik [REDACTED], both Saudis. The Fatwa was encouraging men to go to Afghanistan to assist the Taliban. [REDACTED] is a member of the Fatwa Committee in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, [REDACTED] told him that the Taliban would assist him in getting from Pakistan into Afghanistan because he was Arabic. In the summer of 2000, AL-SABRI decided to travel to Afghanistan with [REDACTED]. AL-SABRI purchased a round-trip ticket on Tunisian Air and flew from Sa'na Yemen, through the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and landing in Quetta, Pakistan. Once in Quetta, AL-SABRI went by taxi to The Taliban Offices as advised by [REDACTED]. He waited for two days in the Taliban offices before leaving to cross the border.

AL-SABRI, [REDACTED] and another individual, [REDACTED], were driven to the border at Boldak, Pakistan in a Toyota Corolla taxi. AL-SABRI paid for the trip but could not recall how much. Once they reached the border at Boldak he, [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] were picked up by motorcycles and taken across the border where they re-met the taxi. They stopped at a restaurant in the middle of the village of Boldak shortly thereafter. From there another driver took them to Kandahar, Afghanistan to an arab guest house called the HABI HABASH HOUSE, where he stayed for two weeks. [REDACTED], a Yemeni, was in charge of the house. While at the house AL-SABRI would go, on a daily basis, to an Islamic Institute across the street.

AL-SABRI told [REDACTED] that he wanted to go Jalalabad, Afghanistan but was advised to wait until someone else from the house went. [REDACTED], a Moroccan, ended up accompanying him to Jalalabad via Kabul. He stayed in Kabul for two days in an "Arab house". The house was run by [REDACTED], a Saudi. The house was a white two story home surrounded by a wall. He did not get to know anyone in the guesthouse. From Kabul AL-SABRI traveled to Jalalabad where he stayed at the [REDACTED] guest-house for the next year. While at the guest-house AL-SABRI traveled to the frontline near Kabul. AL-SABRI acknowledged there was fighting going on there. AL-SABRI advised that it is common knowledge if you are an Arab in Afghanistan the Afghans will steal from you so AL-SABRI was always armed. He purchased a Russian Makrof sawed off pistol from [REDACTED] while in Jalalabad two to three months prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks

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against the United States. [REDACTED] is a Tunisian in his 30s, approximately 6 foot and very thin. He manages a mudafa in Jalalabad that is located next door to the Red Cross office. [REDACTED]'s sister in law introduced AL-SABRI to a young Moroccan woman for the purposes of marriage. AL-SABRI advised [REDACTED]

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he did not get married because of the chaos that followed 9/11 and his subsequent arrest.

AL-SABRI first heard about the attacks against the United States on the radio in Jalalabad. He left Jalalabad after Kabul fell and went to a village whose name he cannot recall but where he stayed for about twenty five days. He then started to Peshawar, Pakistan with two other Arabs, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and an Afghani guide. The guide advised them that we would likely be arrested at the border and suggested that they turn themselves in. They did so two days before Ramadan.

AL-SABRI was shown the [REDACTED] photobook and identified the following individuals as:

No. [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] (AKA [REDACTED]) - came to visit [REDACTED] in jail once.

No. [REDACTED]: [REDACTED] (AKA [REDACTED]) - AL-SABRI met him at [REDACTED]'s house once. [REDACTED] was with him. [REDACTED] wanted to marry [REDACTED]'s sister. [REDACTED] told AL-SABRI [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]) was responsible for collecting money in Yemen for Chechyna.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

AL-SABRI identified the following individuals from the [REDACTED] book:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,


v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RML)

ISN 324 FD-302 (July 17, 2002)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription

07/17/2002

On 07/8/2002 and 07/09/2002, MASHUR ABDALLAH MUQBIL AHMED AL SABRI, ISN [REDACTED] 00324 [REDACTED], was interrogated at [REDACTED] Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The interviews were conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] (FBI), SA [REDACTED] (NCIS), TS [REDACTED] (US Army) and other representatives of the US Government. On 07/11/2002 and 07/13/2002, AL SABRI was interviewed by Special Agent [REDACTED] (FBI) and TS [REDACTED] (US Army). On 07/17/2002, AL SABRI was interviewed by Special Agent [REDACTED] (FBI) and TS [REDACTED] (US Air Force). On 08/02/2002, AL SABRI was interviewed by SA [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], FBI and other representatives of the U.S. Government. AL SABRI provided the following information:

SAUDI ARABIA

The following information related to Saudi Arabia is a summary of previous interrogation sessions with AL SABRI: In 1997, [REDACTED] introduced AL SABRI to [REDACTED] who had been involved in fraudulent passports. [REDACTED] also introduced AL SABRI to [REDACTED]. In 1998, AL SABRI went to jail because of his involvement with these individuals.

Because he was a Yemeni citizen, he was sent back to Yemen. AL SABRI attempted to return to Saudi Arabia, but could not obtain a visa, even with the help of his father.

YEMEN

While living in Yemen, AL SABRI lived in a house owned by [REDACTED]'s family with 15 other individuals. They were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Although AL SABRI claims to not have known it at the time, several of the men living in the house were involved in an auto theft ring. The chief suspects or ring leaders of the auto theft ring were [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED], and [REDACTED]. They were identified as such because they actually stole the cars. [REDACTED] were identified as the drivers. The original plan was to steal vehicles in Yemen and smuggle them across the border into Saudi Arabia. AL SABRI did not believe that they ever were given the opportunity to execute this plan. AL SABRI believes that they were under surveillance by the police and stated that when the police raided the house where they were

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SA [REDACTED]

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all living, he (AL SABRI) was in the wrong place at the wrong time. They were arrested in May, 1999.

While in jail, the four chief suspects were held in solitary confinement for 20-22 days. It was not until [REDACTED] came out of solitary that AL SABRI learned about the theft ring. [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED], was kept in isolation because he was a Saudi citizen. It was during this time in prison that AL SABRI met [REDACTED] for the first time. AL SABRI described the jail as a courtyard facility with dormitory housing and approximately 60 inmates. The inmates were free to communicate with each other. He remembered that [REDACTED] was also in jail with them. AL SABRI was at the opposite end of the dormitory as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. AL SABRI stated that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] often communicated with each other in prison and [REDACTED] hardly ever spoke to AL SABRI. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were always together and appeared to be very close. AL SABRI described [REDACTED] as serious, quiet and a loner whom he did not have any personal conversations with.

[REDACTED] talked about getting married in Sana'a and leaving Yemen. He was going to ask his father for money and buy a house in Saudi Arabia. After being released, AL SABRI observed [REDACTED] at the house where they all stayed previously (owned by [REDACTED] family). [REDACTED] was looking for [REDACTED] but instead spoke with his brothers since he was not home at the time.

AL SABRI never had visitors while in prison. [REDACTED] was visited by [REDACTED] and this is where AL SABRI first met [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was engaged to [REDACTED]'s daughter. AL SABRI did not recognize the photo of [REDACTED], and denied seeing him at the prison.

AL SABRI was asked to identify his friends to which he stated [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. AL SABRI identified the photograph of [REDACTED] which was located on the [REDACTED] dated 02/2002. AL SABRI stated that [REDACTED] did not live at the house with the rest of them but was always in the company of [REDACTED].

AL SABRI also noted that two photographs were missing from the FBI bulletin, one was [REDACTED], because he was dead, and the other was [REDACTED], aka [REDACTED].

In January 2000, after nine months of incarceration, AL SABRI, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were released from jail due to lack of evidence. AL SABRI maintained a friendship with [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]). They returned to the house where they were previously living and [REDACTED] worked on his marriage contract. Approximately 4-7 days after being released, [REDACTED] married [REDACTED]'s daughter. AL SABRI and [REDACTED] attended the wedding which was described as a single ceremony. AL SABRI

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knew that all of [REDACTED]'s daughters married Saudi citizens and learned from [REDACTED] prior to the wedding that one of them would not be attending the wedding ceremony. He was identified only as [REDACTED] and apparently was in Afghanistan.

AL SABRI denied knowing anything about the planning for the attack on the USS Cole. He never overheard conversations regarding same nor was he tasked with any operation or intelligence gathering function for the attack.

AL SABRI had no knowledge of plans to rig these stolen vehicles with explosives for terrorist acts. He believed that the plan was to steal the cars, sell them to buy weapons and kidnap European and/or American tourists for ransom money. Their intentions were to put pressure on the Yemeni Government to release [REDACTED], former head of the Yemeni Army who was implicated in the deaths of four German citizens.

AL SABRI identified photograph # [REDACTED] (known to FBI as [REDACTED]) as the brother-in-law of [REDACTED]. [Note: It is unclear if [REDACTED] was actually [REDACTED], the Pentagon highjacker, who was married to one of [REDACTED]'s daughters].

AFGHANISTAN

In August 2000, two months prior to the USS Cole attack, AL SABRI left for Afghanistan, however, he stated that he actually began thinking about going to Afghanistan about 1 1/2 years earlier. AL SABRI traveled with [REDACTED] to Afghanistan. [REDACTED] was described as approximately 22-23 years old. AL SABRI stated that he had no previous contact with [REDACTED] prior to meeting him one week before they left for Afghanistan and the only thing he knew about him was that he was from Taiz, Yemen. He told AL SABRI that he was going to Jihad. AL SABRI went to Afghanistan to find a wife and denied going to escape any involvement with the planning of the USS Cole.

