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STUDY OF THE EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENTS IN SVN JULY 68

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SUBJECT: Captured Enemy Document Exploitation

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1. Forwarded for your information is the attached MACJ2 Study which describes in detail the system for exploiting captured enemy documents currently in effect in the Republic of Vietnam.

2. The information contained in this study was compiled during visits to US/AiVN/PWMAF units in the field and from records maintained at the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC).

3. Any comments or additional information regarding this study should be forwarded to the ACofS, J2, ATTN: MACJ26.

PHILIP B. DAVIDSON, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Assistant Chief of Staff, J2

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I. (C) INTRODUCTION

A. The purpose of this study is to examine the captured enemy document exploitation program as it presently exists in the Republic of Vietnam.

B. Captured enemy documents have come to represent one of the most valuable sources for first hand intelligence on enemy activities in Southeast Asia. Information gleaned from captured documents provides timely and detailed data on subjects ranging from enemy infiltration, OB, and attack plans to grand strategy. The study describes the chain of events from the time of capture by US, RVNAF, and FWMAF tactical units to division level field exploitation. The study includes methods of evacuation and covers final detailed exploitation at the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) in Saigon.

C. The information presented in this study was developed through a series of visits to US, RVNAF, and FWMAF units by personnel from Exploitation Division, J2 MACV. Information on the operations of the Combined Document Exploitation Center was obtained through operational contacts with the center.

II. (C) DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION IN FIELD UNITS

A. General. Guidelines for the exploitation of captured documents are outlined in FM 30-5 and MACV Directive 381-11. Under the governing directives, it is required that captured documents be expeditiously processed, exploited, and evacuated through the chain of command, with the original forwarded to CDEC within seven days after capture. CDEC summarizes the documents and prepares extract or full translations as appropriate and disseminates them to 120 in and out of country addressees.
The information provided below outlines this system as it operates in US, RVNAF, and FWMAF units in the Republic of South Vietnam.

B. Document Exploitation in US Army Units.

1. During the course of this survey, 12 US army field force, division, and separate brigade level headquarters were visited. Document exploitation procedures in the respective headquarters were generally the same and in consonance with MACV Directive 381-11.

2. Documents captured during tactical operations are usually forwarded directly to brigade, bypassing battalion (Annexes A & B). At brigade a small US/ARVN IPW team screens the documents for information of immediate tactical value. Spot reports are issued on highly significant documents. In operations where IPW teams accompany a battalion size unit, the initial screening is accomplished at battalion level. After the initial screenings have been accomplished and necessary readouts made, the documents are quickly passed to the division or separate brigade IPW section for more detailed processing.

3. At the division IPW section, the documents are screened, logged in, and detailed readouts are often provided. Readouts and summaries provided at this level vary from brief handwritten reports to more formal ones, such as the report prepared by the 101st Abn Div IPW Section, at Annex C. Most of the reports done by the IPW Section receive wide distribution to higher, lower, and adjacent units to include the respective corps headquarters, local ARVN divisions, and FWMAF units as appropriate. At the brigade level, highly significant information is disseminated by spot report. The INTSUM, however, serves as primary means of disseminating information gained. The IPW sections' linguistic and translator support is provided by ARVN MID personnel, as well as by intelligence, security, and special forces headquarters. The number
of personnel assigned to the IPW sections vary from one division to another. However, a typical IPW section, such as that of the 4th US Inf Division, has 25 US interrogators, 7 ARVN interpreter/translator from HQ II Corps, and 20 ARVN personnel from the 12th MIDs. The US and ARVN personnel in the division or separate brigade IPW sections process all incoming documents in addition to conducting IPW interrogations and other administration functions.

4. To enhance the exploitation capability at the IPW sections, 3M reproduction machines have been issued or are programmed for all US/FWMAF divisions and separate brigades. These machines enable copies of significant documents to be made while the originals are expeditiously forwarded to CDEC. It was noted that originals were occasionally loaned (for a short time only) to ARVN divisions for a "quick review" prior to submitting the documents to CDEC. With 3M machines available, copies of significant documents can be made not only for local use but for lateral dissemination to ARVN and FWMAF units.

5. Documents are generally being evacuated to CDEC expeditiously. The majority of the documents are moved by regularly scheduled courier flights. However, units such as the 25th Inf Div, in Cu Chi, are close enough to Saigon to make daily runs to CDEC by road. Under emergency conditions, the 25th Div, as do other units, flies documents into Saigon. It was noted that the 1st Air Cav Div and the 11th ACR made excellent use of helicopters in quickly moving documents from the capturing unit to higher headquarters. Some other units surveyed, however, were not fully utilizing all available forms of retrograde transportation and, as a result, transit time was excessive. It should be pointed out, however, that highly significant documents requiring expedite processing can be transported to Saigon via 1st
MI Bn (ARS). Aircraft couriersing 1st MI Bn (ARS) personnel and equipment travel to Bien Hoa, Da Nang, Can Tho, and Nha Trang on a daily basis. Significant documents sent via the 1st MI Bn (ARS) can arrive in Saigon within hours after dispatch. This service, however, is limited to highly significant documents. Necessary arrangements to use this service can be made through local 1st MI Bn (ARS) detachments located in each corps area.

6. It was noted that most of the documents are sent directly to CDEC by the divisions and separate brigades. HQ II FFORCEN, in Long Binh, and HQ PCV, in Phu Bai, are either bypassed completely or serve as transit points, while the 55th MID, HQ I FFORCEN, in Nha Trang, processes documents, from division level units, enroute to CDEC.

7. Almost all the units visited had SOP's (Annex D) providing guidance for the exploitation of captured enemy documents and the handling of PWs and detainees. For those units not having SOP's, necessary guidance and actual copies of other unit SOP's were provided.

8. During the survey it was noted that very few US IPW sections required their translator personnel to "marry-up" CDEC translations with those summaries or readouts prepared initially by the IPW section. The general practice is for the division G2 administrative personnel to pass incoming CDEC summaries to the appropriate intelligence sections but few of the IPW personnel surveyed were habitually checking CDEC's translations against their own product. The 25th US Inf Div IPW Section was one of the units accomplishing this. Such comparisons not only aid translator personnel but also serve as a check to ensure that all significant intelligence is properly gleaned from the documents.

9. In some cases, it was noted that several IPW sections were consistently attempting to render full translations on documents prior to
forwarding them to CDEC. As MACV Directive 381-11 limits field exploitation to seven days, efforts by small IFW teams to render full translations may tend to stymie the system and sap interrogator assets. Experience has shown that CDEC has the best capability for providing rapid readouts, summaries, and full and extract translations of significant documents, and disseminate findings throughout the intelligence community. IFW teams are encouraged to make copies of those documents selected for full translations so the original can be forwarded to the CDEC for further exploitation.

C. Document Exploitation in US Marine Units.

1. Document exploitation procedures in the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions are extremely well organized and in accordance with the pertinent command directives.

2. During combat operations, battalion and regimental "S2 scouts" ensure that documents captured are quickly placed in intelligence channels. At battalion, documents are screened for information of tactical value prior to being passed to regiment. Very important intelligence gleaned during this screening is disseminated by spot report. The division SOP requires that captured documents must arrive at division within 48 hours after capture. All available forms of retrograde transportation are used to move documents to division.

3. At division level, documents are immediately forwarded to the division Document Translation Center (DTC) where the first in depth processing takes place. Documents are logged in, assigned batch numbers, and screened for items of significance. On very important documents, spot reports are submitted and disseminated to the appropriate units throughout the area. Other documents are reviewed and considered for summary,
full, and extract translation. If action is taken, the report is typed on a stencil and copies are distributed to higher, lower, and adjacent units. The original documents and two copies of the translation report are retained at the DTC for a 72-hour period to enable the DTC to further exploit the documents, should such a request be received from any of the addressees. Documents are then dispatched to CDEC on a daily basis. They are either sent directly to CDEC or via III MAF, which, as with most of the other US force-level headquarters, does not process documents enroute to CDEC, but merely serves as a transit point for documents from subordinate units. Those CDEC publications based on documents captured by Marine divisions are returned to the appropriate DTC where they are compared with the division translation. Both reports are filed and held for a period of three months.

4. The DTC's in the two marine divisions are each manned by a VN linguistically qualified US Marine officer. He is assisted by one Vietnamese civilian and two ARVN interpreters from HQ I Corps. However, unlike the other US divisions, the Marine divisions do not desire the support of an ARVN MLD.

D. Document Exploitation in ARVN Units.

1. The information obtained concerning ARVN methods and procedures for document exploitation was gained through visits to selected ARVN units and the four corps headquarters.

2. Documents captured by ARVN tactical units are normally screened by the commander of the capturing unit for information of immediate tactical value. The documents are passed through intelligence channels where they are screened at each echelon. At the division IPW section, detailed
document readouts are accomplished with the pertinent information published
in the division INTSUM. Reports, in Vietnamese, are submitted to higher,
lower, and adjacent units and agencies, to include the division advisory
team. The division advisory team, assisted by ARVN interpreter personnel,
translates ARVN reports into English and makes distribution to higher,
lower, and adjacent advisory elements and US units. Original documents
normally accompany the report to corps headquarters; however, in some cases,
they are sent directly to JGS in Saigon.

3. Documents captured by non-ARVN elements, such as Regional Forces,
Popular Forces, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups, and the National Police,
though very few in number, are evacuated and exploited by several methods.
The manner in which this is accomplished depends on the unit of capture,
the district (sub-sector) or province (sector) in question, and the
proximity to an ARVN headquarters. Selected districts and provinces have
District Intelligence and Operation Coordination Centers (DIOCC) and a
Permanent Office of the Province Intelligence Coordinating Centers (PO-PICC)
which have representation of the local military and civilian intelligence
agencies. Should a document be captured in a district or province with a
DIOCC or PO-PICC, information gained receives wide dissemination at the
local level. In areas where these centers and committees have not been
established, the district or province chief is responsible for disseminating
information gained and for coordinating evacuation. When evacuation of
documents by the National Police or GVN agencies is accomplished, a copy
of the document or report is furnished to the respective corps headquarters.
Documents evacuated through military channels go through the sub-sector
and sector S2s to the corps headquarters. In cases where ARVN divisions
are located in the immediate area, documents are turned over to the
division for transfer to corps headquarters.

4. At corps headquarters, documents are reviewed and analysed. Reports are disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units; original documents are forwarded to JCS. The US Senior Intelligence Advisor in the corps headquarters is briefed on a daily basis and provided reports on captured documents, or on occasion receives original documents or copies of the originals. The reports are translated and distributed, while in the case of original documents, copies are made and couriered to CDEC through US channels.

5. JCS receives, reviews, and passes the selected documents to CDEC for final exploitation.

E. Document Exploitation in ROK Units.

1. The HQ ROK Field Force Vietnam, in Nha Trang, was visited in the course of this study. Captured enemy document exploitation procedures were very well organised.

2. Documents captured during ROK operations are first screened at regimental level. One ROK officer and an ARVN MID interpreter/translator perform the initial screening and render spot reports on very important documents. The documents are then forwarded to the MID at the respective division or the ROK marine separate brigade where additional screenings are accomplished. Intelligence concerning the division or separate brigade TAOR is ferreted out and reports in Korean are disseminated to higher and lower units. Copies of the original documents and reports are subsequently passed to the ROK field force MI Group.

3. The MI Group at field force level is supported by an ARVN MID and Vietnamese civilian personnel. At this level, documents are rescreened for information of intelligence value. Significant findings are published in
both Korean and Vietnamese as full and extract translations, and reports
are rendered as appropriate. Copies of the Korean reports are sent to
the 55th MI Det, at I FFORCEV HQ, for translation into English and dissemination.
Normally, copies of originals and reports are forwarded to G2, ROK Forces
Headquarters, in Saigon after processing. However, in cases where the
volume of documents received is too large for the MI Group to handle, the
overflow is forwarded to G2, ROK Forces, in Saigon, unprocessed.
Consideration is being given to passing documents from the MI Group to I FFORCEV,
in Nha Trang, for forwarding direct to CDEC via US channels. This change
would result in a more rapid dissemination of findings to the total intel-
ligence community.

F. Document Exploitation in Australian Units.

1. Elements of the 1st Australian Task Force were visited and cap-
tured document exploitation programs and procedures were found to be very
efficient and well regulated.

2. Documents captured by Australian tactical units are first screened
at company level. During operations, ARVN interpreter/translator personnel
accompany the tactical elements. Additionally, an interpreter/translator
is located in the company CP. Initial readouts are passed to battalion
and to the Intelligence Officer, at Task Force, via the command net.
Depending on the location, the nature of the documents, and the type and
availability of transportation, documents are evacuated through battalion
or sent directly to Task Force Headquarters. Frequently this evacuation
is accomplished by helicopter.

3. The Task Force Interrogation Unit renders the first in-depth
processing of the documents. Here documents are logged in, assigned
control numbers, and screened for significant information. Summaries,
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extract, and full translations are made as appropriate, and receive area-wide distribution. Original documents, after full processing has been accomplished, are forwarded to CDEC with copies of the translation report. It should be noted that the Task Force Interrogation Unit is supported by the 10th ARVN MIB and is provided ARVN translator/interpreter personnel from III Corps HQ. With this support the Australians have the capability to fully exploit the documents in their own headquarters, passing the documents to CDEC after full exploitation has been accomplished. Should a large cache of documents be captured, which would be beyond the processing capability of the Task Force Interrogation Unit, the documents would then be couriered directly to CDEC for a rapid readout.

III. (C) DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION AT CDEC

A. Historical and Organisational Outline. Prior to October 1965, the captured document exploitation program was primarily a function of RVNAF. US participation in this effort was primarily advisory in nature, performed by approximately 8 US military and 30 local national translators. However, as the conflict intensified, the value of captured enemy documents as one of the primary intelligence sources became readily apparent, as did the need for the implementation of national level combined documents exploitation program. On 1 October 1965, the CDEC was established and the necessary actions to enlarge and improve the program were undertaken. In October 1966, the center was relocated to a newly constructed facility and the personnel strength was increased to 14 US military, 77 local national civilians, and 28 RVNAF personnel. Today the center is authorized more than 350 personnel. The activities of the center are guided by a US and an RVNAF co-director operating under the staff supervision of the J2, MACV and the J2/JOS, respectively. CDEC has the mission of supporting all US, RVNAF, and FWMAF
units by providing them, on a timely basis, with raw information of intelligence value derived from captured enemy documents.