[REDACTED] was the person who had the most influence on AL SABRI going to Afghanistan, although he admitted that he was also influenced by the fatwa issued by the sheikhs in Yemen. [REDACTED] told AL SABRI that there was security and peace in Afghanistan and that prior to the Taliban taking control it was lawless. [REDACTED] set a plan for AL SABRI which AL SABRI recanted, saying that it was just a plan to get to [REDACTED]'s house. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were very close friends. AL SABRI later described [REDACTED] as his best friend as well.

When AL SABRI and Al [REDACTED] arrived in Qandahar, AL SABRI stayed at the [REDACTED] house for approximately two weeks. After four days, AL SABRI met [REDACTED], a Yemeni recruiter who tried to convince him to join Al Qaeda and further his training at Camp Al Farouq. [REDACTED] was described as 5'9", very thin and 28-30 years old. AL SABRI told

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interrogators that he was not convinced enough and that he had to stick to the plan or schedule that [REDACTED] set for him. AL SABRI denied having ever gone to any type of training camp even when confronted with evidence that he was seen at the Jihad Wall Camp in the company of [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and other known terrorist subjects.

AL SABRI told interrogators that while in Afghanistan he was known as [REDACTED]. He stated that the only people who knew his real name were [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. In a separate interrogation, AL SABRI told interrogators that the only people that knew him as [REDACTED] were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Even [REDACTED] referred to him as [REDACTED].

After two weeks, AL SABRI traveled to Kabul with [REDACTED], a 5'3" Moroccan in his late 30's with muscular build, and stayed at the Arab House for two days. This house was run by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was described as being 6'0", heavy, very fat, older than AL SABRI, a Saudi National who had been in Afghanistan for a long time. AL SABRI attended the mosque next to the guesthouse for prayers but never heard a sermon by UBL. AL SABRI wanted to go to the front lines but was told by [REDACTED] that since he did not have any weapons training he could not go.

After two days, he and [REDACTED] traveled to Jalalabad where they stayed one night with a friend of [REDACTED] (nfi). The next day, the men drove AL SABRI to the house of [REDACTED]. This was approximately 09/2000. AL SABRI stated that everyone knew of [REDACTED] but he could not explain why he was so important except that he was a well know Arab National. AL SABRI stayed in [REDACTED]'s house for 12 months. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were very close. [REDACTED], a Saudi citizen who is approximately the same age as AL SABRI, lived there with his wife, a Moroccan. [REDACTED] invited AL SABRI to stay in the guest bedroom while in Afghanistan. No one else came to stay at this house while he was there. AL SABRI trusted [REDACTED] exclusively due to the recommendation of [REDACTED]. AL SABRI described [REDACTED] as a brother and best friend.

[REDACTED]'s wife had a sister named [REDACTED] who still resided in Morocco. [REDACTED] arranged that AL SABRI and [REDACTED] would be married. AL SABRI never communicated with [REDACTED] while in Afghanistan, nor has he written to her since his arrival in Cuba. [Note: this contradicts previous interviews where AL SABRI stated that he went to Afghanistan to look for a wife. He never mentioned [REDACTED] before.]

AL SABRI trusted [REDACTED] so much that he gave his passport to him for safe keeping. [REDACTED] did not work during the time AL SABRI lived with him. AL SABRI believed that [REDACTED] inherited money from his family in Saudi Arabia. AL SABRI never met Usama Bin Laden and believed that [REDACTED] never met Usama Bin Laden. AL SABRI never heard

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UBL preach at a mosque in Jalalabad. The only details AL SABRI provided regarding his 12 months in Jalalabad was that he went hunting with [REDACTED] and went with him to different mosques to distribute money.

[REDACTED] received money from his family to support his living expenses and also received money from Saudi Arabia. This money was a collection of donations and was sent to Pakistan through the hawala system. The point-of-contact in Pakistan was an Afghan male, 5'3" (same height as [REDACTED] with a curly beard and very slim. This Afghani would take a taxi from Pakistan to Jalalabad either once a month or once every two months. On one occasion AL SABRI observed the Afghani with approximately 9000 riyals (\$2,400 USD). [REDACTED] would collect the money, and usually on a Friday towards the end of the month, he would go to the Sifat Allah Mosque and distribute the money for the students who were studying the Koran. The money usually went to the parents of the students and was a reward for doing well.

[REDACTED] spoke of Al Qaeda but only that they were very active in Qandahar. [REDACTED] vocalized disagreement with Al Qaeda's involvement with suicide bombings.

During his 12 months, he was introduced to [REDACTED] whom AL SABRI described as a weapons dealer. He also met [REDACTED] who was in the company of [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] told AL SABRI that [REDACTED] collected funds for the Jihad in Chechnya.

Although AL SABRI heard about the attack on the USS Cole, it was not until two months after the attack (10/2000) that [REDACTED] came to Jalalabad to buy weapons. While there he told AL SABRI that his former roommate, [REDACTED], had been the suicide bomber on the USS Cole. At this time AL SABRI knew that he could never return to Yemen. He knew that he would be implicated because he lived with the suicide bomber. He described his state of mind as being mentally exhausted and stressed. During a separate interrogation, AL SABRI told a different version to the story. [REDACTED] was in a market in Jalalabad and ran into some Arabs who told him of the attack. [REDACTED]'S friends, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] told him of the news. When [REDACTED] returned home, he told AL SABRI. AL SABRI then told him the whole story about living with these guys and going to jail with them. AL SABRI was unable to explain his reaction/emotions.

After staying in Jalalabad for 6 months, he decided to return to [REDACTED]'s Arab house in Kabul to try and get to the fighting at the front line. On this second trip to Kabul, he observed the man in photograph [REDACTED] (known to interrogators as [REDACTED]) at the guesthouse. [REDACTED] would come into the house and greet people then go upstairs to the private offices. This person never was introduced to AL SABRI, nor did he greet him when he came in. [REDACTED]

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██████████ was well know and would spend about ½ to one hour in the private room. AL SABRI knew that this room was used as an administrative office. He often heard a television and a phone behind the door. It was mandatory to knock and wait before entering this room. AL SABRI never went into the room because he kept his money with him. He clarified that people usually went there to get money that ██████████ had stored for them. AL SABRI stated that these people collected their money because they were going to the front line.

Also on this second trip to Kabul, AL SABRI saw ██████████, aka ██████████, whom he had known from jail in Yemen. ██████████ told him that he was going to the front line. At this time in 05/2001, ██████████ finally authorized AL SABRI to go to the 2nd line of defense near Bagram. AL SABRI went there to support the Taliban who were positioned to fight Masood's Northern Alliance troops. AL SABRI did not recall seeing any Americans either at the Kabul guesthouse or at the 2nd line of defense. He was shown a photograph of ██████████ but did not recognize having seen him. AL SABRI soon became bored since there was no fighting and decided to leave, returning to Kabul for 2-3 days. AL SABRI took a taxi back to ██████████'s home and remained there for another 8 months.

In approximately 11/2001, AL SABRI left ██████████'s home due to Masood Northern Alliance forces encroaching on Jalalabad. ██████████ arranged for an Afghani (nfi) to take him to a small village where he spent the entire month of Ramadan. After 25 days, the Afghani returned and told AL SABRI that the Northern Alliance had taken Jalalabad and he had not been able to get in touch with ██████████. The Afghani guide and AL SABRI, along with two Saudi Arabs named ██████████, tried to escape the fighting through Pakistan. When they got to Peshawar, Pakistan, the Pakistani Army arrested them.



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,
v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN 324 FD-302 (July 18, 2002)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription

07/18/2002

On 07/18/2002, MASHOUR ABDULLAH MUQBIL AHMED AL-SABRI (ISN 00324) was contacted for interview at Guantanamo Bay , Cuba, by Special Agent (SA) , Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), . In addition, Specialist (SPC) , U.S. Army Language Specialist, was present to conduct Arabic translation for the duration of the interview.

AL-SABRI described a varied and spotty work history for the past six years of his life. In approximately 1996, AL-SABRI attended one month of night school before dropping out of high school. He has not sought any other type of formal education or vocational training since then. AL-SABRI drove a taxi for three to four months (circa 1996) then worked for the Ministry of the Hajj as a "doorman", guarding the entrances and exits to the camps where the Hajj participants stayed. After the Hajj, AL-SABRI went back to driving taxis for the next year. AL-SABRI drove a bus for approximately fourteen days in Mecca, Saudi Arabia during the subsequent year's Hajj.

AL-SABRI advised he was looking for any kind of work but was having difficulty finding work. At the time, AL-SABRI was 17 to 19 years old and did not want to leave Mecca because he was living with his family who were taking care of him. He spent his free time playing soccer, which is how he met his friend . AL-SABRI advised he has not seen in four years (circa 1998), prior to being deported from Saudi Arabia.

AL-SABRI went to Sana'a, Yemen after his deportation from Saudi Arabia. He met two people, and , on the airplane going to Sana'a. AL-SABRI stayed with them for two to three days. While in Sana'a, AL-SABRI visited for about two hours with another friend, , who he met through . After leaving Sana'a, AL-SABRI went to Taiz, Yemen where he stayed for about two weeks with his paternal uncle .

AL-SABRI then rented a house in Taiz with money he brought with him from Saudi Arabia. He stated that he brought \$7,000 Saudi riyals, which he claimed he had saved from his previous jobs. AL-SABRI sold honey in Taiz to earn money. At this point, AL-SABRI stated he was angry with himself for his situation and the fact he could not go back to Saudi Arabia.