1. Receipt, Screening, and Categorisation.

a. The initial stages of document exploitation commence at the time the documents arrive at CDEC (Annex F). As previously stated, field units have a maximum of seven days to accomplish tactical screening and field exploitation. However, conditions such as circumstances surrounding the capture, the criticality of the information, and the availability of local translators will influence the amount of time taken for tactical exploitation. Documents arrive at CDEC in every conceivable type of container ranging from sandbags and cans to trailer loads; they are usually delivered via established message center, mail channels, or courier system. During the period 1 January to 31 May 68, CDEC received 1,841,525 pages of captured documents from field units (Annex F).

b. Documents arriving at the center are first logged in according to unit of dispatch and capture data taken from the Document Batch Tags, such as date, location, and capturing unit. The documents are then carefully screened by highly qualified Vietnamese civilian intelligence specialists. During this phase, the documents are segregated into five categories to establish priorities for exploitation and disposition.

(1) Type A documents contain highly significant information such as the location of minefields, planned ambushes, and impending attacks. Documents in this category receive immediate processing, with the intelligence obtained being returned to the capturing unit, and disseminated to appropriate commands and staff sections by electrical message of "Immediate" or "Flash"
(2) Type B documents are those which contain intelligence information of value to field commanders and staff sections, but which are not of sufficient urgency to be classified as Type A. Experience has shown that the majority of the documents exploited are in the Type B category. During the two-month period immediately following the 1968 VC/NVA Tet offensive the center received more than one-half million pages of captured enemy documents. After screening all the documents, approximately 50,000 pages, or 10%, were considered to be of intelligence value and almost all were Type B documents.

(3) Type C documents contain information of marginal intelligence value. During the initial screening, documents in this category, such as personal documents of Vietnamese civilians which may have been erroneously picked up by FWMAF units, are passed to the ARVN element of CDEC for rescreening prior to being returned through channels.

(4) Type D documents, primarily propaganda materials, are exploited by the center only if they contain new or significant information. Normally material of this nature is forwarded to the appropriate information or psychological warfare agency for exploitation.

(5) Type E documents, those containing information on the enemy communications system, are passed on to the appropriate communications intelligence agencies for detailed processing.

2. Summaries, Extracts, and Full Translations.

   a. Upon completion of the screening process, documents selected for exploitation (Types A & B) are passed to the document evaluators. At this point, draft summaries in English are made (see Annex H) and then are edited by US personnel.
b. Selected documents (Types A & B) are processed in accordance with in-house priorities and are summarised, in English and Vietnamese, assigned IR and document log numbers, and published daily as CDEC Bulletins (Annexes I & J). Summaries of significant documents are published in a daily message format while information from Type A documents is expeditiously disseminated by spot report.

c. In addition to CDEC bulletins and messages, documents containing information beyond the scope of a summary are published in extract or full translation format in English by the US element at CDEC (Annex K). The ARVN element publishes Vietnamese versions of CDEC bulletins, and prepares detailed document studies in Vietnamese, as directed by the J2/JCS.

d. Each CDEC bulletin contains one or more captured document summaries. For ease of handling by intelligence analysts, simplification of distribution, and for the sake of economy, each CDEC bulletin is collated to contain summaries of documents captured in given corps areas or relating to corps areas of interest. CDEC's typing and proofing sections, along with the reproduction and distribution sections, operate on a 24-hour basis to ensure maximum daily output. In the reproduction section, approximately 75,000 impression pages are printed per day, in addition to approximately 50,000 blank DD forms 1396 (IR forms). On a daily basis, CDEC distributes bulletins, extracts, and full translations to approximately 113 addressees ranging from tactical units in the field to national level agencies.


a. In addition to processing captured enemy correspondence and publications, CDEC also processes captured enemy films and voice tapes. Information gleaned from these items is published in message and CDEC Bulletin format and receives wide distribution to in and out of country users.
b. During OPERATIONS JUNCTION CITY and CEDAR FALLS, as an example, CDEC received some 67 reels of captured enemy film. These films, captured near the Cambodian border by the 173rd Abn Bda., were produced by the COSVN motion picture facility. After summarizing the films, CDEC prepared a bilingual (English/Vietnamese) informational guide which furnished a short narrative of the scenes depicted and rendered a preliminary assessment of the purpose and quality of the films (Annex L). Composite reels with accompanying sound tracks were provided for many of the films. Other films and voice tapes receive similar processing at CDEC. Captured film and tapes held at CDEC are made available to tactical units and intelligence staff sections on a temporary loan basis.

4. Storage: Microfilm Storage and Retrieval, and Archives.

a. Recognizing the need to rapidly and efficiently handle large amounts of raw intelligence information in support of the expanding intelligence requirements in Vietnam, the US element of CDEC is equipped with an Automated Document Storage and Retrieval System (ADSRS). This system has been incorporated into the DOD worldwide Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS). The mission of the ADSRS at CDEC is to store, on annotated microfilm, all intelligence documents pertaining to the Southeast Asian Theater, and to automatically retrieve, upon request, those documents containing information required by field commanders and staff agencies.

b. CDEC's data base, comprising some 1,152,000 document pages, contains a varied assortment of intelligence documents. Captured documents in the system are photographed, with translations, for input into the ADSRS. Other documents in the system include interrogation reports of the Combined
Military Interrogation Center (MIC), the National Interrogation Center (NIC), field commands, intelligence information reports, agent reports, intelligence summaries, and periodic intelligence reports.

c. Each document placed into the system is coded by a specific identification of the document and by a detailed indexing of its contents. Queries run against the system might include description of an air defense site in a given province, all the military installations in a particular locale, OBS information on specific units, or the like. Documents containing information to satisfy the queries can be retrieved in any of several ways: images on a viewing screen for immediate browsing, hard copies, coded 35mm microfilm, and uncoded 16mm microfilm.

d. To assist national level intelligence agencies and staff sections, CDEC's complete 35mm microfilm data base has been furnished CINCPAC and DIA; updating of this data base is done on a continuing basis. As an additional service, major US field units and selected staff sections have been issued 16mm reader/printers. Selected subjects from the data base, such as those in Annex M, have been placed on 16mm microfilm cartridges and made available to appropriate consumers on a loan basis. In addition, CDEC personnel make periodic visits to major headquarters in-country to photograph their intelligence files and return them to the units in 16mm microfilm cartridges for permanent retention in 16mm microfilm format.

e. The final form of document storage at CDEC is the archives, which under current agreements, are maintained by the ARVN element of CDEC. Since enemy documents captured in the Republic of Vietnam are legally the property of the Vietnamese government, the archives at CDEC serve as the central repository for captured enemy documents. Presently there are approximately 760,954 US-captured pages and 192,455 ARVN-captured pages, totalling 953,409
f. GDEC "Go Teams" are available to provide special support to major tactical commands during upcoming operations. During OPERATIONS CEDAR FALLS (Jan 67) and JUNCTION CITY (Feb - May 67), three GDEC "Go Teams" were provided. Field commanders were furnished on-the-spot oral summaries and immediate readouts of highly significant documents. Selected documents were expeditiously evacuated to GDEC where couriers were able to wait for readouts on significant documents and return to their units with the findings.