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AL-SABRI advised that a friend, [REDACTED], recommended that he go to Afghanistan since he could not return to Saudi Arabia. According to AL-SABRI, [REDACTED] fought in Afghanistan with the Taliban two years prior to meeting AL-SABRI. AL-SABRI and [REDACTED] met prior to his arrest by Yemeni authorities for his association to people involved in a car theft ring. AL-SABRI had no contact with [REDACTED] while he was in jail. After his release, AL-SABRI first went to see his uncle and then looked for [REDACTED]. AL-SABRI located [REDACTED] by going back to pray at the mosque where they first met. AL-SABRI described [REDACTED] as a normal religious man who was not well known in the community. AL-SABRI stated that [REDACTED] belonged to a religious group called Jama'at Al-Tabligh. Many people in Yemen belonged to Jama'at Al-Tabligh. Mostly, they just went out preaching. AL-SABRI claimed he never participated in preaching with Tabligh members and never saw any American Tabligh in Yemen.

[REDACTED] helped AL-SABRI get to Afghanistan by providing him with contacts, a plan, and a route. AL-SABRI flew from Sana'a, Yemen to the United Arab Emirates, to Bahrain, to Karachi, Pakistan. After arriving in Karachi, AL-SABRI hailed a taxi and told the driver to take him to the "Taliban House", which was a well known location. AL-SABRI personally did not know the location; however, the driver knew where the "Taliban House" was located and drove him straight there. AL-SABRI described the house as a big, one story place with four rooms on the side of the house where he stayed. It contained a mosque, many bathrooms, and was occupied mostly by Afghanistans with a few Arabs. AL-SABRI provided two of the Arabs' names as [REDACTED] (Yemeni) and [REDACTED] (LNU).

AL-SABRI rode in a car from Quetta, Pakistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan with three Arabs: [REDACTED], [REDACTED] (LNU), and [REDACTED]. In Kandahar they stopped at a guest house called Habi Habash where they stayed for 14 to 15 days. AL-SABRI advised that the other three wanted to be martyrs but did not say how they intended to accomplish this. AL-SABRI claimed his reason for going to Afghanistan was simply to check it out and possibly get married. AL-SABRI and his three traveling companions parted company in Kandahar. AL-SABRI left Kandahar for Kabul, with a Moroccan named [REDACTED], where they stayed for two days. Their final destination was Jalalabad where [REDACTED] instructed AL-SABRI to contact [REDACTED]. According to AL-SABRI, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] knew each other from Afghanistan when they both fought with the Taliban. AL-SABRI claimed he did not maintain contact with [REDACTED] while he (AL-SABRI) was in Afghanistan. AL-SABRI stated he was not impressed with Afghanistan at first because the streets were "broken up"; however, he contemplated settling in Jalalabad. AL-SABRI stayed with [REDACTED] for approximately one year.

When asked who could corroborate his story, AL-SABRI replied [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (both of whom are

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██████████ incarcerated in Yemen) and ██████████ (a detainee at ²██████████
²██████████ Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). Additionally, AL-SABRI stated that the
people with whom he lived and with whom he was arrested in Sana'a, Yemen
should be able to corroborate his story. AL-SABRI thought the Government
of Yemen would know where these people were located.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,
v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN [REDACTED] FD-302 (Feb. 21, 2003)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/21/2003

[REDACTED] ISN [REDACTED]-00002 [REDACTED], was interviewed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After being advised of the nature of the interview, [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED] was shown a photo of [REDACTED] ISN [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] could not remember the detainee's name, however he identified [REDACTED] as being a student at the basic training class at the Al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] was not sure of the exact time frame that he saw [REDACTED], since he has taken multiple training classes at Al Farouq. [REDACTED] believes he saw [REDACTED] in early 2001, around February or March.

There were approximately 60 students going through basic training when [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were together at the camp. There were approximately five to six classes going through the camp at one time. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in different classes. Of the 60 students, about a half dozen or so spoke English, including [REDACTED]. Because [REDACTED] spoke English, [REDACTED] had the opportunity to speak with him. [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] as being soft spoken and deliberate in his speech. He spoke rather slow. Based on the fact that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in separate classes, [REDACTED] did not get the opportunity to interact with [REDACTED] on a regular basis.

All students that take the basic training class at Al Farouq get the same type of training, no matter what class they are in. The training consists of the following:

- (1) Two weeks of weapons training - students shoot approximately 40 rounds.
- (2) Two weeks of basic commando course
- (3) Two weeks of topography.
- (4) Two weeks of explosives.

Following the basic training, students go back to their safe house in Kandahar where they are given the following choices:

- (1) They can sign up for advanced training such as guerrilla warfare, conventional warfare, and advanced explosives.

Investigation on 02/20/2003

at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
02/21/2003

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED] On 02/20/2003 Page 2

(2) They can go home.

(3) They can go to the front line and fight Jihad. The front lines for non-Afghans were in two areas, one was the airport in Baghām and the other was in the north close to Kunduz. These positions were defensive positions that saw little action. According to [REDACTED] the Taliban would attack and retreat often and because of the language barrier between Afghans and Arabs, only Afghans were allowed to be on the attack teams. Arabs and other foreigners were only allowed to fight at the defensive locations. Many Arabs did not have the patience to do this and were upset about the lack of action.

The Al Farouq training camp was funded by Al Qaeda and therefore was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The following countries and/or regions had training camps in Afghanistan; Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kashmir, Philippines, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

[REDACTED] saw Usama bin Laden approximately eight times. He traveled with multiple bodyguards with a convoy of two to three vehicles. The bodyguards blended in with the regular population and the only distinguishing feature was that they carried weapons.

If you were an Arab and you wanted to travel to Afghanistan you would get in touch with another Arab who would direct you to a training camp where you would take a basic operations class, similar to the one mentioned above. Following training you would get in touch with your Arab contact and he would lead you through Afghanistan. Based on [REDACTED] mannerism and personality, [REDACTED] doesn't believe that [REDACTED] is the type that would go to the front lines and fight. According to [REDACTED] it is prestigious for a Muslim to be able to participate in military training which will give him the opportunity to fulfill his religious obligation of Jihad.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,


Petitioner,
v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN 324 FD-302 (June 2, 2003)



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of Transcription 06/02/2003

On May 31, 2003, MASHUR ABDULLAH MUQBIL AHMED AL-SABRI, Internment Serial Number (ISN) [REDACTED]-00324, was interviewed by FBI Special Agents [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] at [REDACTED], U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [REDACTED] provided Arabic translation. AL-SABRI provided the following information:

AL-SABRI was unhappy regarding the length of time it has taken to process his case. He had no complaints regarding his health.

Regarding his passport, [REDACTED] (phonetic) was to bring AL-SABRI's passport with him from Jalalabad. [REDACTED] had asked AL-SABRI to leave Afghanistan with him. AL-SABRI was in a village outside of Jalalabad and the passport was in [REDACTED] home. [REDACTED] never showed up to leave with him, so AL-SABRI thinks he may have been killed.

AL-SABRI's kunia is ABU ABDULLAH. He used it in Afghanistan, and even before he went to Afghanistan. He is not married and does not have children, but stated that he does not have to be to use this kunia.

AL-SABRI would like to get married when he leaves Guantanamo Bay. He is willing to go back to Yemen, or go back anywhere away from here.

AL-SABRI stated that he did not know who the Northern Alliance was, and did not care to know. He swore that he did not know them and that he has heard of them since he has been in prison. AL-SABRI was asked who he went to fight in Afghanistan, he stated that he did not fight anyone in Afghanistan. He went to Afghanistan to see what it was all about. He had heard a lot about the purely Islamic government there, and the safety of Afghanistan. He found it to be that way when he arrived. He described safety as being able to walk down the street without anyone talking to you. He further stated that in Yemen a person could be grabbed up when walking in the street, and arrested. If your family did not have power or money in Yemen, and there was no money to bail you out, you would be in prison forever. When asked if he considered this corruption, he stated that every government has corruption and there are good and bad governments everywhere.

AL-SABRI was shown a flyer photo of [REDACTED], which has been placed in a 1A envelope. He stated he did not recognize him.

Investigation on 5/31/2003 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

[REDACTED] Date dictated 6/2/2003

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

Continuation of FD-302 of MASHUR ABDULLAH MUQBIL AHMED AL-SABRI on 5/31/2003 Page 2

He asked about this individual in relation to USAMA BIN LADEN. The interviewers told him that he was BIN LADEN's doctor. AL-SABRI commented, who is BIN LADEN to now have his own personal doctor. It was further explained to AL-SABRI by the interviewers that [REDACTED] may not be BIN LADEN's personal doctor but he is a doctor and he also provides counsel to BIN LADEN.

AL-SABRI is currently housed in [REDACTED], and has not been able to write a letter for the six months he has been housed there.

Six months ago he wrote one to be sent, but he has not received a reply and does not know if any letters have arrived for him. When he has inquired the guards have told him that it is up to the interrogators as to whether he receives luxury items or not. He stated that other than a few weeks ago when he was shown some photographs, he has not been talked to for nine months, when some civilian and military interviewers talked to him and had him moved from [REDACTED] and then into isolation. AL-SABRI requested that the interviewers check on the status of his mail.

AL-SABRI was also interested in knowing about [REDACTED], saying that the detainees talked together about what it might be like but he had not gotten a chance to talk to anyone who had actually been in there.

The interviewers explained the benefits to the living conditions of [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,
v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN 324 FD-302 (July 2, 2003)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription

07/02/2003

MASHUR ABDULLAH MUOBIL AHMED AL-SABRI, ISN# [REDACTED] 00324 [REDACTED], was interviewed at [REDACTED] U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by Special Agent [REDACTED], FBI, and SA [REDACTED], Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Serving as Arabic translator was [REDACTED].