5. Reference Publications.

a. To facilitate the daily operations at GDEC, it has been necessary to develop a growing series of reference publications. Though not a mission function, in-house training requirements coupled with command and field intelligence needs have made it mandatory to develop such a series.

b. The Viet Cong Terminology Glossary is a lengthy compilation of terms and jargon employed by VC/NVA forces (Annex N). Experience has shown that many who speak Vietnamese as a native language encounter confusion and uncertainty when queried about the exact meaning of much of the VC/NVA terminology. This glossary serves not only as an excellent training aid for translator personnel at GDEC, but also assists intelligence personnel in field units as well as those in CONUS agencies. Other GDEC reference publications include the VC Terminology for Irregular Forces and an intelligence guide for the Identification of VC and NVA Documents. The compilation of VC/NVA Cover Designations and Letter Box Numbers has proved to be very useful document for intelligence analysts. These publications were primarily designed to be used at GDEC; however, due to the high degree of
interest displayed, these referenced publications have been distributed throughout the intelligence community.

IV. (C) CONCLUSIONS.

A. General. It was determined by this study that the majority of the units are exploiting documents in an excellent manner. Documents are quickly exploited in the field and evacuated through channels as prescribed by MACV directives, or the pertinent ARVN or FWMAF directives. In no case was it noted that documents were permitted to remain unexploited for any protracted period of time. Although the approach varied somewhat as to the degree of translation necessary for "field exploitation," documents were moved to the CDEC generally within the authorized time frame. The following comments are not intended to apply to every unit but are included as areas that the intelligence officers might consider as points that were noted in one or more of the units visited.

B. Captured Document SOP's. It was noted that units having more comprehensive document exploitation SOP's had more effective processing and evacuation procedures. There was the notable exception to this, the 101st Airborne Division. Although the unit has no SOP applicable to processing captured documents, it handles them in an excellent manner. Command interest and the dynamic efforts of the intelligence personnel are responsible for this. On the other hand, other units not having an SOP, or an inadequate SOP, were inconsistent in their compliance with the pertinent document exploitation directives. With the constant turnover of personnel, an SOP is particularly appropriate in that it provides newly assigned personnel ready references appropriate to their unit. The 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions, for example, have detailed SOPs and it is apparent
that a lot of thought and effort goes into their exploitation program. Their record in document exploitation has been superior.

C. Utilisation of CDEC Publications.

In the interest of timeliness, CDEC disseminates its publications direct to various units separated from their headquarters by great distances or detached from their parent unit. However, requests for CDEC to distribute publications to several sections within a headquarters is considered unreasonable and cannot be filled. The number of copies of CDEC publications distributed to a given headquarters is decided by the G2/S2 of the unit concerned. The number of copies received by similar units varies greatly from one unit to another. For example, 1 US division is receiving only 1 copy of each CDEC publication, while another is receiving 28 copies. The number of copies received by most other divisions falls midway between these extremes. Periodic reviews must be conducted by G2/S2 personnel to determine that the number of copies of CDEC publications received is neither insufficient nor excessive.

D. Utilisation of Retrograde Transportation. Generally speaking, most units attempted to expeditiously move the documents from the capturing unit back through channels to the division headquarters where full exploitation could be effected. However, many units failed to utilise all available means of retrograde transportation such as medevac choppers, supply vehicles returning from the field units, mess trucks, and the like. In fact, one unit was so formal about the arrangements between the brigade and the division that the IR documents were wrapped, tagged, and dispatched through the regular AG distribution channels from brigade to division, thereby delaying the documents sometimes as much as 24-72 hours. Here again, an adequate SOP would provide guidance for all concerned on
the best methods of moving documents.

E. Field Exploitation. In some cases, it was noted that G2s are tasking IPW sections to render translations beyond the scope of the initial readout or summary. IPW sections are not geared for making lengthy translations nor processing large volumes of documents and, in being required to do so, it not only taxes IPW personnel, but it prevents them from performing other IPW functions and delays the documents receipt at CDEG. If G2s would limit their requirements to readout summaries of immediate tactical information, this would allow the originals to be expeditiously forwarded to CDEG. In those cases where the documents are of such a nature that they must be retained, copies should be made on the 3M reproduction machines and the originals forwarded to CDEG. In the event a large cache of documents beyond the capability of the IPW section should be captured or uncovered, the documents can be couriered to CDEG where an expeditious readout can be provided while the courier waits. Experience has shown that CDEG is not only capable of screening thousands of readouts and summaries, but CDEG is also capable of quickly distributing intelligence gained to consumers throughout the intelligence community.

F. CDEG "Go Team." When in their "Go Team" status in the rapid screening of large volumes of documents captured or uncovered during major tactical operations, the IPW sections are limited in their translation capability when dealing with large volumes of documents. Therefore, before a team is requested, consideration should be given to bundling the documents and dispatching them to CDEG by special courier. Under the direct supervision of the co-directors and the senior Vietnamese intelligence analysts, CDEG is capable of quickly and thoroughly screening
thousands of pages of captured documents. Significant information gained can be furnished the waiting courier and reported by spot report throughout the intelligence community.
INTERROGATION SECTION
101st Military Intelligence Detachment (Prov)
APO San Francisco 96383
AVROC-MI-P

2 July 1968

BATCH NUMBER: 101-323-68
DPCG: 291030 June 68, TD 569069
CAPTURING UNIT: 42/327th Inf, 101st Abn Div
CIRCUMSTANCES: Search of HU Complex
DATE RECEIVED AT IPW SECTION: 30 June 1968

ITEM SUMMARY

1 List of 48B Medical unit of Tri Thien Zone (Quang Tri and Thua Thien and
Hue). 94 names on list. Unlisted:
   LE DANG DUNG, Capt, Doctor
   DAU KHUY, Capt, PO
   HOANG DUC THAI, 1Lt, IO
   PHAM TO, 1Lt, Oriental Medicine
   DANG VAN TUNG, 2Lt, Asst PO

2 Notebook of weapons of sick and wounded soldiers in 48B Medical Treatment
   unit. 1 Jan 68. 16 persons on list.

3 Official letter from H-1 rear political office to 48B Medical Treatment
   on use and maintenance of radios. Signed by MAJ NGUYEN VAN HAM, CO, 15
   Jan 68:

4 Unit Strength book for 48B Medical Treatment Unit, dated 20 Feb 68.
   4 Cpte 22 Cpls
   3 1Lts 31 FPCs
   1 2Lt 8 Pts
   5 Aspirants 12 Workers
   9 Snr Sgts
   7 Sgts

Cadre:
   4 Doctors
   1 Oriental Medicine
   10 Med Spec
   35 Medics
   1 Chemist
   5 Public Affairs Officials
   1 Ordinance Asst
   1 Transportation
   2 Finance
   5 Security guards
   3 clerks
   10 Mess personnel
   3 Adjutants
   1 PO
   5 HQs
   1 Messenger

5 Transfer order to Miss Muoi from 4th Aht Hospital to 48B Medical Treatment
   unit, signed by MAJ DANG VINH DUNG, Chief of Surg Office, 11/10/68.

6 Hospital notice to Lt Pui Cong Thuan (Cl-FTC) issued from 48B Medical
   Treatment unit, signed by QUANG, 25 Nov 68.

7 Commendation to cadre of Medical Treatment Unit:
   PHAN QUANG, Lt, Doctor
   NGUYEN VAN THUYET, Corps, Medic
   PHAN VAN QUANG, Asp, Med Spec
   NGUYEN HONG HAI, Med Supply
   NGUYEN HONG MINH, Med Staff, Corp, Adj
   MISS NGUYEN THUYET HANH, Corp, Nurse

GROUP 4
DATED AT 3 YEARS
ASSIGNED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10
ITEM 8
Commendation letter to 48B Medical Treatment Unit issued from rear Zone Agency. Signed by LTC HOANG KHUE, CO, signed 1 Nov 67.

9
Commendation Letter: Military Exploit liberation Medal 1st Class to 48B and 48C Medical Treatment Units, Signed by COC NGUYEN XUAN HOANG, FO, Commander in Chief, 4th Zone Front Line. 27 Oct 67

10 Recommendation Letter from Rear Agency issued to:
   - 48th Medical Treatment Unit
   - 48th Rear Section
   - 48th External Section

11 Songbook of NGUYEN VAN CUU

12 Medical Books

13 48B Medical Treatment Unit Correspondence Book

14 Notes on Missions and meetings of 48B Medical Treatment Unit for 1963, 64, 65, 66.

15 List of Sick and wounded soldiers treated from 1963 to 1966.

16 Recommendation Letter for Cadre in Medical Treatment Unit.

/s/ Nelson F. Smith, Jr.
for JOSE A BOLTON
CPT, MI
Chief Interrogator
INTERROGATION SECTION
101st Military Intelligence Detachment (Prov)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVIC-MI-P

2 July 1968

SUBJECT: Document Readout

BATCH NUMBER: D-101-323A-68
DPOC: 291030 June 1968/YD 569 069
CAPTURING UNIT: A/2/327th Inf, 101st Abn Div
CIRCUMSTANCES: Search of hut complex
DATE RECEIVED AT IPW SECTION: 30 June 1968

ITEM SUMMARY

1. Ten oaths of discipline of the Communist Army.

2. 48th Treatment Team's medical records dating from 13 Feb 1967 to 19 Jan 1968. All wounded patients were from 803rd Rept and 90th Unit. 1st Lt (Doctor) PHAN QUANG and his assistants in charge.

3. Emergency treatment records which haven't been filled out.


5. Medical tool list.

6. Surgical tools (materials) were transferred from M/Sgt NGUYEN XUAN HINH to a person named DAO, PTLD (FAU THUAT LUU DONG Mobile Medical Team).


8. Paper containing written poems (no military information).

/s/Nelson F. Smith, Jr.
for JOE A BOLTON
CPT, MI
Chief Interrogator

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEARS INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED
ANNEX C

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERROGATION SECTION
101st Military Intelligence Detachment (Prov)
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDG-MI-P

SUBJECT: INTERROGATION REPORT/DOCUMENT READOUT

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIBUTION:
COMUSMACV (Attn: MACVJ26) Saigon 2
CG, III MAF Da Nang 2
CG, PCV (Attn: G2 Coll) Phu Bai 10
CG, TF SRAY Phu Bai 2
CG, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle (Attn: G2) 3
CG, 1st Air Cav, Camp Evans (Attn: G2/IPW) 2
CG, 1st ARVN Div (Attn: G2/IPW Advisors) 2
SA, 1 CORPS, Da Nang 4
CO, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle 4
CO, 2nd Bde, 101st Abn Div, LZ Sally 4
CO, 3rd Bde, 82nd Abn Div, Gia Le 4
CO, Div Arty, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle 1
CO, 8th Radio Research Fld Sta, Phu Bai 1
CO, 326th Engr Bn, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle 1
CO, 501st Sig Bn, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle 1
CO, 2/17th Cav, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle 1
CO, 101st Avn Bn, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle 1
CO, 308th CBT Avn Bn, Camp Eagle 1
SA, Thua Thien Prov 1
CO, 9th ARVN MI Det, Camp Eagle 1
CO, 17th ITT Det, 3rd Med Bn, Phu Bai 1
CO, Det C-1, 5th SFG (ABN), Da Nang 1
CI Section, 101st Abn Div, Camp Eagle 5

Special

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Handling Detainees Documents and Material

1. PURPOSE: To specify policies and procedures for classifying and processing detainees, and for handling captured documents and material.

2. SCOPE: The procedures used in processing personnel documents and material are generally similar. However, certain differences do occur. This regulation establishes a system for each category.

Handling Documents

1. GENERAL: Captured enemy documents are a valuable source of intelligence information. All captured documents, regardless of subject of content, will be processed by the most expeditious means.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES: a. The Regt S-2 exercises primary staff responsibility for intelligence exploitation. He also exercises staff supervision of the 511th MI Det in handling, processing and exploiting such papers.

   b. Commanders will:

      (1) Insure that all subordinate elements promptly report and evacuate all captured documents.

      (2) Insure that captured documents are not released to local civilian or military authorities without approval from the Regt S-2.

   c. 511st MI Det will:

      (1) Maintain accountability of all documents evacuated by Regt elements.

      (2) Record all pertinent data and transmit it to the Regt S-2.

      (3) Provide translator support to Squadron level for local exploitation.

      (4) Evacuate captured documents to higher headquarters for continued exploitation.
(5) Provide five copies of translation or screening of documents (not captured with personnel), one for Regt S-2, one for capturing Squadron S-2, one forwarded with document, one for next higher headquarters, and one for IPW file.

3. PROCEDURES: a. Captured documents will be screened by capturing unit for information of immediate tactical value. The documents are then tagged and promptly forwarded to the Regt S-2. Tags will include the following information as a minimum: capturing unit, date/time group of capture, location of capture. A brief summary of documents contents is desired, if possible.

b. Documents with a bearing on Free World and RVN security, of a high counterintelligence value, or containing significant information of Viet Cong, or NVA policies will be forwarded without delay.

c. Documents found with a PW are tagged and moved by the escort to the PW collection point.

d. Technical documents captured with equipment are tagged and kept with the equipment.

e. Cryptographic Documents:

(1) Documents containing only codes or charts pertaining to enemy messages or message traffic are handled as SECRET and delivered promptly to Regt S-2.

(2) Cryptographic Documents containing Order of Battle information are also handled as SECRET and forwarded promptly to the Regt S-2. A copy of this document is also kept in normal evacuation channels and notification is made to the G-2, next higher headquarters by spot report.

f. The capture of film and tape recordings is reported immediately by spot report and evacuated by the most expeditious means to the Regt S-2.