AL-SABRI was shown the photographs of seven [REDACTED] detainees to include [REDACTED], [REDACTED]. AL-SABRI identified [REDACTED] as follows:

AL-SABRI stated he knows [REDACTED] from Yemen. AL-SABRI was arrested with [REDACTED] in Yemen for alleged car theft. AL-SABRI stated that he first met [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]'s sister's husband's house. This is the house they were in when arrested. They spent nine months together in prison. AL-SABRI stated he last saw [REDACTED] in Yemen when they had lunch about 2 days after being released from custody. They never went to trial and according to AL-SABRI, they were cleared of all charges. AL-SABRI has seen [REDACTED] in [REDACTED].

AL-SABRI elaborated on the story about being arrested for the car theft stating that two groups of three, one group of nine, and one individual were arrested. AL-SABRI was in the group of nine as well as [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and others. Only three of the total, one being from the group of nine actually committed the car thefts. AL-SABRI speculated they were arrested at [REDACTED] brother-in-law's house because the persons involved in the car thefts used to visit this house a lot.

With regard to [REDACTED], AL-SABRI stated he had heard from [REDACTED] that when [REDACTED] left Yemen he went to the front lines in Afghanistan with the Taliban and fought against Masood and the Northern Alliance. Interrogators in Kandahar told AL-SABRI that MADANI was dead.

AL-SABRI stated that [REDACTED] had also fought in Bosnia prior to them meeting. AL-SABRI did not have any further information regarding [REDACTED]'s fighting in Bosnia.

AL-SABRI stated he was not aware of any training done by [REDACTED] or whether he carried any weapons.

07/02/2003

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

SA [REDACTED]

07/02/2003

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)
Continuation of FD-302 of

On
, Page

[REDACTED]
Mashur Abdullah Muqbil Al-Sabri

07/02/2003

2

AL-SABRI was not aware if [REDACTED] knew USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL), but he stated that the interrogators in Kandahar told him that both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (NFI) were body guards for UBL. AL-SABRI did not think that made sense as [REDACTED] had not been in Afghanistan that long. AL-SABRI did not know if [REDACTED] was a member of Al Qaeda.

AL-SABRI stated that while they were in jail together, [REDACTED] never spoke of any war stories or training he may have received.

AL-SABRI did not know if [REDACTED] had killed anyone while fighting for the Taliban.

With regard to the USS Cole, AL-SABRI stated that he was not involved in that attack or any other terrorist attack. AL-SABRI stated he did not know if [REDACTED] had any involvement or not.

AL-SABRI stated he did know one of the USS Cole bombers, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was another of the nine arrested for the car thefts. AL-SABRI and [REDACTED] were also in prison together for nine months. AL-SABRI stated that [REDACTED] did not talk much and he was shocked when he heard the news regarding [REDACTED]'s involvement in the USS Cole bombing. AL-SABRI stated he thought it was wrong for [REDACTED] to bomb the USS Cole. AL-SABRI stated he did not know if [REDACTED] was related to Al Qaeda or not.

When AL-SABRI and [REDACTED] spoke briefly at [REDACTED] they exchanged the news that [REDACTED] was in prison in Yemen for his involvement in the USS Cole bombing.

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[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)

Petitioner,)

v.)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)

Respondents.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN [REDACTED] CITF (Dec. 3, 2002)

[REDACTED]

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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE (CITF)
REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

1. DATE OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY 03 Dec 02	2. PLACE [REDACTED], Guantanamo Bay, Cuba	3. ACTIVITY NUMBER [REDACTED]
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
4. REMARKS

Subject Interview of: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Internment Serial Number (ISN) [REDACTED] was interviewed on December 3, 2002, at [REDACTED], U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Present during the interview were Special Agent [REDACTED], Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Sgt. [REDACTED], Minneapolis Police Department (JTTF), and Contract Linguist [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] provided Arabic/English translation. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

In previous interviews [REDACTED] stated he worked for [REDACTED] at the Institute for Arabic Studies in Kandahar, Afghanistan. [REDACTED] met USAMA BIN LADEN on several occasions at the Institute and is familiar with many Al Qaeda members who were in Afghanistan. [REDACTED] denies being a member of Al Qaeda but said that several people attempted to recruit him during his time in Afghanistan.

[REDACTED] was initially shown the book entitled "September 11 - A Testimony" which depicted photographs of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. He stated that the attacks were wrong and not in-keeping with the teachings of Islam. [REDACTED] said he hoped he was not being judged on the actions of BIN LADEN.




[REDACTED]

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4. REMARKS (Continued)




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Declassified by: FS
Date: 16 Dec 2008

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4. REMARKS (Continued)



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Date: 16 Dec 2008

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MASHHOOR ABDALLAH MOQPEL AL-SABRI (known associate of [REDACTED] Yemeni attack plans) - [REDACTED] saw him in the Al Qaeda guesthouse in Kandahar. He lived at the guesthouse. [REDACTED] thinks he looks Yemeni. He also prayed at the same mosque as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] sometimes saw him at the BIN LADEN compound. He cannot remember his name, but thought he was a simple person. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of his affiliations.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believed that Al Qaeda and AL Wafa did not get along and were enemies. [REDACTED] did not have any relations with AL Wafa that [REDACTED] was aware of. [REDACTED] did not associate with simple people, only with high-ranking Taliban and Al Qaeda. The only time Al Qaeda would give money to the Institute would be during "the feast." The Institute would then distribute the money to the poor.

[REDACTED] continues to be very cooperative and stated he is willing to answer any questions in order to help the investigation.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,


v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

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Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN  CITF (June 8, 2004)



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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TASK FORCE (CITF) REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY		
1. DATE OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY	2. PLACE	3. ACTIVITY NUMBER
08 Jun 04	Bagram, Afghanistan	[REDACTED]
<p>4. REMARKS</p> <p>Subject Interview of: (UNK) [REDACTED]</p> <p>Date/Place: 08 Jun 04/Bagram, Afghanistan</p> <p>[REDACTED] On 08Jun04, [REDACTED], was interviewed at the Bagram Personnel Control Facility (BPCF), Bagram, Afghanistan (AF). The interview was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED], Naval Criminal Investigative Service. The interview was conducted in the English language with Mr. [REDACTED] contract linguist, providing English to Pashtu translation.</p> <p>[REDACTED] indicated that he was feeling well and had been treated well. He stated that he was happy that BPCF had begun to broadcast via loudspeaker the Arabic call to prayer. [REDACTED] stated that as long as he was able to pray at the appropriate times, he was happy.</p> <p>[REDACTED] He indicated he saw [REDACTED] in Kandahar in late 1999 or 2000. He also heard that [REDACTED] was a guard in Tora Bora with Usama Bin Laden (UBL). [REDACTED] never saw [REDACTED] guarding UBL. [REDACTED] indicated that he was residing in Pakistan approximately 6 months prior to 11Sep01, so he only heard rumors about [REDACTED] being a UBL bodyguard. He believed the rumors to be reliable as [REDACTED] was also on the Internet (NFI) and TV.</p> <p>[REDACTED] did not know what type of training [REDACTED] had received in AF. He did not know why [REDACTED] was in Kandahar, however believed that [REDACTED] had been in AF prior to 1999. He did not know if [REDACTED] was in AF preparing for a martyrdom mission, though [REDACTED] opined that all mujahadeen were in AF preparing for martyrdom missions. He was unaware of [REDACTED] receiving any boat training. [REDACTED] did not believe that it was possible to receive any training to operate a boat in AF as there was no body of water to train on.</p> <p>Reporting agent asked [REDACTED] to list all of his email accounts that he used while on the Internet. He indicated that he usually used the Internet to read Islamic news (newspapers) or to check his email. He often used [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] to search for news article in Arabic. He recalled having the following email accounts:</p> <p>[REDACTED] indicated that it had been a long time since he checked his accounts and therefore could not recall exactly, however he indicated that he had provided this information to Americans who interrogated him in Pakistan, and also provided a copy to his Jordanian interrogators.</p> <p>[REDACTED] Yemen.</p> <p>[REDACTED] saw him in Kandahar in 2000, before the bombing of the USS Cole. He may have been in Kandahar as early as late 1999. When [REDACTED] met him in Kandahar it appeared that [REDACTED] was not working on anything in Kandahar. [REDACTED] "employed" [REDACTED] as an assistant in helping him obtain a</p>		

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

[redacted] indicated that he was unaware of where [redacted] stayed during their visit to Malaysia or whom they met with. He did not know if his brother and [redacted] attended to anything other than obtaining a good prosthetic leg for Khallad. [redacted] indicated that he was about 50% certain that [redacted] was also a guard for UBL. He was unable to account for why he thought that or how he became aware of that rumor.

[redacted] knew that [redacted] was captured while in a safe house in Karachi, PK, circa February or March 2002. [redacted] had been hiding in that safe house. He saw [redacted] at that safe house prior to his [redacted] capture. [redacted] talked with [redacted] briefly when he saw him, but did not know how [redacted] occupied his time while in that safe house. He did not recall seeing a computer at the house or an internet connection. Further, he stated that he did not recall seeing any telephones, other than satellite/mobile telephones. There were 12 to 15 other Arabs in the safe house with [redacted]. They mostly hid in the house as they could not speak Pashtu and knew they would be arrested at checkpoints if they attempted to leave the house. [redacted] recalled there was a black British man (FNU/LNU) who was also in the safe house with [redacted]. When asked if he knew if [redacted] was a member of Al Qaeda, [redacted] indicated that he was not sure. [redacted] further stated that he worked for UBL, however he is not a member of Al Qaeda. He then explained that one could work for UBL and not be a member of Al Qaeda.

[redacted] indicated that in order to be a member of Al Qaeda one must:

- 1) Swear bayat to UBL
- 2) Be paid by the organization
- 3) They cannot leave the organization unless they are on a mission.

If one swears bayat, it is a sin in their hearts to do anything that would harm the organization.

[redacted]
[redacted] was shown a photo of [redacted] 00324 [redacted] whom he recognized as Mashoor aka Salman. [redacted] was not sure which name was his legal name and which was a kunya. He met him in Kandahar after the bombing of the USS Cole. He may have also seen him in Kandahar in early 2001. [redacted] saw him a total of 2 to 5 times. Though he was introduced to him, the two of them never really talked much. [redacted] knew that Mashoor was new to AF at the time he met him. Mashoor was residing in the Al Ansar guesthouse in Kandahar. This guesthouse was close to the Haji Habash Mosque (near an old AF Army base), and was run by [redacted] and [redacted]. Mashoor only stayed at this guesthouse for a few days before he left (whereabouts unknown). Mashoor would come and go from the [redacted] guesthouse and only stayed in Kandahar for a few days. [redacted] was not certain what Mashoor was doing when he was in Kandahar or what he was doing when he left. [redacted] knew that Mashoor was from Yemen, however he was born in Saudi Arabia, either Mecca or Medina.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was asked if he wanted any food or drinks during the next interview. He responded by stating that as long as he had the call to prayer he was happy. Once all of his interviews are complete [REDACTED] wants time away to pray and reflect. He does not care if he is held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Afghanistan, or in the US. Based on information that he has seen and heard, he would prefer to be in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. [REDACTED] is not concerned with his future fate, even if it means being sentenced to several hundred years in prison. He only wants time to pray and read religious books.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Declassified by: FS
Date: 16 Dec 2008

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)

Petitioner,)

v.)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)

Respondents.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN [REDACTED] CITF (Nov. 9, 2004)

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Declassified by: FS
Date: 16 Dec 2008

UNCLASSIFIED
FOR PUBLIC RELEASECRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE (CITF)
REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY

1. DATE OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY 09 Nov 04	2. PLACE [REDACTED] GTMO, Cuba	3. ACTIVITY NUMBER [REDACTED]
<p>4. REMARKS</p> <p>Witness Interview of: (UNK) [REDACTED]</p> <p>Date/Place: 09 Nov 04/ [REDACTED] GTMO, Cuba</p> <p>[REDACTED] On 9 Nov 04, [REDACTED] ISN [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED] Naval Station Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, by Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] and SA [REDACTED] Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), Fort Belvoir, VA 22060. [REDACTED] provided Arabic/English language translation.</p> <p>[REDACTED] was cooperative throughout interview. [REDACTED] was offered drink and tobacco during the interview. [REDACTED] expressed he had no problems concerning his health, nor any problems with the Military Police. [REDACTED] explained he had requested to be transferred to [REDACTED] because he did not get along with the other detainees. According to [REDACTED] the other GTMO detainees thought that [REDACTED] was a spy and constantly badgered him about it.</p> <p>[REDACTED] was interviewed based on previous information provided by [REDACTED] wherein [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] could provide information about [REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] AI SABRI, which he identified as Mashoor Al Tazi, the Yemeni.</p> <p>[REDACTED] advised that in April 01 and in May 01, before and after [REDACTED] attended the Al Farouq training camp, he stayed in two guesthouses in Kandahar, AF. The names of the guesthouses were Hajji Habbash and Alnabras guesthouses. In April 01 [REDACTED] stayed at the Alnabras guesthouse for two days before he was sent to the Al Farouq training camp. [REDACTED] attended the training camp 21 days and after his graduation, he returned to the Alnabras guesthouse. [REDACTED] saw AI SABRI in Alnabras and Hajji Habbash guesthouses, which were owned by Usama Bin Laden (UBL). According to [REDACTED] Alnabras guesthouse was for the new comers where all new recruits reported. The Hajji Habbash guesthouse was for the VIPs. [REDACTED] explained AI SABRI stayed at the Alnabras guesthouse and he was able to go to the Hajji Habbash guesthouse anytime without any paperwork or documentation. [REDACTED] believed AI SABRI worked at the Alnabras guesthouse where AI SABRI facilitated the lodging and training of the new recruits and their travel to the front lines.</p> <p>[REDACTED] described the Alnabras guesthouse as a three-story building with many rooms. [REDACTED] believed AI SABRI stayed at the first floor because the other floors were colder than the bottom floor. [REDACTED] did not see AI SABRI's sleeping quarters.</p> <p>[REDACTED] further explained he observed AI SABRI traveled, without any documentation, between these two guesthouses and the Kandahar airport frequently. According to [REDACTED] AI SABRI used a blue in color, Honda motorcycle for his travel between the airport and the guesthouses. [REDACTED] believed AI SABRI carried messages between the guesthouses and the airport.</p> <p>[REDACTED] observed AI SABRI was well respected at the guesthouses.</p> <p>[REDACTED] did not observe AI SABRI carrying a weapon. AI SABRI was usually with a person named [REDACTED]</p>		

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

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Date: 16 Dec 2008

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

[redacted] described [redacted]. According to [redacted] was a troublemaker, whom other recruits avoided. A group of others usually hung around with AI SABRI.

[redacted] believed Mashoor [redacted] AI SABRI was famous because he was there for a long time and he was well known and respected.

[redacted] explained AI SABRI and others worked for UBL. They did administrative and organizational duties. AI SABRI and others around him helped signing in the new recruits and facilitate their moves to the front lines.

[redacted] also believed that AI SABRI facilitated the transfer of weapons and other supplies to frontlines. [redacted] explained at the time, AI SABRI wore a traditional Afghan uniform.

[redacted] stated AI SABRI was a member of Al-Qaeda because he was following UBL's orders to keep the guesthouse up and running. [redacted] further explained that AI SABRI, because of his demeanor and his free travel to and from both houses and the airport, appeared to be one of the bosses. [redacted] also believed during Ramadan, 01 (around Sep 01), AI SABRI transferred approximately \$20,000.00 in U.S. currency to the airport, where some of the training took place.

[redacted] did not physically observe AI SABRI swearing [redacted] to UBL; however, he believed AI SABRI must have swear Ba'yat to UBL, because AI SABRI and the people around him knew UBL's travel dates and routes.

[redacted] knew UBL had visited these guesthouses often but he did not observe UBL visit while [redacted] stayed at the Alnabras guesthouse.

When questioned if [redacted] ever saw AI SABRI at the Al Farouq training camp, [redacted] replied, "no" he did not see AI SABRI at the Al Farouq training camp because [redacted] believed AI SABRI had attended the training camp prior to when [redacted] did. [redacted] believed AI SABRI attended the training in 95 somewhere in Khowst, AF where the training was held during that time. [redacted] further explained without training, people were not allowed to go to the front lines.

[redacted] further explained there was another GTMO detainee, [redacted] who knows AI SABRI from Afghanistan. Aman was also an administrator in another guesthouse in Pakistan. [redacted] stated that about a week ago [redacted] had asked [redacted] if the Americans captured AI SABRI.

[redacted] further explained [redacted] another detainee, who worked for UBL knew AI SABRI. [redacted] described him as being a skinny person with a long beard and mustache.

[redacted] further disclosed that [redacted] another friend of AI SABRI, was killed in Afghanistan and Khaled [redacted] the right hand man of UBL, who knew AI SABRI, disappeared after the bombing. [redacted] was the head of these guesthouses and he would give permissions to the new recruits to go to the Hajji Habbash guesthouse. [redacted] and AI SABRI worked under [redacted]

[redacted] sold weapons at the guesthouse.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

[REDACTED] heard that [REDACTED] was from Somalia and he was a Christian who converted to Islam later on. [REDACTED] stated he would be able to identify him if he saw a photo.

[REDACTED]

At the end of this interview [REDACTED] requested to see his regular interrogator and stated he wanted to speak with her.

Agent's Comment: A query of the database revealed [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] 00324 [REDACTED] traveled between the guesthouses and the Kandahar airport frequently. The Kandahar airport is synonymous for the UBL compound; where UBL, his family, close associates, and body guards lived. There was a guesthouse for single mujahideen at the compound, as well.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Date: 16 Dec 2008


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____)
MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)
)
Petitioner,)
v.)
)
GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)
)
Respondents.)
_____)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

ISN  CITF (Feb. 10, 2005)