4. REFERENCES: a. FM 30-5

b. MACVDir 20-5

c. MACVDir 381-1

d. MACVDir 381-46

e. MACVDir 190-3
C6 AND THE VC KONTUM CITY UNIT WILL ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE ATTACK. THE ATTACKERS ARE REQUIRED TO OCCUPY AT ALL COSTS THEIR DESIGNATED TARGETS DURING THE NIGHT AND REPEL RVNAF REINFORCEMENTS DURING THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE 406TH BN WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAIN DIRECTION OF THE ATTACK. THIS UNIT IS TO SEIZE THE PROV CHIEF'S OFFICE AND SECTOR HQ AND KILL ALL OCCUPANTS; OVERRUN THE LOI HO AREA (WHERE ONE SF BN, US CIA AGENCY, KONTUM PRISON AND A TRAINING SCHOOL ARE LOCATED). SUBSEQUENT MISSION OF 406TH BN IS TO ATTACK CAM NGUYEN HUE, DESTROY DAKHIA BRIDGE AND TO INTERCEPT RVNAF REINFORCEMENTS FROM PLEIKU UTILIZING B40 RL AND MINES. THE 304TH BN IS RESPONSIBLE FOR A SECONDARY ATTACK TO DESTROY THE AIRFIELD AND KONTUM TRAINING SCHOOL. C3 INF CO OF 304TH BN WILL ACT AS RESERVE. COMBAT SUPPORT ELM OF 304TH BN WILL SUPPORT THE BATTALION'S MAIN DIRECTION OF ATTACK AND HELP INF UNITS BREAK THROUGH THE TRAINING SCHOOL. SUBSEQUENT MISSION OF 304TH BN IS TO SUPPORT UNITS 11 AND 15 OF 406TH BN IN THE ATTACK ON THE PROV CHIEF'S OFFICE AND THE DESTRUCTION OF DAKHIA BRIDGE. THE KONTUM BN UNIT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUPPRESSION OF RVNAF OFFICERS AND OVERRUN KONTUM PRISON TO LIBERATE PRISONERS. UNIT C6 IS TO ELIMINATE RVNAF ELM GUARDING THE DAKHIA BRIDGE AND INTERCEPT REINFORCEMENTS FROM PLEIKU. DOCUMENT FURTHER INDICATES THAT VC UNDERGROUND FORCES IN KONTUM PROV CAPITAL ARE INADEQUATE. SUMMARY OF DOCUMENT WILL BE PUBLISHED UNDER CDEC DOC LOG #07-1137-68, AND ALL TRANSLATION WILL FOLLOW UNDER ITR #6 027 7125 68. OP 4
ANNEX G

FROM: COMAGAG
TO: CO, ProvCorps, VINA
CO, IFFV, NHA Trang VUMNLF
CDR, 7th AF, Saigon VUMFKA
CO, 4th US INF Div, Pleiku VUMVBB
DSA, II CTZ, Pleiku VUMVBB
SA, 24th STZ, Kontum VUMVBB
PSA, Kontum Prov (VUMVBB)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FOR 02

SUBJECT: SPOT REPORT (U)

(C) INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM ENEMY DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY 24TH STZ RVNAF II CTZ ON 1 JUL 68 VIC AS8004, AND RECEIVED CIDEC ON 2 JUL 68 DISCLOSES A PLAN OF ATTACK ON KONTUM PROVINCE CAPITAL BY THE VC KONTUM PROVINCE UNIT ON AN UNSPECIFIED DATE. DOCUMENT INDICATES THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACK IS TO SEIZE KONTUM PROVINCE CAPITAL AND TO HELP LOCAL POPULATION GAIN CONTROL OVER THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION. THE ATTACK WILL BE EXECUTED BY 406TH BN WITH UNITS 14, 15 AND 207; AND 304TH BN WITH 1ST, 2D, 3D INF CO AND A COMBAT SUPPORT ELM.
Subject: (C) Diverted by the Paris Peace Talks, VC Cadre and Men Doubt the Success of General Offensive

(C) Directive dated 5 Jun 68, originated by SUB-COSVN Current Affairs Committee, directed on 13 Jun 68 by PCV.

The directive addressed to "urgently correct erroneous ideology and assessment of the Peace Talks at Paris and the General Offensive." The document states that according to reports from various localities, units, and cadres, the VC had diverted its efforts to the most contested areas, including low-level cadres in the Saigon area, and had been broadcasting and recruiting people every day in order to follow the Paris Peace Talks. At the beginning, they expected an immediate result, but they became pessimistic after learning that the war may be escalated and prolonged due to US refusal to withdraw troops from SVN and to cease bombing completely in SVN. They even argued that "if we respond to the US proposals, our troops will withdraw to SVN and US troops withdraw to the United States and then participate in a Dinh-Thieu-Ky style election, how can we expect to win victory?" In conclusion, these people kept debating in accord with enemy propaganda and quit believing in the complete victory which would be obtained in the all-out violent attack and general uprising. In areas which were subject to FWMAF/RVNAF counterattacks, VC cadres who were demoralized by difficulties and hardships.

The directive makes clear the VC's lack of appreciation for the great victories achieved throughout SVN, and it is urgent to warn our allies and friends that the VC's situation is insecure, and we must handle accordingly.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

The document is releasable to P.W. VVTR and FREE MILITARY ATTACHES FORCES.
especially in the Saigon-Cholon-Giadinh areas, became pessimistic and doubted the complete victory to be obtained during the all-out attack and general uprising. As the corrective measure, A51 urged addressees to make maximum use of the COSVN Resolutions 6 and the Resolution dated 14 May 1967 in political indoctrination sessions. Document states that every cadre and combatant should be indoctrinated to fully understand Chairman Ho's teaching: "More difficulties and hardships to be encountered when reaching victory" so that they would harden their standpoint and accomplish their missions under all circumstances. In regard to the Paris Peace Talk, A516 reaffirmed that: "everybody must realize that the aggressors were forced to de-escalate the war; restrict bombings on NVN and come to the Paris conference as defeated aggressors who were condemned by the entire world. As for victorious us, we came to the Paris conference as men who have fought for a right cause with the sympathy and support of all people in the world. This was a great political success for us and a bitter-political setback for the enemy. Everybody should also realize that the Paris Peace Talk is only part of our diplomatic struggle aiming at winning stronger support for our resistance against Americans from all people in the world. This diplomatic struggle is very important but it cannot bring forth decisive effects. It can expand our victories or create more favorable conditions for us really in the war. This peace negotiation will become meaningful only when we succeed in the all-out attack and general uprising. Under such circumstances, this peace negotiation will be a favorable condition for the enemy to accept a complete fall or a withdrawal from SVN with honor. Therefore, we must commit all our might to successfully implement an all-out attack and general uprising to seize powers and cannot sit and wait for the Paris Peace Talk or any other diplomatic struggle."

(0) CKGC COMMENT: No Further Exploitable Information
(C) VC/NVA Plan to Attack Saigon.

(C) Notebook, entries by an individual from an U/I rear service unit, contains a series of resolutions recorded by the author while attending a political training course conducted by an unspecified agency. The first entry with the heading "City Resolution" provides an assessment of RVN/ARVN and VC/NVA in the aftermath of the all-out attacks against Saigon during the Lunar New Year period. The resolution also points out that although numerous successes were achieved during these attacks, serious mistakes were made by the VC/NVA, which resulted in a failure to trigger a people's uprising. In addition, the "Second Front" could not be started until a very late stage of the campaign. These shortcomings were attributed to the very insufficient motivation conducted among the population and an over-simplified command organization which had failed to carry the attacks to a successful end.