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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE (CITF) REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY		
1. DATE OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY	2. PLACE	3. ACTIVITY NUMBER
10 Feb 05	GTMO, Cuba	
<p>4. REMARKS</p> <p>Witness Interview of: (UNK) [REDACTED]</p> <p>Date/Place: 10 Feb 05/GTMO, Cuba</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] On 8 and 10 Feb 05, SA [REDACTED] DoD CITF, Fort Belvoir, VA, 22060 interviewed [REDACTED] [REDACTED] ISN [REDACTED] linguist [REDACTED] facilitated the Arabic-English translation of the interview. SA [REDACTED] who is also assigned to CITF, observed the interview.</p> <p>[REDACTED] Before the interview, SA [REDACTED] asked how he was doing and [REDACTED] explained he was doing very well and he did not have any complaints. [REDACTED] was provided tobacco (dip), chocolate and nuts, which he accepted.</p> <p>[REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] explained that this agent wanted to clarify certain questions raised during the last interview with [REDACTED] regarding ISN [REDACTED] 00324 [REDACTED] Mashoor AL SABRI (Ref: FM40 20041109 - [REDACTED]). [REDACTED] stated that he remembered the last interview with this agent and it was about Mashoor AL SABRI. [REDACTED] stated that after the last interview, he started to think about AL SABRI and he remembered something, which he had not told to this agent during the last interview. [REDACTED] stated he remembered that in September 2001, AL SABRI came to Tora Bora with another GTMO detainee, [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] further explained that [REDACTED] was the person who carried the large sum of money to the Kandahar airport with AL SABRI. [REDACTED] knew about they (AL SABRI and [REDACTED] carried money because when [REDACTED] was arrested by the Pakistani soldiers and was placed in a Pakistani Jail, he was in the same cell with [REDACTED]. While they were talking, [REDACTED] revealed to him that [REDACTED] and AL SABRI carried 10,000.00 U.S. currency and 20,000.00 Saudi Riyals from Hajji HABBASH guesthouse to Kandahar airport, then to a hospital in Jalal Abad, AF. [REDACTED] further stated that according to [REDACTED] the money had come from outside (NFI).</p> <p>[REDACTED] GUESTHOUSES AND AL SABRI'S DUTIES AT THE GUESTHOUSES: [REDACTED] stated that around May 2001, AL SABRI worked at the Hajji HABBASH and NIBRAS guesthouses. Hajji HABBASH was for new comers and NIBRAS was for the people who have been in Afghanistan for a while, like important people and such. AL NIBRAS was located on the same street where the Islamic University was located. AL SABRI helped new arrivals (fighters) travel from Hajji HABBASH guesthouse to the airport or to Kabul. They were two of them who transported the new comers. The driver was [REDACTED] did not know how to spell [REDACTED] AL SABRI assisted [REDACTED] while he drove. Sometimes people (new soldiers) would want to go to different places like going in the town for shopping or to the airport to fly to what ever their destination was. AL SABRI and [REDACTED] would facilitate their travel, by helping them to find a cab or transporting them with the 12-person bus, [REDACTED] owned/drove. When new people came from the training camps, mainly Al Farouq, they would need groceries and other necessities. AL SABRI would help them to get a taxicab. If some one wanted to go somewhere, AL SABRI would help that person to make reservations for a plane or a car. One time [REDACTED] got some help himself from AL SABRI and [REDACTED]. One day, when [REDACTED] wanted to go to the market, they, AL SABRI and [REDACTED] helped him to find a car. [REDACTED] stated that they found a cab and three of them traveled in the same cab. After [REDACTED] got off the cab, AL SABRI continued his travel to Hajji HABBASH guesthouse. If some one wanted to buy</p>		
[REDACTED]		

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

a weapon, AL SABRI would help them to find a weapon or the weapons dealer. AL SABRI had a friend who was a weapons dealer. Most people would want to buy a personal weapon because it was cheap and the assigned weapons had to be turned in if they were not fighting. [REDACTED] further stated that [REDACTED] the manager of the HAJJI HABBASH guesthouse received his orders through telephone. [REDACTED] would then call [REDACTED] or AL SABRI and pass on the order. [REDACTED] was trying to explain how orders were received and how they were passed down). [REDACTED] would also ask [REDACTED] and AL SABRI to buy if the guesthouse needed items and/or groceries. According to [REDACTED] AL SABRI owned a Yaban (phonetic) brand, model 70 motorcycle. AL SABRI was able to go anywhere with that motorcycle. AL SABRI parked his motorcycle at AL NIBRAS guesthouse. Others (new soldiers) had to have permission papers to travel. According to [REDACTED] if AL SABRI did not admit knowing about AL NIBRAS guesthouse, it was because NIBRAS was a VIP house and AL SABRI did not want anyone to associate him with AL NIBRAS. At the time when AL SABRI worked at the Hajji HABBASH guesthouse, [REDACTED] was the commander of the guesthouse and [REDACTED] was the [REDACTED] over [REDACTED] further explained that [REDACTED] was also known as [REDACTED] (he, who never gets upset). [REDACTED] used to work at Al Farouq and he come from Al Farouq camp to take charge at the guesthouse. He was originally from Bahrain; there fore he was also known as [REDACTED] further explained at the end of his second week of training at Al Farouq, he earned visitation rights and he was able to go out for a visit. [REDACTED] went to AL NIBRAS guesthouse. In AL NIBRAS, [REDACTED] saw AL SABRI. [REDACTED] noticed AL SABRI was very busy with errands he was doing. AL SABRI was carrying messages and taking people to places. [REDACTED] would not dare asking what those messages were or what AL SABRI was doing. AL SABRI was well respected. [REDACTED] know this because AL SABRI was working at the guesthouses, he was an administrator, he had his own room, he was able to travel without any travel documents and/or permission, he was there for a long time and the guesthouse guards respected him. AL SABRI was not one of the transit residences. [REDACTED] stated that AL SABRI did not wear special clothing or anything significant, which would make him important or well respected. There was no such thing, as one would wear a special type of clothing, which would represent importance. AL SABRI was well known in these guesthouses.

[REDACTED] TORA BORA: [REDACTED] further explained when Usama Bin Laden came from Tora Bora to the Hajji HABBASH guesthouse; AL SABRI also came back from Tora Bora. [REDACTED] further explained that while he was at Tora Bora, around September 2001, he observed AL SABRI wearing the commonly issued military vest and with a Kalashnikoff in his hand. [REDACTED] described the issued vest as green, Chinese or Russian made, containing four magazine pockets and four hand grenade pockets. The vest was like an apron, which tied in the back with ties. AL SABRI was wearing a Chinese made vest. AL SABRI, at the time was not carrying hand grenades. [REDACTED] did not see AL SABRI firing his weapon and/or engaging the enemy with his Kalashnikoff (AK-47).

[REDACTED] MONEY: When [REDACTED] was questioned about his earlier statement wherein he stated that he knew AL SABRI carried large sum of money, [REDACTED] stated that Around 1 October 01, a lot of people were arrested while they were escaping to Parachinar, Pakistan. Parachinar was the closest Pakistan border to Tora Bora region where [REDACTED] was located. [REDACTED] was arrested and he was put in Pakistani Jail with [REDACTED] revealed to [REDACTED] that himself [REDACTED] and AL SABRI carried the money from Kandahar to Jalal Abad, Afghanistan to a hospital. [REDACTED] did not know the name of that hospital. According to [REDACTED] they [REDACTED] and AL SABRI) were going to give the money to Sheik (Usama Bin Laden) himself in Kuhat, Afghanistan, but they were not able to complete their mission because the war had started. [REDACTED] further explained that [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED] detained at GTMO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AL SABRI's OTHER ASSOCIATES: [REDACTED] further explained that three of the GTMO detainees should know AL SABRI very well. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] had three brothers, [REDACTED] who was deceased, the oldest one was arrested in Yemen and the other one whom [REDACTED] did not have any further information. [REDACTED] was adamant about there were four [REDACTED] brothers. [REDACTED] also stated that [REDACTED] a Saudi national who is in jail in [REDACTED]

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

would have information about AL SABRI.

[REDACTED] was also questioned regarding his knowledge of [REDACTED] because of a request from another CITF agent assigned to [REDACTED] investigation. SA [REDACTED] stated that he was a bone doctor, studied in Peshawar, Pakistan. He spoke English, Arabic and Urdu. His name was [REDACTED] He used to work in Al Wafa, which was owned by UBL. [REDACTED] though first aid to soldiers who returned from fighting, so they could help the wounded soldiers. In GTMO, [REDACTED] was pretending to be crazy but he was not crazy.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] explained if the case agent wanted to speak with him more on [REDACTED] he would answer his questions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)


Petitioner,)

v.)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)

Respondents.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

 CITF (Feb. 15, 2005)

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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE (CITF) REPORT OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY		
1. DATE OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVIT	2. PLACE	3. ACTIVITY NUMBER
15 Feb 05	GTMO, Cuba	[REDACTED]
4. REMARKS		
<p>Witness Interview of: (UNK) [REDACTED]</p> <p>Date/Place: 15 Feb 05/GTMO, Cuba</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] On 11 and 15 Feb 05, SA [REDACTED], DoD CITF, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060, interviewed ISN [REDACTED] Linguist [REDACTED] facilitated the English-Arabic translation of both interviews.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED] Agent's Comment: SA [REDACTED] is known as [REDACTED] from CITF.</p> <p>[REDACTED] On 15 Feb 05, [REDACTED] stated that he will make an exception for this agent and he will answer all questions truthfully. [REDACTED] stated he knew Mashoor AL SABRI, ISN [REDACTED] 0324 [REDACTED] knew AL SABRI from 98-99, Sa'ha Yemen. They did not have a specific relation. [REDACTED] just knew him. AL SABRI was a Yemeni who lived in Mecca. [REDACTED] met AL SABRI through other friends, [REDACTED] who lived in Saudi Arabia at the time. [REDACTED] did not know why AL SABRI came back to Yemen from SA. According to [REDACTED] AL SABRI's problems started when he rented that house in Yemen from [REDACTED]. It was a big house and many Yemenis rented that house. [REDACTED] explained AL SABRI rented that house because the Yemenis whom he met in SA, lived in that house [REDACTED], the landlord, was a mujahaddin in Bosnia and he was a well-known person.</p> <p>[REDACTED] further explained he knew the people in that house and none of them have any connections with any group because he [REDACTED] knew all these guys and their convictions.</p> <p>[REDACTED] The house (BAYT HABRA) was a place only for sleeping. There was no organization or any type of organized activity in that house. Some of the people who lived in that house came from Bosnia and Afghanistan. Even though some of the residents had plans against Yemen Government, AL SABRI was not associated with them. AL SABRI was the new guy. [REDACTED] further stated that he knew some of the residents of BAYT HABRA had secret plans but no one else knew about those plans. [REDACTED] stated that some of those guys rented three cars with falsified SA passports. Their intent was to sell those cars to make money. They also threatened the Yemeni Interior Minister with death but even they did not like Al Qaeda. [REDACTED] stated, "I know these guys, they did not like Al Qaeda". These people did not agree with Usama Bin LADEN. They wanted to get rid of the Yemeni Government because the Yemeni Government killed Abu Hassan AL MIKTAR, a famous mujahaddin.</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p> <p>[REDACTED]</p>		

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

██████████ stated that many Yemenis who came from SA, stayed in that house and up until now, he knew AL SABRI did not associate with any one or a group in that house. According to ██████████ Yemen Government captured two of the residents, ██████████

██████████ who had come from Bosnian Jihad. After the arrest of ██████████ the Yemeni Government came back and arrested all of the house residents because ██████████ had confessed to their plans. After arresting everyone, including AL SABRI, the Yemeni Government conducted an investigation and found out AL SABRI was not involved with any criminality. So AL SABRI was released. The people who were involved with any criminality were given many years of jail time.

██████████ (the suicide bomber of USS Cole attack) was one of the guys who were found innocent by the Yemeni Government. ██████████ was also in Bosnia and Afghanistan but he did not have connection with the car theft ring, or the house. He just lived there. ██████████ knew Hassan as ██████████ from Bosnia. He was the executer of the USS Cole mission. AL SABRI's problem was started when ██████████ was involved with the USS Cole incident. After ██████████ blew himself up, Americans told Yemeni Government that ██████████ was a part of a cell who lived in that house. Yemeni Investigators and American Investigators did not agree with each other. U.S. Investigators though everyone in that house belonged to an Al Qaeda cell.

██████████ Yemeni Government did not have a problem with Jihadists. If any one wanted to go Bosnia or Afghanistan, it was all right by the Yemeni Government. It was not a crime to participate in a Jihad in another country. After the USS Cole attack, the U.S. Government started to pressure the Yemeni Government and the Yemeni Government started to arrest whoever came from Afghanistan. The Yemeni Government also focused on the car theft ring, among them was also AL SABRI. AL SABRI was certain the Yemeni Government was going to arrest him so the only solution for him was to leave Yemen. Many people left Yemen for Afghanistan and this convinced the U.S. Government that they were terrorists.

██████████ stated this was the true picture, which he knew. ██████████ saw AL SABRI's photograph in FBI's wanted web site, when he ██████████ was in Jordan, about 2003 and he was so surprised because ██████████ himself was a much bigger player and his photograph was not even posted in the FBI web site. AL SABRI did not have anything to do with anything. ██████████ stated that this is what he knew about AL SABRI. If AL SABRI had involved with any wrong doing while he was in Afghanistan, ██████████ would not know about it. The last thing ██████████ knew about AL SABRI was that AL SABRI had left for Afghanistan in 2001 after the USS Cole attack. According to ██████████ this was the first time AL SABRI went to Afghanistan.

██████████ GUESTHOUSES: ██████████ stated that he knew about Hajji HABBASH and AL NIBRAS guesthouses and he knew AL SABRI stayed at Hajji HABBASH guesthouse. All Arabs who stayed in Hajji HABBASH were mainly Yemeni Arabs. Both houses were close to each other and they were in Kandahar City, AF. Hajji HABBASH was close to the Hajji HABBASH mosque. In fact, the whole neighborhood was called Hajji HABBASH. AL NIBRAS was outside the neighborhood but it was still very close to the Hajji HABBASH guesthouse. AL NIBRAS guesthouse was for new people who were being sent to the training camps. The particular thing about AL NIBRAS guesthouse was that the AL NIBRAS management kept the house in tight control and they did not allow any media news get in. They did not want the new comers to hear any bad news and about the war to prevent low moral. Hajji HABBASH was for everyone, new, old, coming to or leaving Afghanistan, everyone stayed at the Hajji HABBASH guesthouse. Especially, people leaving Afghanistan, passed through Hajji HABBASH guesthouse. ██████████ stated that between late February until April 2001, he was there and he saw AL SABRI. At the time, AL SABRI was new to the area and ██████████ believed AL SABRI was not involved.

██████████ The general manager of both houses was ██████████ who oversaw ██████████. At the time, ██████████ was in charge of the Hajji HABBASH and ██████████ was in charge of AL NIBRAS guesthouses. After ██████████ took

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4. REMARKS (Continued)

[REDACTED]
over the AL NIBRAS guesthouse. [REDACTED] was in charge of Hajji HABBASH guesthouse before he was transferred to AL NIBRAS guesthouse.

[REDACTED] stated that before the war, AL SABRI did not have any terrorist related associations. [REDACTED] related again that his knowledge about AL SABRI was up until the war. [REDACTED] would not know if AL SABRI was engaged in any activity after [REDACTED] saw him last.

[REDACTED] stated that AL SABRI did not have a car or a motorcycle while he lived in Yemen. [REDACTED] did not know if AL SABRI had a motorcycle or a car while in Afghanistan.

[REDACTED] further state that when [REDACTED] was captured, he was involved with Al Qaeda. At the time, [REDACTED] lived in BAYT HABRA, Yemen. [REDACTED] was also arrested in Yemen but he was released. After his release, [REDACTED] went to Afghanistan and he was still involved with Al Qaeda. After the USS Cole attack, [REDACTED] went back to Yemen around August 2001 and he was arrested in 2002.

[REDACTED] was questioned how many times AL SABRI was arrested in Yemen. [REDACTED] stated that AL SABRI was arrested twice in Yemen. One was because of the car theft ring incident and the second time was for the USS Cole attack. This was because the Yemeni Government was focused on the people who lived in BAYT HABRA.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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b2 [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)
)
Petitioner,)
v.)
)
GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)
)
Respondents.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

b2 [REDACTED]

b2 [REDACTED]

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b2
SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT:
b2 SUBJECT: 2 2 b1, b2
b1, b2

1. b2 SUMMARY: b1, b2
b1, b2

2. b2 APPROACH USED: b1
3. b2 EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH: b1, b5
4. b2 b2 b2
b1, b2, b5

5. b2 RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING: b1, b5
6. b2 SUMMARY OF INFORMATION b2
b1, b2, b5

1. b2 b1
b1

2. b2 b1
b3 b1 b3 b1
b1

3. b2 b1
b1 b3 b1 b3 b1
b3 b1 b3 b1
b1

4. b2 b1, b2
b1, b2 b1, b2
b1, b2, b5 b1, b2, b5

b1, b2
b1, b2 b1, b2, b5
b1, b2, b5 b1, b2, b5
b1, b2 b1, b2

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5. b2 b1
b1
b3 b1
b1

b1

b1

b2 b1,b2

1. b2 b1 b1
b1 o3 b1
b3 b1
b1

2. b2 b1
b1 B2
b1 b1
b1 b1
b1 b1


3. b2 b1 o1
b3
b1

4. b2 b1
b1

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5. b2 b1
b1




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b1



b2



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b2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)

Petitioner,)

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GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)

Respondents.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

b2

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b2
SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT
b2 SUBJECT: ISN b2 2 b1, b2
b2

REASON(S) FOR VISIT:
b2

REQUIREMENTS ADDRESSED:
b2

1. b2 SUMMARY: b1, b2
b1, b2
b1, b2, b5

2. b2 APPROACH USED: b1
3. EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH: b1, b5
4. COOPERATION/KNOWLEDGEABILITY/TRUTHFULNESS/EXPLOITED: b2
b1, b2 b5

5. b2 RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING: b1, b5
b1, b5

6. b2 SUMMARY OF INFORMATION b2
b1, b2
b1, b2
b1, b2
b1, b2

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b1, b2
[Redacted]

F. b1
b1
[Redacted]

b1 b1, b2, b5
[Redacted]

b1, b2, b5
b1
[Redacted]

b1

b1

b2
[Redacted]

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b2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)

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b2

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b2

SUMMARY INTERROGATION REPORT

b2 SUBJECT: ISN b2 2 b1, b2
b2

REASON(S) FOR VISIT:

b2

REQUIREMENTS ADDRESSED:

b2

1. b2 SUMMARY: b1, b2
b1, b2

b1, b2, b5

2. b2 APPROACH USED: b1

3. EFFECTIVENESS OF APPROACH: b1, b5

4. COOPERATION/KNOWLEDGEABILITY/TRUTHFULNESS/EXPLOITED: b2

b1, b2 b5

5. b2 RECOMMENDED APPROACH FOR NEXT MEETING: b1, b5

b1, b5

6. b2 SUMMARY OF INFORMATION b2

b1, b2

b1, b2

b1, b2

b1, b2

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b1, b2



F. b1


b1



b1

b1, b2, b5

b1, b2, b5



b1



b1

b1

b1

b2





UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)


Petitioner,)

v.)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)

Respondents.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)



Taliban
Sukh

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QQQQ

SUBJ [REDACTED] AF; PK [REDACTED]

CITE: [REDACTED]

SERIAL: [REDACTED]

PASS: [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: [REDACTED] AFGHANISTAN (AF); PAKISTAN (PK).