In a paragraph with the heading "Mission and Requirements for the City", the resolution prescribed that during the forthcoming attack on Saigon, every effort will be made to capture maximum locations in the City, especially Q1 and Q2 and 21st Precincts in Saigon, which must be seized and held for several days. In any event, the local elements which were due to promote a people's uprising should be considered as of paramount importance. Speaking of advantages and disadvantages, document states that there would be no surprise factor to be exploited by the VC/NVA since Saigon is now on the defensive and the RVN/ARVN therein are well prepared. Besides, recent casualties made it necessary for the VC/NVA to get additional replacements. Other difficulties that the attackers are likely to encounter include the reserve att-
It is now taken by Catholic quarters and the growing opposition to VC proselytizing on the part of the RVNAF, especially the GVN Police. On the other hand, several factors which would favor the VC/NVA attack include (1) the FWMAF/RVNAF resistance is likely to be weaker than during the Tet period due to their past heavy casualties; (2) many gaps could still be found in their defense system; (3) the VC/NVA are now more experienced in street fighting, larger in number, better prepared and equipped with more modern weapons than in the previous attack. Furthermore, the forthcoming attack would be simultaneously launched in all three areas in a mutual support stratagem which would deprive the FWMAF/RVNAF of effective reactions.

A subsequent entry points out that according to Politburo's Resolution a Third Dry Season Offensive is now beyond the FWMAF/RVNAF's capabilities. The same entry indicates that although the requirements of the Tet Offensive have not been met, it was still considered as the greatest victory ever achieved since heavy casualties were inflicted on the FWMAF/RVNAF and a grave political setback was experienced by them. As a result, President Johnson was compelled to de-escalate and request for a meeting with NVN, then withdraw from the Presidential Election Campaign.

(U) CDEC COMMENT: *Extract Translation Will Follow Under IIR #6 027 4445 68.

A. L. Galli
IAC, USA
Dir, US ELM, CDEC
**Tổ-Tắt Nội-Dung**

- Tin Tức Về Thưởng Bình Thước Bệnh Xá Điển Bản

- Phẫu bệnh ấn do tên Phær-Ban, TT/Y sĩ điều trị bệnh tại Điển Bản quy y, Quảng-Đà kỳ cấp cho 45 tên điều trị tại bệnh xá trong thời gian từ 10-2 đến 30-3-68 :

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<td>- Mân, Cv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tâm, Cv</td>
<td>- Sơn, Cv</td>
<td>- Khỉem, Cv</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Như, Cv</td>
<td>- Ngôn, Cv</td>
<td>- Lương, Cv</td>
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**NOT-THỊNH:**
- TTTVHH - TTTTHH (3b)
- TTHQ/KQB - L. TT924 (2b)
- KST - KTB (4b)
- NKT - Cúc LK (2b)
- Nhà Đồng 1/DSCG (1b)
- TK. Quang-Ian (2b)
- TK. Quang-Mín (2b)

**TL. & TÁ (G). Trường Phòng 2/TTP:**
Thiếu Tá Giám Tộc Trung Tâm KTTLHP

**KHA-THÁC:**
Tstp. căp

**THÀI-LIỆU:**
Màu-nhò
This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 23 June 1968 and concerns a directive, published by A25 (Sub-COFVN), to set erroneous conceptions and assessments of the negotiations in Paris of the General Offensive-General Uprising Phase.

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17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 4
DOWNGRADED AT 3-YEAR INTERVALS,
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

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UNCLASSIFIED

REPLACES DA FORM 1048, 1 AUG 80,
DP Form 2520 (Rev 10-87),
AF Form 112, Jul 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 85.
(C) Following is a full translation of a captured enemy document which contains information concerning a directive on the Paris Peace Talks. This document was captured on 23 June 1968 in South Vietnam (TT518514) by B/2/12 Inf, 25th US Inf Div. The document was received at CDEC on 30 June 1968, and was summarized under CDEC Document Log Number 06-2716-68 in Bulletin No. 13,842 dated 30 June 1968, (IR Number 6 027 7041 68).

CDEC Doc Log No. 06-2716-68

-----------------FULL TRANSLATION-MODIFIED FOR STUDY-----------------

Current Affairs Committee

DIRECTIVE

A-25

To Urgently Correct Erroneous Conceptions and Assessments of the Negotiations in Paris and of the General Offensive-General Uprising Phase

1. In weak areas, a number of compatriots (including our installation) listen to Saigon and BBC radio broadcasts every day to keep abreast of the Paris conference. At first, these people expected the negotiations to bring a solution to the problems of independence and peace for Vietnam. When they saw that the conference was dragging on, they became pessimistic.

2. In some places where enemy counterattacks are fierce, some of our comrades being confused in the face of difficulties, rigors of war and death, failed to see the great victories which we have achieved throughout South Vietnam, especially in Saigon, Cholon, and Gia Dinh, and the importance of these victories.

3. In the face of the fierce war situation, because they have not yet understood the glorious role of the revolutionary combatants, a number of our cadre, fighters and personnel have attached less attention to their behavior and ethics. Their sense of organization and discipline has left much to be desired.

In order to overcome past shortcomings; to create much enthusiasm for the General Offensive and General Uprising in every locality, unit, agency; to create a revolutionary spirit; and to inspire tens of thousands of people with a sense of urgency determination, vivacity and audacity (as prescribed in the 11 May Resolution of COSVN), the Current Affairs Committee of A-25 suggests that all echelons and branches carefully review the following subjects and use them in an extensive indoctrination program:
The Paris Negotiations: First of all, it is necessary for the cadres to realize and make everybody clearly realize that the aggressors were compelled to de-escalate the war, limit the bombing on North Viet, and come to the Paris conference as defeated aggressors, who were condemned by the whole world. As for us, we came to the conference in the proud position of a victor, who has the right to be on his side and has enjoyed the sympathy and support of the whole world. This is a great political victory on our part and a heavy political defeat on the enemy's part. At the same time, it is necessary to clearly realize and make everybody clearly realize that the Paris negotiations are only part of our worldwide diplomatic offensive, aimed at isolating the U.S. aggressors to a greater extent, and at the same time, winning stronger and broader sympathy and support from the people of the world for our people's national resistance for salvation.

The General Offensive and General Uprising Phase: The reason misconceptions of the General Offensive and General Uprising phase are prevalent among our cadre and compatriots is that Resolution 6 and the 14 May Resolution have not been properly studied. The clear-sighted and correct assessments of the reasons have not been adequately imparted to the Party members and the masses. For this reason, all echelons and branches should refer to paragraph 2 of Resolution 6 (Basic Problems of the General Offensive, and General Uprising) and base their thinking on the successes of the Second Phase of the General Offensive and General Uprising in order to improve their knowledge of the requirements, objectives, characteristics, and nature of the General Offensive and General Uprising Phase, to strengthen their confidence in our ability to secure total victory through the General Offensive and General Uprising.

Echelons and branches, especially Party Chapters and Village Youth Groups, are requested to carefully study and review this directive, in order to take positive measures for carrying it out and to urgently report specific results to A-25.

5 June 1968
For the Current Affairs Committee of A-25

---END OF TRANSLATION---
**CONFIDENTIAL**

**BULLETIN No. 12.035**

**ENEMY DOCUMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log No.</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Capture Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90-68</td>
<td>(U) North VN Propaganda Films.</td>
<td>21 Apr 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(C) Items 3 and 4: Film Reel #68, entitled &quot;Heroic South Vietnam&quot;, was produced by the SVN Liberation Film Studio in 1963. The film begins with scenes of Dien Bien Phu and the surrender of the French General, De Castries. Next is a three minute sequence on talks at the United Nations and President Johnson and American military personnel coming into South Vietnam/Sig7. The American influence in South Vietnam is exploited and the film brings out the crude and discourteous manners which the Americans bring with them. This is illustrated by people smoking marijuana and visiting houses of prostitution. The scenes following are of prisoners captured by the Americans and the inhumane treatment afforded them. The film switches to a VC-controlled hamlet where women and children are seen making pungi stakes and boobytraps and helping to set them up. A tunnel and the method of entry into the tunnel are shown. Lastly, a blacksmith's shop in NVN is shown. The shop's activities as a weapons and ammunition factory are emphasized. Generally the movie follows a theme of American aggression from Dien Bien Phu to 1963, and attempts to show atrocities by the Americans. The film switches from one sequence to another with no smooth transition. The reel is accompanied by an Undated Booklet, entitled &quot;Introduction to the Film &quot;Heroic South VN&quot;, which was produced by the SVN Liberation Film Studio in 1963, depicting the American and Diem plots and crimes in attempting to partition Vietnam and change South VN into a colony and a military base. According to the booklet, the second part of the film covers the herioc revolution and...</td>
<td>1 May 68</td>
</tr>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doc Log No.</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Capture Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>CDEC</td>
<td>insubordination of the SVN people against Americans and Ngo Dinh Diem. The third part points out the turn in the SVN people’s struggle with the birth of NLF/SVN. The film containing scenes taken on-the-spot and reproductions of some FWMAF/RVNAF documents, was shown at the Moscow Film Festival and was awarded a Certificate of Commendation by the Organization Committee of this Festival.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(C) Items 5 and 6: Film Reel #70, entitled, “On the First Front Line in the Western Part of the Fatherland,” was produced by the Vietnam Newsreel and Documentary Film Studio in 1961. The film is professionally made, depicting the life of the front line soldier. The photography is excellent, although the quality of the film itself is only fair. The film begins with scenes of mountains and lakes then switches to a hamlet. The first portion mostly concerns the infiltration of a small-size unit to the region. The unit moves over mountains, through jungles, and down rivers to finally join a band of guerrillas already in the area. Scenes of a Montagnard tribe are shown and a NVN captain is shown teaching songs to children.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(D) CDEC COMMENT: (1) No Further Exploitable Information. (2) Films Forwarded to JUSPAC.</td>
<td></td>
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A. L. GALLI
LTC, USA
Dir, US XSem, CDEC

2
SELECTED SUBJECTS AVAILABLE ON 16MM MICROFILM CARTRIDGES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>FEET</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Manpower Losses &amp; Gains</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy Health &amp; Medical Problems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changes in Enemy Goals &amp; Objectives</td>
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<tr>
<td>After Action Reports</td>
<td>800</td>
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<td>Enemy Morale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy Economic Status &amp; Problems</td>
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<td>Friction Among Enemy Factions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy Leadership Problems</td>
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<td>Enemy Reduction of Casuals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effects of RD Program</td>
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<td>Effects of Friendly PSYOP on Enemy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy Claims of Casualties Inflicted</td>
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<td>Effects of Air Operations</td>
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<td>Effects of Chieu Hoi on Enemy</td>
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<td>Enemy Food Supply Programs</td>
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<td>Phu Loi Battalion</td>
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<td>Enemy Recruiting</td>
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<td>Transportation System</td>
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<td>Experiences during Infiltration</td>
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<td>VC/NVA Ammunitions</td>
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<td>VC/NVA QM and Misc Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>COSVN Rear Service Doan 83</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>A 160</td>
<td>Đăng viên chính thức</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A 161</td>
<td>Đăng viên dự bị</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABF</td>
<td>A backup leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABT</td>
<td>A backup troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACL</td>
<td>ấp chiến lược</td>
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<td>AD</td>
<td>An dưỡng</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>ấp đội</td>
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<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>A phó</td>
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<td>1. an ninh</td>
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<td>2. anh nuôi</td>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>2. AT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATK</td>
<td>An toàn Khu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATS</td>
<td>ấp tận sinh</td>
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</table>
ụ bán bia
ụ chiến đấu
ụ sử dụng
ung thòi
tình hình...
ụn nán
... tú tướng
ụy danh
ụy hiếp
... đường 13
ụy thể
ụy
 cân ...
cấp ...
chi ...
chi ... tạm thời
chính ...
dáng ...
dáng ... cơ sở
Đặc khu ... Nam Tuyên
Đặc khu ... Sài-Gòn,
Chợ-Lớn, Gia-Đình
huyện ...
huyện ... căn cứ
huyện ... Tòa Thánh
khu ...
khu ... khu 5
khu ... Miền Đông
khu ... Miền Tây

firing berm
earth breastwork; combat fortifications
gun emplacement; pillbox
to decay; rot; deteriorate
deteriorating situation
to correct; rectify; shape
to shape one's thoughts
prestige, reputation
to oppress; to exert pressure on
to exert pressure on Highway 13
prestige

Party committee
... member
... echelon
chapter ...
provisional chapter ...
field grade political officer
Party committee
Party organ
Special ... for the Southern Demarcation Zone
Sàigon-Cholon-Giadinh Special Region ...
district ...
base area district ...
(Cao daist) Holy See District ...
region ...
Region 5 ...
Eastern Nambo ...
Western Nambo ...
HISTORIC VC AND NVN DATES

1 May 1886  International Labor Day
19 May 1890  Hồ-Chí-Minh's birthday
30 Aug 1917  Thái-Nguyễn Uprising
03 Feb 1930  Formation of the Indochinese Communist Party
12 Sep 1930  Nghệ Tĩnh Uprising (in Nghệ-An and Hà-Tĩnh Provinces)
27 Sep 1940  Bác-Sơn Uprising.
23 Nov 1940  Cochinchinese Revolt.
13 Jan 1941  Bồ-Lương Uprising.
19 May 1941  Formation of the Việt-Minh Front.
22 Dec 1944  People's Army Day.
19 Aug 1945  August Revolution.
02 Sep 1945  Independence Day.
23 Sep 1945  Nam-Bồ Resistance.
06 Jan 1946  Election of the First National Assembly.
06 Mar 1946  Signing of the Preliminary Convention (Modus Vivendi).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Oct 1946</td>
<td>Formation of the United Vietnamese Women's Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Dec 1946</td>
<td>Anti-French Resistance Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jul 1947</td>
<td>Memorial Day (commemorating the WIAa and KIAs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jan 1950</td>
<td>Recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) by the Communist-bloc Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Mar 1950</td>
<td>All People's Anti-American Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Mar 1951</td>
<td>Formation of the Vietnamese Labor Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Dec 1953</td>
<td>Ratification of the Agrarian Reform Bill by the National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 May 1954</td>
<td>Điện-Biên-Phủ Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul 1954</td>
<td>Signing of the Geneva Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Oct 1954</td>
<td>Liberation of Hanoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 1955</td>
<td>Complete Withdrawal of French Expeditionary Forces from NVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 1955</td>
<td>Complete Liberation of NVN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sep 1955</td>
<td>Formation of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 May 1960</td>
<td>Election of the Second National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Dec 1960</td>
<td>Formation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFL SVN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX N

MAP SYMBOLS

Cell
Squad
Section
Platoon
Company
Battalion
Regiment
Brigade
Division
Soldier
Squad leader
Assistant Squad leader