IPSP: [REDACTED]

SUBJ: [REDACTED] A TALIBAN OFFICE IN QUETTA, PAKISTAN, HELPING ARABS CROSS THE BORDER INTO AFGHANISTAN BY PROVIDING TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS AND COORDINATING LODGING [REDACTED]

WARNING: [REDACTED] THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. . REPORT [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: [REDACTED] 20020217.

REQS: [REDACTED]

SOURCE: [REDACTED] -YEAR OLD SAUDI ARABIA NATIONAL WHO USED THE TALIBAN OFFICE, KNOWN AS DAFTARE TALIBAN, IN QUETTA, PAKISTAN, TO ENTER AFGHANISTAN AND STAYED IN HOUSES RECOMMENDED BY THE OFFICE TO TRAVEL EASILY WITHIN AFGHANISTAN. RELIABILITY HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED.

SUMMARY: [REDACTED] IS A TALIBAN OFFICE IN QUETTA, PAKISTAN, HELPING ARABS CROSS THE BORDER INTO AFGHANISTAN BY COORDINATING TRAVEL AND LODGING FOR A FEE. TALIBAN OFFICE ADVISES ARABS TO STAY AT HOUSES IN KABUL AND KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, DURING TRAVEL.

TEXT: 1. [REDACTED] TALIBAN OFFICE IN PK. THE TALIBAN OFFICE CALLED [REDACTED] IS IN AN UNDETERMINED LOCATION OF QUETTA / [REDACTED] /, PK. (SOURCE COMMENT-- I DO NOT REMEMBER THE LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OR A DESCRIPTION BECAUSE I WAS NOT THERE VERY LONG.) MOST TAXI DRIVERS ARE FAMILIAR WITH [REDACTED] LOCATION AND CAN FIND IT EASILY IF ASKED. [REDACTED] SOMETIMES CHARGES A FEE, DEPENDING ON TRAVEL PLANS, TO PROVIDE ARABS DIFFERENT MEANS TO CROSS THE BORDER INTO AF AND LODGING WHILE TRAVELING. [REDACTED] ENCOURAGES ARABS TO TRAVEL TO THE AF BORDER CHECKPOINT BY TAXI AND CHANGE TRANSPORTATION MEANS TO UNKNOWN TYPES OF MOTORCYCLES PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED FOR TRAVELERS BY [REDACTED] (FIELD COMMENT-- THERE IS A POSSIBILITY [REDACTED] COORDINATED WITH BORDER PATROL GUARDS, SINCE BORDER GUARDS DID NOT REQUIRE SOURCE TO PROVIDE IDENTIFICATION OR PASSPORT.) (SOURCE COMMENT-- I JUST DROVE RIGHT PAST THE CHECKPOINT AND INTO AF.) [REDACTED] INFORMS TRAVELERS OF DIFFERENT LODGING OPTIONS IN AF CITIES ACCORDING TO TRAVEL PLANS. ONE OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS [REDACTED] OFFERS IS FOR TRAVELERS TO STAY IN THE [REDACTED] HOUSE IN KANDAHAR / [REDACTED] /, AF. ANOTHER RECOMMENDATION IS A HOUSE IN KABUL [REDACTED] /, AF KNOWN AS "THE [REDACTED]". (SOURCE COMMENT-- I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE CITIES AND I DO NOT REMEMBER WHERE THE HOUSES ARE LOCATED OR WHAT THEY LOOK LIKE.)

[REDACTED]

(FIELD COMMENT-- THE AL-QAIDA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION USED THE [REDACTED] HOUSE AND POSSIBLY USED "THE [REDACTED] HOUSE.)

COMMENTS: (FIELD COMMENTS)-- 1. [REDACTED] SOURCE WAS NOT FORTHCOMING WITH INFORMATION AND REFUSED TO ADMIT HE KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT AL-QAIDA TERRORIST [REDACTED]. SOURCE CLAIMED HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE ATTACK ON USS COLE UNTIL AFTER 12 OCTOBER 2000, WHEN HE WAS IN AF. SOURCE BECAME INCREASINGLY AGITATED AND RESISTANT, THE LONGER HE WAS INTERVIEWED. REQUEST EVALUATION.

[REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,

Petitioner,

v.

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,

Respondents.

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

IR 4 201 0851 05



[REDACTED]

4. (b)(7)

[REDACTED]

5. (b)(7)

[REDACTED]

6. (b)(7)

[REDACTED]

7. (b)(7)

[REDACTED]

0000

[REDACTED]

8. (b)(7)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

9. ~~10/~~

[REDACTED]

10. ~~11/~~

[REDACTED]

11. ~~12/~~

[REDACTED]

12. ~~13/~~

[REDACTED]

13. ~~14/~~

[REDACTED]

14. ~~15/~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

15. ~~15/~~ [REDACTED]

16. ~~16/~~ [REDACTED]

Q000
PASS: [REDACTED]

TEXT CONTINUES:
17. ~~17/~~ [REDACTED]

18. ~~18/~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

20. 157

[REDACTED]

21. 101

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Q000
PASS: [REDACTED]

TEXT CONTINUES:

[REDACTED]

22. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

24. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26. [REDACTED]

27. [REDACTED]

28. [REDACTED]

PASS: [REDACTED]

TEXT CONTINUES:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

29. [REDACTED]

30. [REDACTED]

31. [REDACTED]

32. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

33. (S)

[REDACTED]

OOOO

PASS:

TEXT CONTINUES:

[REDACTED]

34. (S)

[REDACTED]

35. (S)

[REDACTED]

36. (S)


[REDACTED]

37. (U) SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 38-42 IS SOURCE B.


38. (S)

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]



39. [REDACTED]



40. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

41. 45/

[REDACTED]

PASS: [REDACTED]

TEXT CONTINUES:

[REDACTED]


42. 49/

[REDACTED]


----- END TEARLINE -----

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



2. (U) THIS IIR IS RELATED TO THE FOUR OTHER IIRS REPORTING ON THE



3. (U) SOURCE AVAILABLE FOR RECONTACT INSTR: US NO:



DISSEM: FIELD: NONE.

WARNING: REPORT CLASSIFIED [REDACTED]

DRV FM: G-3.

DECL: 25X1.

BT

#0055

NNNN



b2 [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____)	
MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)	
)	
Petitioner,)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)
)	
GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)	
)	
Respondents.)	
_____)	

b2 [REDACTED]

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b2 [REDACTED]

SERIAL: b2 [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: b2 AFGHANISTAN (AF).

B2 [REDACTED]

SUBJ: b2 [REDACTED] - b1, b2 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED] b2 [REDACTED]

b2 [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: b2 [REDACTED]

REQS: b2 [REDACTED]

SOURCE: b2 [REDACTED] //ISN b2 000324 b2 / B1 [REDACTED]
B1 [REDACTED] T1, T5 [REDACTED]
T1, T5 [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: b2 [REDACTED] b1 [REDACTED]
b1 [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. b2 [REDACTED] b1 [REDACTED]
b1 [REDACTED]
b3 [REDACTED] b1 [REDACTED]
b1 [REDACTED]
2. b2 [REDACTED] b1 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED]
3. b2 [REDACTED] b1 [REDACTED]
b1 [REDACTED]

b1

4. [redacted] b2

b1

[redacted] b1

COMMENTS: 1. [redacted] b2 [redacted] b1, b5

b1, b5

b2, b5

b2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_____)	
MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)	
)	
Petitioner,)	
v.)	Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)
)	
GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)	
)	
Respondents.)	
_____)	

b2

b2

b2 [REDACTED]

SERIAL: b2 [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: b2 AFGHANISTAN (AF).

IPSP: b2 [REDACTED]

SUBJ: b2 [REDACTED] b1, b2 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED] b2 [REDACTED]

b2 [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: b2 b2 [REDACTED]

REQS: b2 [REDACTED]

SOURCE: b2 [REDACTED] b1, b2 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED] b1, b5 [REDACTED]
b1, b5 [REDACTED]

SUMMARY: b2 [REDACTED] b1 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. b2 [REDACTED] b1, b2 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED] b1, b2, b5 [REDACTED]
b1, b2, b5 [REDACTED]

2. b2 [REDACTED] b1 [REDACTED]
b1 [REDACTED] b1, b2, b5 [REDACTED]
b1, b2, b5 [REDACTED]

2.A. b2 [REDACTED] b1, b2 [REDACTED]
2.B. [REDACTED]
2.C. [REDACTED]
b1, b2 [REDACTED]

COMMENTS: 1. b2 [REDACTED] b1, b5 [REDACTED]
b1, b2, b5 [REDACTED]

b2, b5



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MASHUR ABDULLAH AL-SABRI,)

Petitioner,)

v.)

GEORGE WALKER BUSH et al.,)

Respondents.)

Civil Action No. 06-CV-1767 (RMU)

b2



b2 [REDACTED]

b1 [REDACTED]

b1 [REDACTED]

b1 [REDACTED]

b2 [REDACTED]

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
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b2 [REDACTED]


PAGE 3 OF 92 IS DUPLICE OF PAGE 1

b2
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b1



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PAGE 5 OF 92 DUPLICATE OF PAGE 3

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B1

7. b1
2,



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b1



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
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
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


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
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
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


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


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


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Office of Mujahedeen Affairs

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
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b1, b5


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
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
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

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b2
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b2 [REDACTED]

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b1 [REDACTED]

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
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
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
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
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In the name of Allah the Most Gracious the Most Merciful

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b2 [REDACTED]

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b1 [REDACTED]

b2 [REDACTED]

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b2 [REDACTED]

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b1 [REDACTED]

b2 [REDACTED]

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b1 [REDACTED]

b2

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b2 [REDACTED]

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b1 [REDACTED]